Monday, 12 February 2007

Focus on Currencies (part 1 of 2)

What follows is part one of a focus on currencies including the US dollar index, the Yen, the Euro, the British Pound and the Canadian dollar. There is a special emphasis on the Yen.

This analysis covers five factors
  1. Technical Analysis
  2. Politics
  3. Commitment of Traders (speculation vs. hedging) of currency futures
  4. The Carry Trade
  5. Fundamentals
Let's kick off with the technicals.
Forex traders will note that charts marked with an "*" are inverse of normal trading pairs. This was done to put all the currency pairs in the same frame of reference (i.e. a weakening chart on a currency pair is bullish for the US dollar and US dollar index).

Click on any chart below for a better view.

Yen / US Dollar (Monthly) *



Euro / US Dollar (Weekly)



Canadian Dollar / US Dollar (Monthly) *



US Dollar Index (Weekly)




US Dollar Index (Monthly)



The charts show that we are at a significant inflection point on the US dollar index, the Yen, and the Euro. Let's look at additional factors to see if we can gather insights as to which way the charts may break. Following is the political perspective.

Congress Takes Aim Over Yen

The Financial Times is reporting US Congress takes aim at Tokyo over yen.
Powerful House Democrats are pressing the Bush administration to persuade Tokyo to strengthen the yen, claiming the currency's weakness is bolstering Japanese imports at the expense of US manufacturers. In a letter to Hank Paulson, US Treasury secretary, the House members alleged that Tokyo was pursuing a cheap currency to subsidize exporters and urged Mr Paulson "to press the Japanese government to reverse their weak yen policy".

The pressure from Democrats sets up a confrontation with the US Treasury secretary, who argues the yen's weakness reflects Japan's economic fundamentals rather than a deliberate policy of manipulation.

Michigan Representative Sander Levin, chairman of the House trade subcommittee, told the Financial Times: "Japan is clearly following policies to maintain a weak yen."

The yen's fall continued on Thursday, down 0.4 per cent to Y121.20 against the dollar and 0.6 per cent to Y157.90 against the euro. Japanese exports as a percentage of gross domestic product have – at 16 per cent – surpassed the levels of 1985 when Japan was forced to revalue under pressure from the US.

Takatoshi Ito, a member of the Japanese cabinet's council on fiscal and economic policy, said: "Japan has not intervened since March 2004 – not even oral intervention – so the ministry of finance is clean as market fundamentals push the yen weaker."

Tensions over the yen are set to be reflected in legislation drafted in the Senate on currency manipulation, analysts said. Representative Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said: "This is directly tied to the administration's efforts to get trade promotion authority renewed. It cannot be the case that we will let the status quo go on."
Comments on Taking Aim
  • The Democrats in Congress believe that higher prices on goods from Asia (nearly everything but food, energy, planes, and weapons) will be a good thing. It won't.
  • The Democrats also must think that higher prices on goods will bring back manufacturing jobs to the US. It won't.
  • Michigan Representative Sander Levin, chairman of the House trade subcommittee, says "Japan is clearly following policies to maintain a weak yen." Hmmm. Like we are not doing everything in our power to maintain a weak dollar? Does any country want a strong currency? The answer to that question should be obvious: Competitive currency debasement is everywhere you look.
  • Takatoshi Ito, a member of the Japanese cabinet's council on fiscal and economic policy, said: "Japan has not intervened since March 2004". That is the fact. And oddly enough the Yen did not plunge until Japan stopped intervening. That goes to show you two things: 1) A primary trend in currencies or anything else can not be defeated by manipulation, which is something gold bugs need to remember when screaming about these conspiracy theories purported by GATA , and 2) Sentiment was so universally bearish on the US dollar by the Spring of 2005 with numerous magazine covers and the shoeshine boy telling everyone that Gates and Buffett were short the dollar, that the dollar was bound to rally.
  • If Congress takes action against either China or Japan as currency manipulators I fully expect a severe market reaction, and that reaction that will generally not be welcome anywhere.
  • While cautioning against underestimating the shortsightedness of legislative bodies in general, this jawboning is more than likely nothing more than frustration by Congress and this administration that we can no longer bully the world markets into doing what we think is in our best interest (and on that we are not even right) . After all who wants higher prices across the board on all kinds of goods and services when it will not bring a single job back to the US? That is essentially what Congress is begging for.
Paulson Sides With Japan

Bloomberg is reporting Paulson, in Congress, Sides With Japan on Yen.
Henry Paulson's defense of Japan's currency policies over the last week is forcing traders to pay more attention to a U.S. Treasury secretary than they have in years.

Paulson caused fluctuations in the yen at least three times in the past week by responding to questions about whether it is undervalued, as alleged by some Democrats and European finance ministers. He sparked an hour-long slide yesterday when he told the House Ways and Means Committee that the currency is set in an open market and that Japan is still struggling with deflation.

Paulson first discussed the yen's slide against the dollar on Jan. 31. Answering a question during testimony at the Senate Banking Committee in Washington, Paulson said he's watching the yen "very, very carefully."

The testimony was only Paulson's second since Bush nominated the 60-year-old for the Treasury post in May. It took Paulson three months to even mention the dollar. When he did, he said he favors a "strong dollar," a script developed by fellow Goldman alumnus Robert Rubin, who was Treasury secretary from 1995 to 1999.

"He has a very hands-off approach to markets and doesn't seem to want to comment very much," said Sophia Drossos, a currency strategist at Morgan Stanley in New York. "He brings a high level of financial savvy. He is viewed as the Republicans' answer to Robert Rubin."

Paulson's remarks may also have had an impact because investors are growing wary about the magnitude of the yen's decline. The currency is near a 20-year low on a trade-weighted basis, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission figures on Feb. 2 showed a record 173,005 positions betting on a weaker yen.

"As soon as he mentioned that he was watching it very closely, that gave traders something to run with," said David Gilmore, a partner at Foreign Exchange Analytics in Essex, Connecticut. "It took literally a couple of days for the market to fully understand," he said.

Paulson "did an admirable job" in cogently laying out his view, Gilmore added. "The interesting thing is that he was so prepared to speak on the yen."
Comments on Paulson
  • Supposedly Paulson is watching things "very, very carefully". So what? Is the US going to sell dollars and buy Yen? Wouldn't that be fun? (especially if Japan reacted as they did before by selling Yen to buy dollars)
  • Sophia Drossos, a currency strategist at Morgan Stanley, said "He has a very hands-off approach to markets and doesn't seem to want to comment very much," and "He brings a high level of financial savvy. He is viewed as the Republicans' answer to Robert Rubin."
  • OK Sophia, if his approach is hands off, exactly why should anyone care what he is watching or for that matter saying? Why does that make him "savvy"? Is he really Robert Rubin?
  • David Gilmore, a partner at Foreign Exchange Analytics had to say: 1) "As soon as he mentioned that he was watching it very closely, that gave traders something to run with" 2)The market ran with it even though "It took literally a couple of days for the market to fully understand" and 3) Paulson "did an admirable job" in cogently laying out his view. Sheesh. I will leave this to the reader to sort out the various contradictions in those statements.
Let's now turn our focus on speculation as defined by Commitment of Traders reports (COTs).

