Saturday, 28 July 2007

Rate Hike Odds Plunge - Gold Should Benefit

Bloomberg is reporting BOJ Less Likely to Raise Rates as Stocks, Prices Fall.
The Bank of Japan is less likely to raise interest rates in August after global stocks slumped and the nation's consumer prices fell for a fifth month.

Investors see a 48 percent likelihood of a rate increase next month, down from 66 percent yesterday, according to Credit Suisse Group calculations based on the exchange of interest payments. Consumer prices excluding fresh food fell 0.1 percent in June from a year earlier, the government said in Tokyo today.

Japan's retail sales unexpectedly fell 0.4 percent in June, the Trade Ministry said today, as higher taxes, lower wages and a furor over lost pension records weighed on consumer sentiment.

Weak Data

"Given today's weak CPI and retail data as well as the stock decline in the U.S., there are more factors mounting against an August rate increase," said Hiromichi Shirakawa, chief economist at Credit Suisse Group in Tokyo. Shirakawa, a former central bank official, said he put the chances of an August rate increase at "less than 50 percent."

Consumer prices in Japan have failed to rise this year, after posting gains in eight months of last year. Those increases led to speculation that the economy was emerging from more than seven years of deflation that discouraged investment and consumer spending.

Nationwide core prices may fall as much as 0.2 percent in August and September because crude oil costs were near records in those months in 2006, said Takehiro Sato, chief Japan economist at Morgan Stanley in Tokyo.

Competition among mobile-phone operators is also exerting downward pressure on prices. KDDI Corp., Japan's second-biggest mobile-phone carrier, said last week that it will cut monthly fees by half, matching a move by larger rival NTT DoCoMo Inc.
Insane Worry Over Falling Prices

Japan is still worried about falling prices. Imagine that. The idea of course is absurd. Falling prices are actually the natural state of affairs as productivity is constantly improving due to advancements in technology. This allows more goods to be produced with decreasing effort (a price deflationary effect).

It is absurd to be worried about falling prices. Falling prices should be embraced. But worries over deflation in Japan caused Japan to go from surplus to having a national debt in excess of 150% of GDP (250% by some measures I have seen) as Japan fought deflation. What did Japan get for its deflation fighting policies? The answer is bridges to nowhere and massive amounts of debt.

What did the Fed get from fighting an imaginary deflation threat in 2001? The answer of course is the worlds biggest housing bubble, massive debt, tapped out consumers, and a real deflation threat. Of course deflation is not really a threat per se. Deflation is only perceived as a threat because of the insane bubble blowing policies and the risk of crash because of those policies. Deflation is needed to wipe out the many malinvestments of insane fiscal and monetary policy over the last 20 years.

In Inflation: What the heck is it? there is a quote from Ludwig von Mises who describes the endgame brought on by reckless expansion of credit: "There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit (debt) expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit (debt) expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved."

Thus the real threat is a policy of theft by inflation that steals from the poor and the middle class. Bernanke of course wants that policy of theft for the benefit of those having first access to money (banks and brokerage houses).

Rate Cut Odds Soar

Nonetheless the odds now favor rate cuts as the WSJ headline Futures Markets Bet Fed Will Cut Rates This Year shows.


Amid stocks battered by credit concerns and disappointing durable-goods and new-home data the futures markets now are betting that the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates this year.

Trading in December fed funds contracts translates into the market giving 100% certainty that the Fed will cut rates to 5% by the Dec. 11 Fed meeting from the current 5.25% rate.

That is up from about a 44% chance at Wednesday’s close. The market is pricing in roughly 50% odds that the FOMC could cut the rate as early as the September or October meetings.


Cleveland Fed Charts

The Fed charts do not go out to December but here is the September chart.



Notice how quickly the odds of FF rate holding at 5.25% have plunged with this market selloff. The odds of a 50 basis point cut have climbed to 20% by September. I doubt that but the odds that the next move is down regardless of what it may or may not do to the dollar are increasingly likely.

There has been a bit of a selloff in gold lately and part of that might be attributed to a yield curve that is inverting once again. Part of it can be contributed to a decrease in liquidity everywhere and raising of cash in conjunction with unwinding of leverage.

But this Fed like all others before it will respond the way they always do: by slashing rates and attempting to blow an even bigger bubble. But this is the end of the line. There is no bigger bubble than housing that will create enough jobs to allow a bigger bubble to be blown. The housing bubble was the "bubble of last resort". It cannot be revived by lowering interest rates.

But the Fed will try. The yield curve will steepen, and gold will take off on its next run higher. In the meantime, volatility in gold associated with the unwinding of leverage and various carry trades can be expected.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Friday, 27 July 2007

Vital Lesson From Blackstone

Before we get to the lesson, let' take a look at commercial REITs. (This will all tie together nicely I assure you). Please consider the following "TA Tips". Watch these three short videos (in order) for a good laugh: (Thanks to Ilya)

REITs discussion with Beejal Patel 2007-04-18
REITS continue to be high flyers...the sector is considered over-valued by many, but Beejal tells us why the technicals show why REITS will likely keep rising.

REITs discussion with Beejal Patel 2007-05-30
Buyouts in the REIT Sector bring back the bullish momentum...A look at the technicals behind the exchange traded fund that tracks the REITS.

REITs discussion with Beejal Patel 2007-04-17
Could the Commercial Reits Sector be ready for another leg up? Beejal takes a closer look at whether the long term bull market could continue.

It seems like it's strike three on commercial REITs. Now, for some charts.

Click on any chart for a sharper image.

2007-07-26 IYR Daily



IYR 2007-07-26 Weekly



Flashback November 20, 2006

Blackstone Acquiring Trust in Richest Buyout
The Blackstone Group, a private investment firm, said yesterday that it had agreed to acquire Equity Office Properties Trust, the nation’s largest office-building owner and manager, for about $36 billion.

The deal marks the largest leveraged buyout in history, eclipsing the $33 billion paid earlier this year for H.C.A., the hospital chain, and it illustrates how private equity firms continue to gobble up corporate America. Under the transaction, Equity Office will go from being a publicly held company to a private one. Blackstone will pay $20 billion and assume $16 billion in debt.

Equity Office, with some 590 buildings and over 105 million square feet of office space in major metropolitan markets, was created in 1976 by Sam Zell, a real estate tycoon who built the business through dozens of acquisitions that were worth, in aggregate, more than $17 billion. Last year, Equity Office acquired the Verizon Building on Sixth Avenue in Manhattan for $515 million.

Matthew L. Ostrower, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, called the proposed deal “a ground-breaking transaction for the real estate world in general and an earthquake for the REIT industry.”

Private equity firms are vying to hold the crown of having led the biggest buyout in history, and, with this deal, Blackstone will be able to do so at least for now. Blackstone will move ahead of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, which led the H.C.A. sale. Kohlberg Kravis also held the prior record with its 1989 takeover of RJR Nabisco, a deal that came to define an era when it was chronicled in the book “Barbarians at the Gate.”

The transaction comes amid a private equity frenzy for the next big leveraged buyout.
Matthew L. Ostrower, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, called the proposed deal “a ground-breaking transaction for the real estate world in general and an earthquake for the REIT industry.”

Oh it was "groundbreaking" alright. Groundbreaking in LBO stupidity, right up there in silliness with the AOL "take under" of Time Warner. Someone at Time Warner clearly lost their mind to approve that deal. And the Blackstone IPO itself sure was an "earthquake" given that it just might have been the deal that finally choked the IPO market.

On that note the Mish telepathic question lines are now open. Questions are now pouring in.

Q: What did Blackstone know that Sam Zell didn't?
A: Obviously nothing. One would have to be a fool to take the other side of a bet as Sam Zell especially when Zell was selling after a runup like that.