Commitment of Traders

For those unfamiliar with this frame of reference, commercial readers and noncommercial traders have to report their open interest in futures (in this case currency futures) once a week. Those results are summarized in COT reports. A quick glance at any of the following charts will show non-commercial, commercial, and non-reportable positions.

Think of commercial traders as either producers or hedgers. In the case of something like gold or corn, the commercials will be the miners or the farmers. But they could also be jewelry makers or cornflake makers like Kellogg's. In short the commercials represent someone wanting to hedge future costs from rising or producers wanting to lock in prices that they can profitably produce at. In the case of currencies, the commercials might be importers or exporters not wanting to take on currency risk. The commercials might also be big trading houses wanting to hedge exposure to various markets for one reason or another. Commercials are thus hedgers.

Think of the non-commercials as the big hedge funds speculating one way or another (long or short) in a commodity or currency. The nonreportable positions would be a small trader speculating one way or another on currencies or commodities. Trading size determines reportability .

Using The COT Report

Investopedia offers advice on Using the COT Report.
In using the COT report, commercial positioning is less relevant than noncommercial positioning because the majority of commercial currency trading is done in the spot currency market, so any commercial futures positions are highly unlikely to give an accurate representation of real market positioning.

Noncommercial data, on the other hand, is more reliable as it captures traders' positions in a specific market.

There are three primary premises on which to base trading with the COT data:
  • Flips in market positioning may be accurate trending indicators.
  • Extreme positioning in the currency futures market has historically been accurate in identifying important market reversals.
  • Changes in open interest can be used to determine strength of trend.
The COT reports come out on Friday as of the previous Tuesday. (This delay is nonsense in the current electronic age, but it is what it is).

If you are still with me, following are a few snapshots from the most recent Currency COT reports.

Yen



The above chart shows that the non-commercials (big speculators) are short 128,526 contracts in the Yen (betting it will fall lower or that if it rises they can make more elsewhere). This is part (but likely only a small part) of the infamous carry trade (shorting the Yen, and investing elsewhere, typically US Treasuries). Each contract represents 12,500,000 Yen (as of this writing $102,804 per contract). The total amount bet on interest rate differentials between the Yen and the US dollar as of the report date is $13,212,986,904.

The article on Paulson above made this statement "The currency is near a 20-year low on a trade-weighted basis, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission figures on Feb. 2 showed a record 173,005 positions betting on a weaker yen."

The COT charts in this blog were reported on Friday February 9th, so we can see some unwinding of positions since then. Or can we? Notice I said reported on February 9th. They reflect positions as of Tuesday February 6th. Just as with stock market short interest (reported only once a month) potentially useful information is kept from the small traders while others potentially know. This is not as bad as short interest in stocks, but there is no real excuse for it. We do not know the current position of the COTs

At any rate the carry trade in the Yen will unwind at some point. It will not be to the benefit of the US dollar when it happens. For more thoughts on this idea please refer to Mr. Practical on the Yen, Carry Trade, and Credit Expansion.

One more point. An unwinding of the Yen position will be Yen supportive and dollar negative. That increases (but certainly does not negate) the likelihood that the trendline break in the Yen as shown on the first chart is a fake one.

British Pound



A quick look at what the non-commercials are doing shows a chart that is about as lopsided as it gets. There seems to be mammoth one sided speculation on the British Pound vs. the US dollar.
62,500 pounds is currently $121,950, and the big specs are long 92,728 contracts thus there is $11,308,179,600 bet on US dollar vs. British Pound currency differentials. This will get unwound at some point and in contrast to the Yen, an unwinding of these contracts should be US dollar supportive when it happens. Timing the reversal is of course the issue.

Canadian Dollar



For whatever reason, hedge funds are short 80,646 contracts on the Canadian dollar.
The unwinding of this trade would be supportive of the Canadian dollar and that similar to the Yen suggests a possibility that this is a potentially false breakdown.

Euro



Speculation on the Euro is not as massive nor is it as one sided as some of the others. However small speculators (nonreportable positions) are substantially long (relative to small spec positions), with commercials net short 65,632 contracts and the big speculators long 45,330 contracts. The unwinding of those contracts would likely be supportive of the US dollar. Each contracts represents 125,000 Euros (as of this writing $162,562 per contract or $7,368,935,460 in total on 45,330 contracts). On the surface, this might not seem like such a big deal (at least as compared to the Yen). But one must also look at the relative weighting of currencies within the US dollar index, and that is where the rubber meets the road.

Relative Weightings

What is the US Dollar Index®?
  • A widely recognized benchmark that reflects the value of the US dollar on global markets
  • A geometric average that tracks the value of the US dollar against a basket of six currencies
  • The USDX® is based upon the original US Dollar Index calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank, base year of 1973
The following pie chart tells the story.



Weightings

Yen 13.6%
British Pound 11.9%
Canadian Dollar 9.1%
Swedish Krona 4.2%
Swiss Frank 3.6%
Euro 57.6%

What the Swedish Krona is doing in the index I haven't a clue. But the key issue is that those expecting a huge rebound in the Yen to sink the US dollar index are likely barking up the wrong tree (at least from the standpoint of an unwinding of futures contracts). The Yen is only 13.6% of the index while Europe (the Euro and Pound) comprise 69.5% of the weighting, with the Euro a whopping 57.6%.

This concludes part one of Focus on Currencies. This is NOT a complete view. The carry trade in the currency markets (as opposed to the futures market) dwarfs the significance of the COT data according to some well respected economists. The message here is that it is easy (too easy) to focus on one or two aspects of a trade while missing the big picture. Tomorrow I will attempt to fill in some of the rest of the picture with a focus on the carry trade as well as a brief discussion on the fundamental factors that drive the relative valuations of currencies.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Sunday, 11 February 2007

Morgan Florida Update

Many have been asking for a Florida update from Mike Morgan at Morgan Florida. He has been quite busy with his consulting business giving tours to hedge funds but he sent me this update today. Here goes from Mike Morgan:
This past week we conducted two tours with hedge fund managers. Following is a brief recap of what is going on in the Treasure Coast. Those on our retainer service will receive a much more detailed version on Monday.





Notes:

1 – Listings fell by 15% but this is not that significant. This is a seasonal effect coming off the bounce up after the New Year. Unfortunately, we are still running 20% above new listings for November-December. More disturbing is the growing number of spec homes that builders do not list. There are a variety of names for these homes, but bottom line is they are still spec homes regardless of what they are called.

2 – Pending Sales are off about 10%. Once again this is not significant in and of itself except that pending sales are up almost 100% from Q3 of 2006. Don’t get too excited however. Q1 is Florida's peak selling season, so the numbers should be much higher than Q3, which is typically one of our slowest quarters. If I was the Wall Street Journal, I could write a headline about Pending Sales UP 100% or I could write a headline that Pending Sales Fall 50%.

3 – Actual sales are worrisome. Sales are off 37% and we are now back to Q3 numbers. This number should be spiking now but it is not. How does that correlate with the rise in Pending Sales? Easy. Many Pending Sales do not close. And we are now seeing much tighter credit requirements for mortgages.

4 – Price Drops are basically flat but four times what it was a year ago. Needless to say, we have not seen the bottom.

5 – New Listings to Sold are up 35%. This is yet another disturbing number. This means inventory continues to grow. The number would be much worse, except that people that are pulling homes off the market and renting them. The other factor is that builders have not been listing inventory.

6 – New Listings to Pendings are relatively unchanged, but still more than 3:1.

7 - Total Inventory is up 1.2%. This is not a good sign in our selling season.

As an aside, it is becoming quite clear that WCI has several projects that will fail and Corus Bank will need to rethink their 65% safety net number. Prices are dropping in towers and sales have come to a halt with the exception of a couple of Miami hotshots that still seem to be able to bring in new speculators for flips.

In addition to the inventory, price, mortgage and other issues you read about daily, another issue that will effect tower closings is multiple units. People that bought Mosaic and Colony and Hammock Bay are now stuck. How much more they can handle is a big question. Another big question is how many multiple buyers will be able to close on Bal Harbour and other towers. Reading about all of this is useless. You need to see it ground level and hear both sides – the sales offices – and the local real estate offices with resales.
Thanks Mike!
Starting sometime next week Mike Morgan will be joining the Housing Board at The Market Traders. Come check it out.

Coming shortly....
A two part blog on currencies with a special focus on the Yen and the Carry Trade but covering the British pound, Canadian dollar and the Euro as well. Stay tuned.

Addendum:

Overnight there were several news releases regarding WCI. Following are two of them.

Reuters is reporting Homebuilder WCI to explore sale of company.
WCI Communities Inc. (WCI), a U.S. homebuilder that has attracted the attention of activist investor Carl Icahn, said on Monday it retained Goldman Sachs & Co. to explore a possible sale of the company, sending shares up 5.4 percent.

The Bonita Springs, Florida-based builder of high-end Florida homes and condominiums said Goldman would also look at other possible changes to its capital structure.

WCI last month adopted a shareholder rights plan, commonly known as a "poison pill" after Icahn said he had boosted his stake in the company to 14.6 percent.
MarketWatch is reporting Builder WCI's shares rise on takeover speculation.
Florida home and tower builder retains Goldman Sachs for strategic review.

Shares of home and tower builder WCI Communities Inc. got a lift Monday after the Florida-based company said it's retained Goldman Sachs to assist in a review of the company's operations and potential sale of the company.

Chief Executive Jerry Starkey said the company expects to generate about $1 billion in free cash flow during 2007, which will allow it to pay down its debt. "We also are exploring the disposition of certain assets, which would further increase liquidity and reduce leverage," the CEO said.

"Once our [tower] receivables are collected and our debt is reduced, we believe our ability to enhance shareholder value through a variety of strategic alternatives, including additional stock repurchases and potentially the sale of our company, will be greatly improved," Starkey added.

In late January, the company said it expected to post a loss for the fourth quarter on higher-than-expected defaults, delayed tower closings and land-related charges. Underscoring the difficulty, WCI said its cancellations exceeded new orders in Florida.

WCI is scheduled to release fourth-quarter earnings on Feb. 27.

Analysts at Goldman Sachs said Monday they have temporarily suspended their investment rating and target price for shares of WCI.
First a poison pill and now this statement from WCI Chief Executive Jerry Starkey: "We also are exploring the disposition of certain assets, which would further increase liquidity and reduce leverage." How much desperation is there in the voice and actions of Starkey when he says and does that? Seems to me he is in a liquidity crisis of sorts.

Morgan WCI Update

Mike Morgan sent me this update this morning as well.
As we predicted more than a week ago, WCI has confirmed the rumors of an alignment with Goldman Sachs to seek out value. We find this nothing more than a delay in the inevitable, or a means to create some complicated new math for us to all wonder about. As if Icahn’s trades are not amusing enough, considering what we know, it appears the only mystery here is what we don’t know that we should know.

We have been spending a great deal of time at WCI properties and analyzing their land. In fact, probably three times as much time as on any other housing company. Nothing changes with the Goldman announcement, other than a PR pop.

Overall, the numbers don’t add up, no matter what math you use. 2007 is likely to get get very ugly unless a white knight with more money than brains shows up.

We are booked solid for WCI and Corus Florida tours now through the end of the month. If you would like to join one of the one person tours, I can generally arrange it. There is nothing like a field trip. You can’t do it from the numbers or the documents. We are also offering tours of Lennar, Centex, Horton, KB and Toll Brothers, but for the time being the concentration seems to be on WCI and Corus.

Regards
Mike
Notes on The Market Traders

For those that have not yet heard, I have launched a very feature rich message board. The announcement was made in Counterfeiting Money - Crime or Good Economics?. Those of you that have not yet seen it, I ask that you please click on that link and read the section starting with the bold Announcements label about 1/3 up from the bottom. The rest of this post pertains to that announcement.

Some have asked for a "flat view" on TMT and while we are working on that across topics, it is quite possible to achieve at least in regards to discussion of this blog. The key is to be in unthreaded batch mode. You must be signed in it seems to get this view, but every post pertinent to the latest blog will show up on a single click once you are in that view. Play around a bit. You should be able to get to that view. Let me know if this helps. I also disabled (for now) opening up new topics in that specific forum so that all responses have to go to one of my posts. This will collectively keep all replies together for a single blog post.

Finally I want to point out how to take advantage of the new Google RSS feeder. Those that just want to see everything sequential for the entire board have a way to do so. You can even click on a post and reply.

Read this post called RSS and the new Google Reader try it out and let me know what you think. The nice thing about this is you can be selective. If you only want Metals and Energy but not economic discussion you can easily achieve that view, in sequential timestamp sequence. You can even click on a post and reply. The only thing missing from the RSS view is the ability to see responses but you do see every subject title and if you then click on a post in RSS it will take you the responses.

These things may not solve everything that everyone wants to do but these are additional capabilities that many of you may not have been aware of.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Thursday, 8 February 2007

Counterfeiting Money - Crime or Good Economics?

Did you ever think that a counterfeiting money could be good for the economy and that the counterfeiter could be considered an economic genius or even a national hero? I received an Email from Nic Corsetti, a friend of mine, describing exactly how that might happen. Here goes from Nic:
Let’s say that I invent a printing press that allows me to produce counterfeit money (let’s say US dollars) by the trillions – these dollars look EXACTLY like real ones, so no one can tell the difference, not even the government or the bank. So I start off the first year by counterfeiting $3 trillion dollars.
  • I use $1 trillion to buy stocks (jump starting the bull market)
  • I use $1 Trillion to buy U.S. Treasury bonds (thus driving bond prices higher and interest rates lower)
  • I use $1 Trillion to go around to every neighborhood in every major city of the U.S. and start buying houses for 10% higher than the listed price
Obviously, this is a lot of work, so I hire a whole network of employees and consultants to help me achieve those lofty goals in a reasonable time period. The apparent benefits would be huge.