Q: Why did they do it?
A: Everyone was desperate to see who could pulloff the biggest deal, no matter how little sense it made.

Q: Why was funding available?
A: For the same reason funding was available for subprime lending until that blew up: fees. Underwriting big deals like this means huge fees to the brokerages. The lack of such deals going forward in addition to enormously reduced fees for packaging CDOs makes it very likely that broker dealers such as Merrill Lynch (MER), Goldman Sachs (GS), and Lehman (LEH) have peaked.

Q: Did Blackstone even think they knew something that Sam Zell didn't?
A: That is much harder to answer. If they did, they were wrong. Perhaps Blackstone only thought it could unload the junk to an even greater fool.

Q: Wasn't the greater fool theory at least part of the IPO of Blackstone itself?
A: Absolutely, so let's take a look at the chart.

Blackstone - BX



Flash Forward July 27, 2007

Blackstone Falls to Record Low in Debt Market Freeze
Blackstone Group LP shares fell to a record low, making the leveraged buyout firm the worst- performing initial public offering this year.

Blackstone has tumbled 23 percent since the New York-based company sold shares in June on mounting concern that the LBO market will dry up as investors shun riskier bonds and loans used to fund takeovers. Rival Fortress Investment Group LLC fell 1.8 percent to $18.96 today, 49 percent below the $37 high reached the first trading day in February.

"If you believe private equity is under some pressure, you are definitely going to take it out on these stocks," said Frederick Lane, managing director of Boston-based investment bank Lane Berry & Co.

Investors around the world are avoiding riskier assets such as the loans that finance LBOs after being stung by losses in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. That rout may hamper New York-based Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.'s plan to raise about $1.25 billion in an IPO later this year.

Ryan O'Keefe, a London-based spokesman for KKR, declined to comment.

Shares of Blackstone, led by Stephen Schwarzman, fell $1.51 to $24.10 at 10:07 a.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. It's the lowest price since it went public at $31 on June 21.

Chrysler, the Auburn Hills, Michigan-based automaker, and Alliance Boots Plc, the U.K. pharmacy chain that KKR is acquiring, failed to find buyers this week for $20 billion of loans. Ten banks, including Deutsche Bank AG and JPMorgan Chase & Co., were stuck holding the debt.
A Vital Lesson

Inquiring minds might be wondering if there is a lesson in all of this. Indeed there is. It can be found by comparing Sam Zell to Bear Stearns and also to the greed at Blackstone. Sam Zell sold when he could, not when he had to. Sam Zell got top dollar. Bear Stearns sold when it had to. The High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund went to zero when Bear Stearns HAD to sell it because of margin calls. See Implications of Basis Capital Fund Missing Margin Calls for more info.

Neither the Blackstone IPO or Sam Zell's sale to Blackstone that needed $16 billion in debt to finance could be accomplished in today's market. That is the lesson here: Sell when you can, not when you have to.

I must give credit where credit is due. That is a saying I frequently hear from Bennet Sedacca on Minyanville. He's one of the brightest minds I know. And as you can see by comparing Sam Zell to Bear Stearns, the difference is vital.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Thursday, 26 July 2007

USDA Prime Only

CNNMoney is reporting Wells Fargo Closes Nonprime Wholesale Lending Business.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., said today that it will close its nonprime wholesale lending business, which processes and funds nonprime loans for third-party mortgage brokers. In 2006, this business represented 1.6 percent of Wells Fargo's total residential mortgage loan volume of $397.6 billion(1).

"Wells Fargo will continue to offer nonprime loans in channels where the company has direct relationships with consumers, including Wells Fargo Home Mortgage's retail channel and Wells Fargo Financial, an affiliate of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A," said Cara Heiden, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage division president. "The decision to close our nonprime wholesale lending business has no effect on Wells Fargo's robust prime lending business which has long held an industry leading position. We will continue to offer prime loans through all our distribution channels, including wholesale."

"For the foreseeable future, we believe continued turmoil in the nonprime sector will result in financial returns for our nonprime wholesale channel that are not commensurate with the risks inherent in this business," Heiden stated. "As a result, we have chosen to discontinue this channel."
Press Release - Alternative Lending Wholesale Division to Close
A Message from Mike Lepore, EVP, Institutional Lending

Continued challenges in the nonprime market have made it impossible to generate acceptable returns that are commensurate with the risks in the Wholesale Alternative Lending business. Because we expect this trend to continue for the foreseeable future, we have made the very difficult decision to discontinue doing nonprime lending in Wholesale, and to focus only on prime lending in this channel.

Effective on Thursday, July 26 at 5 p.m. CT, we will no longer accept new applications through our Wholesale Alternative Lending channel.

Wells Fargo remains committed to making credit accessible to a wide spectrum of consumers, where consistent with our responsible lending practices. We will continue to follow our controlled, profitable growth strategy and sustain our industry leading position by offering nonprime loans through channels that enable direct access to consumers. Prospects for these businesses – which include Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Retail, and Wells Fargo Financial – continue to be promising.
Wells Fargo Email

Following is the email that went out to some mortgage brokers doing business with Wells Fargo.
To all,

It is with deep regret that the decision to close has been made. Thank you for all your support over the past 3 years. If you desire, you may contact me at ****.com [email address removed by Mish]. I hope that I may be able to work with all of you in another capacity sometime in the near future.

Best Regards,

Dave Driscoll
Account Executive
Wells Home
Fargo Mortgage
Some lenders are sure to follow suit and others will tighten lending standards dramatically. In the latter category is JPMorgan / Chase.

JPMorgan / Chase Tightens Lending Standards

JPMorgan / Chase announced Simplified Mortgage Disclosures, Product Choices for Non-Prime Consumers.

Chase today announced it:
  • Has developed a new upfront disclosure in a simple format. Consumers now can compare important product features for traditional as well as non-traditional mortgages, including more information on how an adjustable-rate feature can affect the monthly payment
  • Will require an initial fixed rate for at least five years on adjustable-rate mortgages for non-prime borrowers to reduce payment shock risk
  • Will employ underwriting guidelines that require borrowers to demonstrate their ability to handle increases in interest rates on non-traditional mortgages
  • Has tightened credit standards, including making adjustments to acknowledge declining home values in certain markets and reducing the use of high loan-to-value ratios and stated-income products
  • Will continue to consider borrowers’ required property tax and homeowners’ insurance payments in determining affordability. Chase offers all its borrowers an option to escrow those payments with Chase
  • Will continue its practice of not offering option ARMs, which can expose borrowers to negative amortization when their monthly payment does not cover interest costs
Yield Curve as of 2007-07-26



Chart thanks to Bloomberg.

A yield curve that is increasingly inverted typically is not good for gold, but the runup from $640 to $690 was overdue for a little pullback anyway. The key point is that after a very brief stint in flat to slightly positive territory, the yield curve has inverted once again. This time however it is the 3 year treasury with widest spread. That will not help home buyers one bit.

Fed to the Rescue?

Forget about it. Falling treasury yields will not help anyone that does not qualify with much tighter lending standards. Falling treasury yields will not remotely come close to helping those whose interest rates jumps 200-300 basis points or more. Heck, in spite of a recent treasury rally, 10-year rates are still higher than earlier this year. And, the Fed will not be acting in time to help anyone. It will be too little too late for most.

Anyone with a subprime loan whose rate will reset later this year, is in deep trouble. Pricing pressures on housing are going to get worse, much worse. Anyone who thinks the Fed can save housing is enormously mistaken.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Price Wars

Prices of goods and services have to go up. Right? At least that is what everyone keeps telling me. After all on the producer side of the equation, energy prices are soaring, raw materials prices are soaring, wages are rising in China, and a new minimum wage in the US will send wages up $.70 this summer and $2.10 by 2009 to $7.25 an hour.