Benefits
  • This will create jobs, since lots of employees and consultants will be needed to spend $3 trillion.
  • The stock market indices will soar. Everyone's 401(k) and day-trading portfolios will increase in value.
  • Home prices will increase by 10% overnight.
  • Interest rates will fall which will make it even cheaper for everyone to borrow money to buy new cars, upgrade into a bigger homes, and buy new gas plasma TVs every year hoping against hope of getting to watch the CUBs someday play in the World Series.
  • The lifeblood of America, vastly underpaid Real Estate Agents, will get a much needed and well deserved infusion of cash.
  • The economy will be humming so fine that no one will care about the loss of jobs to India and China.
  • Cheap goods will continue to pour into the US and the CPI will show only a modest 2% rise in the price of goods.
Additional Printing Presses

This is such a good plan, I decide to let some of my best friends in on the action. So I pick twelve of my closest cronies and give them identical printing presses, and instruct each of them to buy stocks, bonds and real estate with their counterfeit money. I tell them to loan the money to anyone who asks. Now we are really getting somewhere.
  • The stock market will rise 30%-50% every couple years
  • By buying massive amounts of treasuries, interest rates will stay at historic lows
  • Everyone's net worth will double every few years if they just buy more real estate
  • There will be no reason to save money, because assets will just keep skyrocketing in value.
  • Wave after wave of immigration proves adequate enough to supply the homebuilding industry with enough manpower to get the job done.
  • So much money is made in the stock market that $50 billion in bonuses can be distributed.
  • Home prices start rising so fast that people start buying two or even three of them. It's a "can't lose" venture.
  • There is so much money floating around that credit standards drop and everyone who wants a home gets one.
  • So many homes are being bought that massive numbers of jobs are created in the mortgage industry, home builders, architects, real estate agents, title insurance, property insurance, home decoration, lumber, copper, cement, truck manufacturers, granite miners, brick layers, roofing, repairmen, industry analysts, home flippers, internet bloggers, internet site maintenance, newspaper ads, Wall Street specialists(to create RMBS, CDO, CDS, Index swaps), hedge fund employees (someone has to trade all these securities, and accountants and lawyers to keep track of all of the above.
  • There are additional profits to be made on Wall Street by investing in IPOs, private equity LBOs, M&A, trading, mutual funds, and hedge funds.
  • There is job growth in investment advisers, investment analysts, day-traders, media cheerleaders, SEC regulators, state regulators, New York D.A. office, and accountants and lawyers to keep track of everything.
  • Government jobs explode. State and local governments get all sorts of funding for projects of all types – big and small. This creates still more jobs.
  • Everyone needs a place to spend their money. Shopping malls, strip malls, big box stores, specialty stores, boutiques and nail salons spring up everywhere.
  • People are so busy shopping they do not have time to cook. This creates a need for more restaurants or coffee shops on every corner.
Even with all of that there is STILL NO INFLATION! Cheap imports keep prices from rising and the best part is that those foreigners keep taking this counterfeit money as if it was real money. No one can tell the difference anyway.

This goes on and on – we have really created a tremendous virtuous cycle where everything just gets better and better.

Everybody Wins

After a few years of counterfeiting I am quite certain that a "new era of goodwill and fortune" would be announced and that I, Nic Corsetti, would rightfully be hailed as the first Economic Grand Wizard to have permanently vanquished recessions.

But what’s the catch? Where’s the hole in this story? Is there a hole in this story? If counterfeiting is such a great idea, why isn't it legal? Actually it is legal.

Legal Counterfeiting
  • My name is not really Nic Corsetti, it is Alan Greenspan (Ben Bernanke if you prefer).
  • My twelve friends are the 12 member banks of the Federal Reserve
  • My employees and consultants are the financial services industry (Wall Street broker dealers, hedge funds, mutual funds, retail banks, and commercial banks)
  • Those printing presses are currently manned by me and my 12 friends
I (Ben Bernanke) hope these printing presses don't break down and that people keep accepting these counterfeit dollars or this economy might implode. This is my only fear right now.
Mish Note: Nic Corsetti is a real person. The above idea came in from Nic via email and was rewritten and reformatted by me. Still, Nic deserves full credit for the idea. Thanks Nic.

As "proof" of the ingeniousness of legal counterfeiting, Alan Greenspan has been hailed as an economic hero and knighted by the queen of england for "contribution to global economic stability". Printing presses do work (for a time) and Greenspan's timing was perfect as discussed in an Interview with Paul Kasriel.
Kasriel: Greenspan is a fascinating study. Some day I hope to write a book about him. Right now I willing to say he is the luckiest Fed chairman in history.
Mish: Greenspan is the luckiest Fed chair in history? How so?
Kasriel: He was fortunate in two very big ways. First off, he was fortunate to preside over the economy at a time when productivity was soaring and the global supply of goods was expanding rapidly because China had entered the world trading arena. In that environment the Fed could create large amounts of money and credit without causing inflation other than in asset prices.
Synthetic Money

By the way, so many others have acquired the magic printing presses that the Fed is now basically irrelevant when it comes to credit expansion and contraction. Synthetic money is now being created in massive amounts in numerous places. For example, GSEs are now running their own printing presses. Want a $500,000 mortgage? Boom, you got it. No one cares if you can pay it back either. It is foolproof as long as home prices only go up. Multiply that by the hundreds of thousands and it all adds up, and much of it done with 0% down, and most of it based on the belief that housing prices only go one way: up. The day of reckoning comes when home prices sink. A collapse is now underway, and it has hit the subprime market especially hard. Those credit problems are guaranteed to spread.

Some may object to the term "synthetic money", perhaps preferring something like creating money by "fiduciary media". The important thing is not what we label it, but rather the general idea of what is happening. And without a doubt enormous amounts of money (credit/debt) are being borrowed into existence with increasing leverage and risk.

Broker dealers (via junk bond offerings) have figured out how to create their own synthetic money backed by essentially nothing. As yields collapsed increasing leverage had to be used to generate the same returns. Such offerings have exploded along with mammoth growth in hedge funds all wanting a piece of the pie.

Some 20,000 hedge funds are now doing things with leverage because yields are too low. Various carry traders have created synthetic dollars of sorts by borrowing Yen and investing in US dollar denominated assets such as US treasuries. This has been building and building and building on itself so that no one even knows how many printing presses are actually running. The day of reckoning on carry trades will come when the Bank of Japan is forced by the market to raise rates at a rapid rate and there is a mad scramble to get out of dollars and back into Yen. Rest assured these events will be anything but orderly when they happen.

Initial sponsorship of "legal counterfeiting" came from the Fed and Central Bankers in general, but once Wall Street got a hold of the magic printing presses, things have gotten more than a little out of hand. This is what happens when you have money backed by nothing and borrowed into existence. This is also what gold lovers see when they recommend gold.

An Austrian Perspective

After reading the above some of you no doubt will be comparing this to hyperinflation and the Weimar Republic. Instead let's look at this (as best we can) from an Austrian perspective.
Money itself (however one defines it) is a claim on real savings (a placeholder for saved goods). For example, a baker makes bread, so what he actually saves is bread. The baker only transforms his savings into money (typically a monetary commodity that has a prior demand for other uses, such as gold) because that's far more convenient. The baker can not actually save bread, as it would get old.

Therefore money, as such, is a claim on real goods. Credit by contrast, is a claim on money itself, which in turn is a claim on real goods. In our present system, credit claims on money to be paid back in the future masquerade as actual money and can thus be termed "synthetic money". In addition there is a "multiplier" effect. Someone gets a loan and spends it on goods. That money is deposited and is treated as money regardless of whether or not it is backed by real goods. Via sweeps and still more lending (see Money Supply and Recessions), the same money is lent out time and time again (the multiplier effect). This is the failure of the central bank administered fiat system: monetary claims proliferate beyond actual production of goods to back them up. In a honest system, only actual savings would be transferred from savers to borrowers (with banks acting as middlemen).