Try again. Wal-Mart is Cutting Prices on 16,000 Items.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., the world's largest retailer, set the stage for price wars Monday as it announced it's cutting prices on more than 16,000 items starting this week in a bid to turn around sales for the critical back-to-school season.

Shares of key retailers such as Sears Holding Corp. and J.C. Penney Co. (JCP) were down, as investors worried about how ensuing price wars would affect profit margins.

Wal-Mart's price cuts, which range from 10 percent to 50 percent, will be backed by a new ad campaign on how to save money as gas prices remain high and kids head back to school. The cuts are deeper and involve even more items than in the year-ago period and top the 11,000 items discounted in advance of last year's holiday season, according to Melissa O'Brien, a company spokeswoman.

Retail consultant Burt Flickinger III said that while he applauded Wal-Mart's move, he noted that the jury is still out on whether it will be effective.

"While it is a smart strategic move, it is going to add profit margin pressure, " Flickinger said.
Pricing Pressure

Pressure on corporate margins is only just beginning. What it costs to produce goods is basically irrelevant if supply is outstripping demand. There is currently overcapacity in damn near everything. We do not need more Wal-Marts, more Pizza Huts, more Applebees, more Targets, more auto capacity, more furniture stores, more Home Depots, or more nail salons. All of those and then some were way overbuilt as new housing subdivisions went up at a frantic pace. Commercial real estate followed residential and provided huge numbers of jobs (although at the low end of the scale).

The payback for this reckless expansion is now underway. Housing has blown up, and corporate expansion of retail is about ready to follow suit. Consumer discretionary spending will take a big hit as rising energy prices and mortgage rates eat away at paychecks.

Rising Minimum Wages Will Not Save The Day

Unfortunately, don't look for rising wages to save the day. That minimum wage bill is going to do nothing but cause problems. Businesses under pressure already will be reluctant to add workers. Instead look for increased layoffs from retail, financial, and service sectors.

Expect economists to be telling everyone "We can't have a recession with unemployment so low." Well we can and we will. That is what happens when overcapacity meets changing time preferences on behalf of consumers. Before this mess is over unemployment will be soaring. How much the government admits will be another story, but look for massive revisions with the next administration in 2008.

Corporate Profits Will Sink

Corporate profits are under pressure with financials leading the way. Kevin Depew was talking about this on Minyanville in point #2 of Five Things: Housing Slump Contained to Only Those Things Affected by Housing Slump.
Countrywide Financial (CFC), the biggest U.S. mortgage lender, reported its third straight decline in quarterly profit due to increases in late loan payments.
  • Countrywide this morning reported that second-quarter net income fell 33% and revenue fell 15%.
  • The company also reduced its forecast for earnings for this year.
  • Why the grim forecast?
  • The company said profit was hurt by impairment charges on securities backed by prime home-equity loans.
  • Well, of course, they said that. This sub-prime mess is going to continue to hurt for awhile. Even Bernanke said so last week.
  • No, sorry. Read that bullet point again: The company said profit was hurt by impairment charges on securities backed by prime home-equity loans.
  • Countrywide Chairman and Chief Executive Angelo Mozilo said "delinquencies and defaults continued to rise across all mortgage product categories."
  • The company also noted it has set aside $293 million for loan losses in the quarter, more than triple the level a year earlier, blaming a loan-loss provision of $181 million on prime home-equity loans, the Wall Street Journal said.
So profits are now being hurt by "Prime Loans". Fancy that. But this contagion is not going to stop with either housing or financials.

Check out this headline: FedEx Freight cuts fuel surcharge.
FedEx Corp.'s FedEx Freight and FedEx National LTL said Monday they will reduce their fuel surcharge by 25 percent, effective immediately.