This "credit inflation" is thus fundamentally different from the "Weimarian printing press inflation". The Weimar situation brings about hyperinflation as the monetary unit itself is inflated in its physical form, as banknotes. By contrast, a credit inflation that creates claims that masquerade as money is prone to deflation because the money needed to pay back the credit is in a shortage (relatively speaking) compared to the outstanding credit claims.

This does not entirely preclude an inflationary outcome. After all, the Fed could in theory decide to monetize just about anything. It could monetize defaulted bonds and loans, it could even go and buy up foreclosed houses if it is prepared to go the Weimar route in order to avert what it would deem a deflationary calamity. As we have discussed in the past, this is unlikely to happen for a variety of reasons (see An Interview with Paul Kasriel and Q&A on the Psychology of Deflation). In addition to the ideas expressed in those articles there is bureaucratic inertia to the fear of losing wealth and power. One key point in this regard is the fact that the Federal Reserve system is made up of creditors. Those creditors will not like the Weimar solution because it would debase their credit claims.

This I believe is the message Trichet, Poole, and Weber were attempting to convey in Central Bankers Cry Wolf.
Weber: European Central Bank council member Axel Weber said investors shouldn't expect central banks to bail them out in the event of an "abrupt" drop in financial markets. "If you misprice risk, don't come looking to us for liquidity assistance," Weber said in an interview in Davos, Switzerland at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. "The longer this goes on and the more risky positions are built up over time, the more luck you need."

Trichet: Current conditions in global financial markets look potentially "unstable", suggesting that investors need to prepare themselves for a significant "repricing" of some assets, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank. "We are currently seeing elements in global financial markets which are not necessarily stable," he said, pointing to the "low level of rates, spreads and risk premiums" as factors that could trigger a repricing.

Poole: "The Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital".
The most important facet of all of this is that monetary claims very likely exceed the pool of real funding by several orders of magnitude. When push comes to shove, this house of cards will eventually collapse in some way.

It is important to recognize that what is happening right now with stock buybacks, leveraged buyouts, and various carry trades for what it is: one giant Ponzi scheme. This will end the way all Ponzi schemes end: when the willingness or ability of consumers or or businesses to take on more debt stops and/or when the willingness to further speculate stops. When either of those happens there will be a mad rush for the exits and no more buyers for "overpriced tulips" will be found. Be prepared.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, 7 February 2007

Inflation Is Now Illegal

As stunning as the "Inflation Is Now Illegal" headline might seem, a new law was indeed just passed that officially makes inflation illegal.

The New York Times is reporting As Inflation Soars, Zimbabwe Economy Plunges.
Hyperinflation has bankrupted the government, left 8 in 10 citizens destitute and decimated the country’s factories and farms. Pay increases have so utterly failed to keep pace with price increases that some Harare workers now complain that bus fare to and from work consumes their entire salaries.

Citing a leaked central bank document, Reuters reported Tuesday that prices of basic items like meat, cooking oil and clothes had risen 223 percent in the past week alone. Soaring costs have made it impossible for both national and local governments to meet budgets and for businesses to afford raw materials, while subsidies for basic commodities have drained the government treasury and promoted corruption.

Seeking to revive farm production, for example, the government sells gasoline to farmers at a bargain rate of 330 Zimbabwe dollars per liter — and farmers promptly resell it on the black market for 10 times that, leaving their fields idle.

The central bank’s latest response to these problems, announced this week, was to declare inflation illegal. From March 1 to June 30, anyone who raises prices or wages will be arrested and punished.

Efforts to suppress dissent are rising: in recent weeks, trade union officials were seriously injured in police beatings, arsonists burned the home of a leading pro-democracy activist and church leaders were arrested while meeting to discuss the economic crisis. Foreign journalists remain barred from the country under threat of imprisonment, and harassment of Zimbabwean journalists has sharply increased.

The black market, which already flourishes beyond the reach of tax collectors and regulators, is likely to grab an even larger share of the economy when the government freezes prices in March, because stores will be unable to make a profit selling products at government-fixed prices.
That folks is hyperinflation. It is not to be confused with a chart of copper that looks like this.

Copper



Nor should hyperinflation be confused with an oil chart that looks like this.

Crude



The important thing to remember about the above chart of crude prices is that it reflects not only the impacts of inflation (an increase in money supply and credit) but also peak oil and geopolitical factors.

Lumber



Seriously folks, does that look like hyperinflation? Yet week in and week out I see comparisons between what is happening in the US to the Wiemar Republic, Argentina, and even Zimbabwe.

OK Mish what about corn?

Corn




Obviously there is a recent bad data print on the downside but otherwise that chart reflects what is happening. Corn has more or less drifted between $3.00 on the top end and just under $2.00 on the bottom end for years on end. Clearly we do not see hyperinflation in corn. But what do we see? We see the results, not of hyperinflation or even inflation. We see the effects of stupid government policies promoting corn based ethanol even when Brazil and other suppliers are willing to provide the US with sugar based ethanol at better prices.

It is important not to confuse stupidity with inflation. It is important not to confuse peak oil with inflation. It is also important not to confuse drought with inflation.

On the other hand it is extremely important to recognize that productivity gains mask inflation. Productivity gains, led by an internet revolution, in conjunction with falling commodity prices let the Greenspan Fed run rampant with what is true inflation (an increase in money supply and credit).

I will have a post on "magic printing presses" tomorrow to discuss these ideas in more detail. I will also have two significant announcements to make as well. I hope everyone tunes in to those announcements. I ask in advance that you read them.

Thanks
Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Monday, 5 February 2007

Delinquency Footnote # 12

I have seen a lot of articles over the past few months about rising delinquencies.

This article from December 2006 is typical: Families Feel the Pressure as Mortgage Delinquency Rates Rise.
America’s middle class is already burdened by a trifecta of economic pressures: the labor market is slowing, household debt burdens are reaching new record highs, and interest rates have been creeping higher for most of this year. Now comes a distressing new report from the Mortgage Bankers Association, which reported yesterday that delinquencies on mortgages rose sharply in the third quarter of 2006.

Delinquency and default rates on loans and personal bankruptcy rates are still at comparatively low levels—only 4.7 percent of all loans in the third quarter—but they have been rising rapidly over the course of this year. Other measures of financial distress are also pointing one way for American families—up. With all pieces of the trifecta staying in place, rising delinquency rates on mortgages may be the beginning of a trend toward more middle class financial insecurity.

The data on bankruptcy rates also show a worrisome trend over the course of 2006. Bankruptcy rates dropped precipitously in 2006 in the wake of large filings in 2005 just before the new bankruptcy law went into effect. However, from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter, the annualized personal bankruptcy rate, measured as bankruptcy cases relative to the U.S. population, grew from 1.2 in 1,000 to 2.0 in 1,000—an increase of 33.7 percent. The bankruptcy rate in the third quarter stood at 2.2 in 1,000, an additional increase of 9.6 percent in that quarter alone.

Middle class families are caught between low income growth, a high debt burden, and rising interest rates—and for the moment, these ingredients are here to stay. The most recent third quarter delinquency, default, and bankruptcy figures show that the dangers to middle class economic security are not theoretical concepts. They are a harsh reality for a growing share of middle class families.
I am having a hard time finding 4th quarter stats but I do see that Mortgage delinquencies jump Foreclosures inch higher in 3Q.
U.S. homeowners had a harder time keeping up with their mortgage payments in the third quarter, the Mortgage Bankers Association said Wednesday, with the delinquency rate rising to 4.67% from 4.39% in the second quarter. A year ago, 4.44% of mortgage holders were 90 days or more past due on their loans.