Rates at FedEx Express and FedEx Ground are not impacted by change, FedEx said.

FedEx National is a long-haul, less-than-truckload service of the shipping corporation's freight unit.

Less-than-truckload, or LTL, carriers, usually fill their trucks with freight from a variety of sources and might re-sort and redistribute it at a company terminal along their route.
Overcapacity in shipping? You bet. What else can it mean when fuel surcharges are removed in smack in the face of crude prices near all time highs.

A few Charts
Click on any chart for a better view.

WMT



CFC



FDX



JBHT



HD



JCP





APPB



Containment

Containment is spreading to retail, consumer discretionary spending, and even shipping. The underpinnings that has kept speculation high and the stock market buoyant, are being removed one by one, sector by sector. The party is all but over but no one seems to have recognized it yet.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Pavlov's Dogs

The Washington Post is reporting Sales of new homes fell 6.6 percent in June
New single-family home sales fell to an annual rate of 834,000 from a revised rate of 893,000 in May, the Commerce Department said. Analysts polled by Reuters were expecting June sales to fall to an 895,000 unit pace from a previously reported rate of 915,000 units in May.

In June, the median sales price of a new home fell 1.3 percent to $237,900 from $241,000 in May. There were 537,000 new homes for sale in June, holding the same level reported in May. It would take 7.8 months to clear that inventory at the current sales pace, up from the 7.4 months reported in May.

"We need to see (housing) starts move lower," said Keith Hembre, chief economist at FAF Advisors in Minneapolis. "Not only were sales down, the homes available for sales were higher. I continue to believe that we are not anyway near the end of the adjustment in the housing market."
Key Points
  • Prior months were adjusted lower (as usual)
  • The magnitude of the plunge this month was huge.
  • Inventory rises (as usual)
  • Starts need to drop
Take a good hard look at point number three. Rising inventory means lower prices are coming. More subtly it means that many are trapped in homes that they cannot sell that they need to sell (because they can't meet their mortgage payments). This will increase defaults and eventually foreclosures and bankruptcies.

Now take a good hard look at point number four. Yes, starts do need to drop. A lot. That will add to unemployment. Look at the problems we are having with unemployment near all time lows. Think of the implications when unemployment rises to a mere 6%.

Treasuries are putting in a very nice rally just as the entire world hates them including foreign governments who after a huge 5 year rally are diversifying out of treasuries into equities.

click on chart for a sharper image



A liquidity crunch is on as I talked about in Avalanche of Leveraged Loan Supply and Liquidity Crunch Looms. But much like Pavlov's dogs, stock market bulls are salivating to buy the dip. Those bulls are ignoring the fact that risk is way underpriced and fundamentals as well as market psychology have dramatically changed for the worse. Yes a bell is ringing, but it is a liquidity warning not a dinner bell. The difference is vitally important even though both bells sound the same.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, 25 July 2007

Avalanche of Leveraged Loan Supply

The Liquidity crunch took another step forward today as California Home-Loan Defaults Rise to a Decade High.
California mortgage defaults rose to the highest level in a decade in the second quarter as falling home sales and higher interest rates battered the housing market.

Homeowners received 53,943 default notices, more than double the 20,909 filed a year ago, DataQuick Information Systems, a La Jolla, California-based provider of real estate data, said today in a statement. Last quarter's default level was the highest since the fourth quarter of 1996, when 54,045 notices were recorded in California.

Californians are struggling to repay home loans as mortgage rates jumped to an 11-month high and tighter lending standards limited their ability to refinance. Southern California home sales last month slumped 36 percent to the lowest for a June in 14 years and San Francisco Bay Area sales fell 26 percent to a 12-year low, mirroring the national slump, DataQuick said last week.

Most of the loans that went into default in the second quarter were originated between July 2005 and August 2006.
Once again it is important to remember this is nearer to the beginning of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end. Housing can and will get much worse.

With that sentence, a telepathic question just snuck in: "OK Mish, that is housing, what about the leveraged buyout market?" The answers come from Bill Gross at Pimco who reports "Enough is enough" and from a Citi presentation that states there is an avalanche of leverage loan supply.

Stuffed

Bill Gross is saying Enough is Enough.
Both borrowers and lenders may have bitten off more than they can chew, and even those that swallow their hot dogs whole – Nathan’s Famous Coney Island style – are having a serious bout of indigestion. Several hundred billion dollars of bank loans and high yield debt wait in the wings to take out the private equity and leveraged buyout deals that have helped propel stocks to Dow 14,000. And lenders…mmmmm, how do we say this…don’t seem to have much of an appetite anymore. Six weeks ago the high yield debt market was humming the Campbell’s soup theme and now, it’s begging for a truckload of Rolaids.

As Tim Bond of Barclays Capital put it so well a few weeks ago, "it is the excess leverage of the lenders not the borrowers which is the source of systemic problems." Low policy rates in many countries and narrow credit spreads have encouraged levered structures bought in the hundreds of millions by lenders, in an effort to maximize returns with what they thought were relatively riskless loans. Those were the ABS CDOs, CLOs, and levered CDO structures that the rating services assigned investment grade ratings to, which then were sold with enticing LIBOR + 100, 200, 300 or more types of yields. The bloom came off the rose and the worm started to turn, however, when institutional investors – many of them foreign – began to see the ratings downgrades in ABS subprime space. Could the same thing happen to levered structures with pure corporate credit backing? To be blunt, they seem to be thinking that if Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have done such a lousy job of rating subprime structures, how can the market have confidence that they’re not repeating the same structural, formulaic, mistake with CLOs and CDOs? That growing lack of confidence – more so than the defaults of two Bear Stearns hedge funds and the threat of more to come – has frozen future lending and backed up the market for high yield new issues such that it resembles a constipated owl: absolutely nothing is moving.
Avalanche of Leveraged Loan Supply

Take a look at a few of these charts courtesy of Citi.

Avalanche of Supply




The Leverage Cycle



Typical CDO Haircuts



Blackstone IPO

The highly touted Blackstone IPO was arguably a watershed event just as the merger of AOL and Time Warner was back in the dotcom bubble. I was wondering if the market would start choking on or after the IPO. Well we have our answers. The IPO was a success but the patient is now looks sick.

Blackstone - BX



Bloomberg is reporting Blackstone Stock's Slide Makes It Second-Worst IPO.

Shares of Blackstone Group LP, which paid founder Stephen Schwarzman $684 million in its June IPO, have posted the second-worst performance for a U.S. initial public offering this year.

Shares of the New York-based private equity firm fell 15 percent in their first month of trading, according to Bloomberg calculations. Clearwire Corp., the wireless Internet service provider that went public in March, fell 20 percent in the first month. Last week, U.K. hedge fund manager Man Group Plc raised less than planned in the U.S. IPO of its MF Global brokerage unit. Its shares have fallen 10 percent.

Rising defaults in the subprime mortgage market have forced banks to tighten lending criteria and that in turn has affected borrowing costs for leveraged buyouts as well. Debt investors have backed away from buying risky issues, causing at least 35 companies to rework or abandon their LBO financing.

Rival buyout firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., which also plans an IPO, was unable to sell $10 billion of senior loans to fund its buyout of pharmacy chain Alliance Boots Plc, two people with knowledge of the deal said today.

Chrysler, a unit of Stuttgart, Germany-based DaimlerChrysler AG, abandoned plans to sell $12 billion of high-yield, high-risk debt to finance its purchase by Cerberus Capital Management LP, investors briefed on the decision said today. Banks led by JPMorgan Chase & Co. will assume $10 billion of that debt and Cerberus and DaimlerChrysler agreed to hold the remaining $2 billion.