The foreclosure rate inched higher in the third quarter, with 1.05% of mortgages in the foreclosure process vs. 0.99% in the second quarter, the MBA said. While delinquency rates on all types of loans rose in the third quarter, it was the subprime category -- loans made to less creditworthy borrowers, that shot up the most to 12.56% from 10.76% a year ago.

"As we expected, in the third quarter delinquency rates increased across the board. However, increases were noticeably larger for subprime loans, particularly for subprime ARMs," said Doug Duncan, chief economist for the MBA. "This is not surprising given that subprime borrowers are more likely to be susceptible to the cumulative increases in rates we've experienced and the slowing of home-price appreciation that has resulted," Duncan said.
Freddie Mac Delinquencies

While doing some research on delinquencies I just happened to be stumble across a recent release from Freddie Mac on delinquencies.

Following is a chart from the above link, and it shows that delinquencies at Freddie Mac are falling dramatically.



That is pretty stunning. Freddie Mac says delinquencies are dropping but everything else I can find shows delinquencies are rising dramatically. OK Mish, what gives?

Footnote # 12

Single-family delinquencies are based on the number of mortgages 90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure while multifamily delinquencies are based on net carrying value of mortgages 60 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure. Includes delinquencies on mortgage loans where the lender or third party retains the largest portion of the default risk as well as Structured Securities backed by alternative collateral deals. Excludes mortgage loans whose original contractual terms have been modified under an agreement with the borrower as long as the borrower complies with the modified contractual terms. Previously reported delinquency data is subject to change to reflect currently available information. For example, delinquency data reported for some Structured Securities may be omitted or subsequently revised by servicers of the underlying loans, which may require revision to previously reported numbers. For periods presented in this report, revisions to previously reported delinquency rates have not been significant nor have they significantly affected the overall trend of our Single-Family "Credit Enhanced" and "All Loans" delinquency rates. Delinquencies on mortgage loans underlying alternative collateral deals may be categorized as delinquent on a different schedule than other mortgage loans due to variances in industry practice.
Essentially Footnote # 12 says that if Freddie Mac renegotiates the terms of the loan with someone who is delinquent then "voilla" that person is no longer delinquent. It seems to me that since about June of 2006 Freddie Mac is struggling to keep this ponzi scheme afloat.

Fannie Mae has its own guidance on delinquencies.
First and foremost, Fannie Mae tries to avoid foreclosure. There are no winners when a home mortgage is foreclosed. It is the least desirable way to resolve a problem loan, and a terrible ordeal for the homeowner. It also is costly for Fannie Mae, as the investor, and for the loan servicer.

Homeowners who are having difficulties making their mortgage payments should immediately contact their mortgage loan servicer (the company to which they send their monthly payments) to discuss options.

Fannie Mae has instructed its lenders and servicers to avoid foreclosure whenever possible by offering borrowers who get behind in their mortgage payments various alternatives, including temporary forbearance, loan modification and preforeclosure sales.
Mish translation: Keep this stuff off the books as long as you can. Cross your fingers and toes with David Lereah and hope the bottom is in.

Foreclosures

A more recent article from January 30, 2007 entitled U.S. banks move earlier to curb foreclosures shows just what is being done to hide the problem.
As the number of borrowers falling behind on their mortgage payments climbs to the highest level in five years, the mortgage industry is trying new strategies to help bail them out. Much of the attention is on homeowners who in recent years took out adjustable-rate mortgages, a popular way to finance a home when interest rates were low. Now, with rates having moved up, many of these borrowers have recently seen, or soon will see, their mortgage rates adjust higher for the first time.
To head off problems, mortgage companies are reaching out to borrowers earlier. Bank of America Corp. is allowing some borrowers with ARMs to refinance into a different loan at no cost. Citigroup Inc.'s CitiMortgage unit is focusing extra attention on parts of California, Florida and New York where home prices have moved up sharply. It is also contacting delinquent borrowers within days after a missed payment, if it doesn't fit their normal bill-paying habits.

For some borrowers, efforts to work out bad loans can be complicated by the fact that many mortgages no longer are held by the banks that made the loans. Instead, roughly two-thirds of mortgages are packaged into mortgage-backed securities and sold to investors. How much leeway a borrower is given can vary, depending in part on the rules spelled out at the time the securities are created. Some agreements, for instance, don't permit loan modifications or limit the circumstances under which a loan can be modified. Others put a cap on how many loans can be restructured.

The increase in bad loans is broad-based, with delinquencies rising in the past year in roughly 80 percent of the 250 local areas analyzed by Moody's Economy.com. Some of the biggest increases have come in California, where high prices have made it hard to afford a home, and in other once-hot markets such as Las Vegas and Port St. Lucie, Fla. Among the handful of major metropolitan areas where delinquencies have fallen: Salt Lake City, San Antonio and Albuquerque, N.M.

The rise in delinquencies is unusual because it comes at a time when the economy is relatively strong. Even though job growth remains healthy, "the total mortgage delinquency rate is the highest that it's been since the depths of the (2001) recession," says Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com. He attributes the increase in part to the weaker housing market and the widespread use of adjustable-rate mortgages, many of which now are resetting at higher rates.
Who is Bailing?

I guess you gotta love it. Delinquencies are soaring but Freddie Mac shows they have been reduced on all loans year over an 11 month period by 24.6%. Foreclosures are soaring but new strategies are invoked to "bail them out". Hmm who is "them"? I suggest "them" is the lenders hoping with fingers and toes crossed that the bottom is in.

In case you missed it, here are the two key sentences from the above article:

For some borrowers, efforts to work out bad loans can be complicated by the fact that many mortgages no longer are held by the banks that made the loans. Instead, roughly two-thirds of mortgages are packaged into mortgage-backed securities and sold to investors.

There are numerous ponzi finance schemes ready to implode. It will be spectacular to watch once it starts unfolding. The longer this progresses the worse it will get.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Friday, 2 February 2007

January 2007 Jobs - the Good, Bad, and Ugly

On Friday, February 2, 2007 the BLS released the Employment Report for January 2007.
Nonfarm payroll employment rose by 111,000 in January, and the unemployment rate was essentially unchanged at 4.6 percent, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor reported today. Job growth continued in several service-providing industries over the month, and construction employment also rose. The number of manufacturing jobs continued to decline. The number of unemployed persons (7.0 million) and the unemployment rate (4.6 percent) were about
unchanged in January.
The expectation was for 150,000 to 170,000 jobs. The number came in at at 111,000. So was the raw number a bad showing? To help answer that question let's take a look at birth/death adjustments.

Job Birth Death Assumptions



January and July are typically the revision months for the BLS. Given that many (myself included) harp about all the positive assumptions, this month we see a negative adjustment of 175,000 jobs. In spite of that significant downward adjustment, jobs still came in at +111,000. All in all that is a respectable showing. But what does it say about September through December? Hmm. The Birth/Death assumptions for those months were +221,000. In effect the BLS assumed 221,000 jobs were created in those four months but now it is saying that 79.2% of those jobs were fictional. But rather than telling us what months they were wrong about, we are left guessing.

The BLS website has this to say about Birth/Death assumptions
  • The net birth/death model component figures are unique to each month and exhibit a seasonal pattern that can result in negative adjustments in some months. These models do not attempt to correct for any other potential error sources in the CES estimates such as sampling error or design limitations.
  • Note that the the net birth/death figures are not seasonally adjusted, and are applied to non-seasonally adjusted monthly employment links to determine the final estimate.
  • The most significant potential drawback to this or any model-based approach is that time series modeling assumes a predictable continuation of historical patterns and relationships and therefore is likely to have some difficulty producing reliable estimates at economic turning points or during periods when there are sudden changes in trend.
Given the BLS does not disclose what they are actually basing their assumptions on, what their methodology is, or what months they admit their assumptions were wrong, it is tough to draw real conclusions based on these revisions. We do know they will be wrong at the turn, that sampling errors may be significant, and the whole game of adding jobs Feb-June, and August-December then attempting to correct those mistakes in January and July makes it tough to do much other than look at overall trends. The overall trend was towards weakening numbers throughout 2006. Let's turn to the establishment data for additional clues.

Establishment Data



Although the raw number of 111,000 was respectable given the massive downward adjustment, a closer look at the establishment data raises additional questions and comments.

For starters note that 14,000 of the 111,000 jobs created were government jobs. That is a fairly robust 12.6%, and not a good sign of anything but waste. Note also that manufacturing and durable goods both shed a lot of jobs. This is not actually a sign of a healthy economy. Most suspicious, however, is the 22,000 construction jobs that were created in the midst of a huge housing slump. Remember that those numbers are seasonally adjusted. So what happens to normal seasonal adjustments when weather was unseasonably warm? Hopefully the answer is obvious.

Thus we have the odd anomaly of a weak 111,000 overall number being stronger than it looks but the makeup of that 111,000 being weaker than it looks. Sheeesh.

Are we done yet? Unfortunately not. The BLS issued this notice in the January report.

Establishment and Household Data Changes
The establishment survey data in this release have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. See the note beginning on page 5 for more information on the revisions. In addition, household survey data for January 2007 reflect updated population controls. See the note on page 6 for more information. ....

Revisions to Establishment Survey Data

In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data have been revised to reflect comprehensive universe counts of payroll jobs, or benchmarks. These counts are derived principally from unemployment insurance tax records for March 2006. As a result of the benchmark process, all not seasonally adjusted data series were subject to revision from April 2005 forward, the time period since the last benchmark was established. In addition, with this release, the seasonally adjusted establishment survey data from January 2002 forward were subject to revision due to the introduction of updated seasonal adjustment factors. Table B presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis for January through December 2006.

The revised data for April 2006 forward incorporate the effect of applying the rate of change measured by the sample to the new benchmark level, as well as updated net business birth/ death model adjustments and new seasonal adjustment factors. The November and December 2006 revisions also reflect the routine incorporation of additional sample receipts into the November final and December second preliminary estimates.

The total nonfarm employment level for March 2006 was revised upward by 752,000 (754,000 on a seasonally adjusted basis). The previously published level for December 2006 was revised upward by 981,000 (933,00 on a seasonally adjusted basis).

As you can see from the above table there was a massive revision based on a methodology change. Did those jobs really occur? In the months stated? Or in 2005 or 2004? If those jobs were indeed created in the stated months, then 2006 was a bit stronger than generally reported.

The Ugly

When it comes to jobs data we are seeing revision after revision and some of the revisions and adjustments can not even be added together because they are not compatible. For example the birth/death figures are not seasonally adjusted, but everything else is, and in some sort of magic those unadjusted numbers are applied to seasonally adjusted monthly employment numbers to determine the final estimate. If that was not enough in and of itself, we have new seasonally adjusted methodology changes, new birth/death model adjustments, and to top it all off there are post-benchmark revisions. Does anyone have any confidence in this?

"The February 2007 issue of Employment and Earnings will contain an article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions."

I can hardly wait. In the meantime, let's call this report what it really is: ugly.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Thursday, 1 February 2007

Central Bankers Cry Wolf

This post will take a look at the Brave New World of Derivatives, what the Fed is saying about that world, and what the world believes the Fed (and central bankers) can really do. Let's start off with a look at the GSEs.

Sallie Mae

Bloomberg reported Sallie Mae 4th-Qtr Net Falls on Derivatives Losses.
SLM Corp., the nation's largest provider of college-student loans, said fourth-quarter profit tumbled 96 percent because of a decline in the value of financial contracts it uses to protect against swings in interest rates.

Net income fell to $18.1 million, or 2 cents a share, from $431 million, or 96 cents, a year earlier, the Reston, Virginia- based company said today in a statement. Earnings excluding the derivatives rose 15 percent, less than analysts expected. Sallie Mae had a loss of $244.5 million related to derivatives and hedges, compared with a gain of $70.2 million in the prior year.
GSEs Where do we stand?

On January 17th 2007, William Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gave a speech on the topic GSEs: Where Do We Stand?
Not long after coming to the St. Louis Fed in 1998, I became interested in Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs. My interest arose when I began digging into aggregate data on the financial markets and discovered how large these firms are. The bulk of all GSE assets are in the housing GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks. Using information as of Sept. 30, 2006—the latest available as of this writing—these 14 firms have total assets of $2.67 trillion; given their thin capital positions, their total liabilities are only a little smaller. Just two firms—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—account for $1.65 trillion of the assets, or 62 percent of all housing GSE assets. Moreover, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have guaranteed mortgage-backed securities outstanding of $2.82 trillion. Thus, the housing GSE liabilities on their balance sheets and guaranteed obligations off their balance sheets are about $4.47 trillion, which may be compared with U.S. government debt in the hands of the public of $4.83 trillion.

My initial curiosity about the GSEs was stoked simply by the size of these firms. As I investigated further, I became concerned about their thin capital positions and the realization that if any of them got into financial trouble the markets and the federal government would look to the Federal Reserve to deal with the problem. .....

I continue to believe that the nation would be well-served by turning the GSEs into genuinely private firms, without government backing implied or explicit. If they bolster their capital, they can function perfectly well as purely private firms. .....

Financial firms throughout the economy ought to have an intense interest in reforming the GSEs. One reason is simply that banks and other financial firms, and many nonfinancial firms, hold large amounts of GSE obligations and GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. I believe that many risk managers simply accept that GSEs are effectively backstopped by the Federal Reserve and the federal government without ever thinking through how such implicit guarantees would actually work in a crisis. The view seems to be that someone, somehow, would do what is necessary in a crisis. Good risk management requires that the “someone” be identified and the “somehow” be specified. I have emphasized before that if you are thinking about the Federal Reserve as the “someone,” you should understand that the Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital. As for the “somehow,” I urge you to be sure you understand the extent of the president’s powers to provide emergency aid, the likely speed of congressional action and the possibility that political disputes would slow resolution of the situation.

At present, there is no process and no one knows what would happen if a GSE is unable to meet its obligations. ......

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae both got into trouble with accounting irregularities in part because of the complexities under GAAP rules of accounting for derivatives positions and rules determining which assets should be reported at market and which should be reported at amortized historical cost. Sound risk management practices require that GSE managements base decisions on market values, or estimates as close to market as financial theory and practice permit. The reason is simple: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursue policies that inherently expose the firms to an extreme asset/liability duration mismatch. They hold long-term mortgages and mortgage-backed securities financed by short-term liabilities. Given this strategy, they must engage in extensive operations in derivatives markets to create synthetically a duration match on the two sides of the balance sheet. These operations expose the firm to a huge amount of risk unless the positions are measured at market value. ....

Since the GSE accounting scandals emerged in mid-2003, one thing has remained rock-solid: The GSEs have continued to borrow at yields only slightly higher than those of the U.S. government, and noticeably lower than those available to any other AAA-rated private company or entity. In other words, despite the vast recent accumulation of knowledge about the significant risks run by the GSEs, as well as their inability (or unwillingness) to manage these risks, investors in GSE debt securities appear unmoved. Upon reflection, the lack of market discipline evident during this crisis period is striking—like a dog that did not bark. This fact indicates to me that there still is a significant problem with the GSEs that needs to be fixed.

The obvious answer to why the dog did not bark is that the so-called “implicit guarantee”—that is, the belief by investors that the U.S. government would not allow the GSEs to default on their debt obligations—has not been removed. .....

I began this speech noting that the Federal Reserve has a responsibility to maintain financial stability. That responsibility includes increasing awareness of threats to stability and formation of recommendations for structural reform. I do not believe that a GSE crisis is imminent. However, for those who believe that a GSE crisis is unthinkable in the future, I suggest a course in economic history.
Key GSE Points
  • Size and leverage of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is enormous.
  • The Fed does not want to be responsible for a blowup at either company.
  • Both pursue policies that inherently expose the firms to an extreme asset/liability duration mismatch.
  • Both hold long-term mortgages and mortgage-backed securities financed by short-term liabilities forcing them to synthetically create a duration match via massive amounts of derivatives.
  • The stocks act as if there is implicit government guarantees. There are no such guarantees.
  • The lack of market discipline is striking.
  • The Fed can provide liquidity not capital.
  • A crisis is not unthinkable. Those that think so need a course in economic history.
Liquidity Support

Let's review one key sentence: "The Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital". For all this talk of "helicopter drops", Poole seems to be calling Bernanke's Bluff. I have pointed out many times before that the Fed has no authority to do "a drop" and probably would not even if they could. No doubt they would act to slash interest rates in a crisis, but depending on the exact nature of Fannie Mae's hedges, it is conceivable that the opposite play might be needed. Is this what has the Fed spooked over Fannie Mae?

Federal Reserve Emergency Powers

In the Panel on Government Sponsored Enterprises, Poole spoke on the Emergency Powers of the Fed.
I am acutely aware that should there be a market crisis, the Federal Reserve will have the responsibility to manage the problem. Just as many market participants apparently believe that GSE obligations have the implicit backing of the federal government, they may also believe that the Federal Reserve has all the powers necessary to manage a crisis. The Fed’s successful efforts to handle the stock market crash in 1987, the near-insolvency of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the financial effects of the 9/11 tragedy all justifiably increase market confidence in the Federal Reserve. In the interest of a full understanding of the Federal Reserve’s powers in the event of a crisis in the market for GSE obligations, I’ll outline the Fed’s powers as provided by the Federal Reserve Act.
....
The Federal Reserve has ample power to deal with a liquidity problem, by making collateralized loans as authorized by the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed does not have power to deal with a solvency problem. Should a solvency problem arise with any of the GSEs, the solution will have to be found elsewhere than through the Federal Reserve.
Because of all the past Fed interventions no one believes the Fed. Is this the case of the boy who cried wolf one time too many? Is the Fed finally issuing a legitimate warning that no one believes? Let's go across the Atlantic and check out things in Europe.

A Warning from Trichet

The Financial Times is writing Trichet warns Prepare for asset repricing.
Current conditions in global financial markets look potentially "unstable", suggesting that investors need to prepare themselves for a significant "repricing" of some assets, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, warned at the weekend in Davos.

The recent explosion of structured financial products and derivatives had made it more difficult for regulators and investors to judge the current risks in the financial system, Mr Trichet said.

"We are currently seeing elements in global financial markets which are not necessarily stable," he said, pointing to the "low level of rates, spreads and risk premiums" as factors that could trigger a repricing.
Did anyone care about Trichet's warning? I think not. The following news link says it all: Davos Elite Brushes Off Trichet.
Bankers, investors, and executives last week arrived at the Swiss resort of Davos giddy about record profits and bonuses. After five days of hectoring by policy makers that they are too complacent, they left just as happy.

"The mood has been totally upbeat," Sunil Mittal, the billionaire chairman of Bharti Airtel Ltd., India's largest mobile-phone operator, said of the 37th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. "I've never seen a mood like this."

Warnings by central bankers such as Jean-Claude Trichet were batted away by dealmakers like Michael Klein, co-president of Citigroup Inc.'s investment banking unit, and David Rubenstein, managing director at the Carlyle Group Inc. buyout firm. They were confident in their ability to cope with the inevitable slowdown of the world's strongest economic growth in three decades.

"The consensus here in Davos is everybody's thinking it'll be another booming year," Morgan Stanley Chief Global Economist Stephen Roach said.
On January 26th Bloomberg reported ECB's Weber Says Markets Shouldn't Expect Central Bank Bailouts.
European Central Bank council member Axel Weber said investors shouldn't expect central banks to bail them out in the event of an "abrupt" drop in financial markets.

"If you misprice risk, don't come looking to us for liquidity assistance," Weber said in an interview in Davos, Switzerland at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. "The longer this goes on and the more risky positions are built up over time, the more luck you need."

"It is time for financial market to move back to more adequate risk pricing and maybe forego a deal even if it looks tempting," said Weber. There's a danger of a "rush to the exit" if investors wait too long, he said.

The catalyst may come in Japan, as the central bank there raises benchmark borrowing costs from the current 0.25 percent, he said.
Are Central Bankers Crying Wolf?

Is this case of the Fed that cried Wolf one time too many? Oddly enough I do not believe Trichet, or Weber, or Poole either. Like everyone else I think the Fed will be there and willing to lend a hand to attempt to bail out the speculators. But unlike everyone else, I think that credit expansion and risk taking have reached such astronomical proportions that when it all implodes the central bankers will be powerless to stop it.

As for the catalyst.... There seems to be too much consensus on the catalyst. "The catalyst may come in Japan, as the central bank there raises benchmark borrowing costs from the current 0.25 percent" Weber said.

As outlined in Mr. Practical on the Yen, Carry Trade, and Credit Expansion I suspect the trigger will either exhaustion or somewhere the eyes are not currently focused.
I am not sure what will pop this global credit bubble, but I suspect it will not be higher US interest rates or a rising Yen. More that likely it will be either pure exhaustion, something totally off everyone's radar, or simply the reverse of some scenario that everyone expects.
In 1980 it took $1 of new debt to create $1 of GDP; in 2000 it took $4 and today it takes $7. All of that extra credit is serving no productive means. It is pure speculation and it will be unwound. Nonetheless the sheep are still grazing.

There is a lot of unjustified faith in this Fed for what little power they have relative to where things stand in the current credit expansion cycle. Whether or not the central bankers are purposely crying wolf is now irrelevant.

This post originally appeared in Whiskey&Gunpowder.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/