Tougher conditions in the credit market have spilled over to IPOs of other financial-services companies.
Widening credit spreads are not good for financials in general, and inability to funds CDOs and leveraged buyouts sure won't be good for the profits of broker dealers. Let's take a look at a few broker/dealer charts.

Goldman Sachs - GS Daily



The failure to hold the 200EMA maked the daily chart look quite sick. The weekly chart, however, does look better.

Goldman Sachs - GS Weekly



The implications are ominous if the 50EMA does not hold on a weekly basis.

Merrill Lynch - MER Daily



On a daily basis this chart is really busted with not only a close well under the 200 EMA but with the 50 EMA crossing under the 200 EMA as well.

Merrill Lynch - MER Weekly



Bear Stearns - BSC Weekly



Lehman - LEH Weekly



Lehman is yet another busted chart. Only GS has a weekly trendline intact. None have a daily trendline intact. Broker Dealers breaking down is not a sign of strength.

Everyone was waiting for a catalyst for a credit bust. If this is indeed it (and history has yet to speak), some may point to Blackstone, others to subprime contagion, others to Bear Stearns, but I don't think there really was one.

Earlier today I made the case that a Liquidity Crunch Looms. Kevin Depew also picked up on that theme in "Five Things" with a post about the Credit Crunch.

Whether or not this is "IT", the appetite for funding IPOs at insanely low spreads is simply not unlimited just as the appetite for housing was not unlimited (regardless of what anyone thought about demographics). If risk preferences are shifting (and it seems like they are) equities in general are simply not the place to be. Worse yet is an avalanche of supply right as the cycle has turned, when leverage has never in history been greater.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Liquidity Crunch Looms

Citigroup is reporting Defaults on Some `Alt A' Loans Surpass Subprime.
Defaults on some so-called Alt A mortgages packaged into bonds last year are now outpacing those from subprime loans, according to Citigroup Inc.

The three-month constant default rate for 2006 Alt A hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages is 2.3 percent, compared with 2.2 percent for subprime ARMs, New York-based Citigroup analysts led by Rahul Parulekar wrote in a July 20 report. The figures represent the percentage of balances in a mortgage-bond pool expected to default in the next year based on 90-day trends.

[Mish comment: Here's the key phrase "expected to default in the next year based on 90-day trends". Wasn't it reliance on trends that got rating companies into hot water in the first place? Essentially Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P, all used trends to predict that housing would rise forever into the future at a slow steady rate. None of the rating companies allowed for reversion to the mean or even a flat market for that matter. I talked about this in Fitch Discloses Its Fatally Flawed Rating Model. I suspect that we are going to find 2% is a very optimistic number. If nothing else the illiquid CDO market now acts as if 2% is optimistic.]

The speed at which Alt A hybrid ARMs are being paid off due to home sales or refinancing has also fallen to about the same level as for subprime ARMs, which typically prepay more slowly, the analysts said. Slower prepayments can make the same rates of defaults more damaging by leaving more of the initial balances outstanding to eat into bond-investor protections.

The combination of challenges mean 2006 bonds backed by Alt A mortgages, a credit grade above subprime loans, may need "lower loss severities to still come out with lower cumulative losses than subprimes," the Citigroup analysts wrote.

More than $800 billion of subprime mortgage bonds and $700 billion of Alt A bonds are outstanding, with ARM bonds totaling more than $600 billion and $450 billion, respectively, according to a March report by Zurich-based Credit Suisse Group.

[Mish comment: Those numbers are telling. $800 billion in total subprime debt, of which $565 billion is in the most toxic years (2005-2006) and a mere 3% of that debt has been downgraded even though Bloomberg calculates that a full 65% of that debt no longer meets the grades originally assigned. See Thoughts on Moody's "Tough Stance" for more information.]

The Citigroup analysts used Alt A ARMs with five years of fixed rates for their study. They didn't include so-called option ARMs, a type of loan with minimum payments that produce growing debt in $200 billion of Alt A bonds.

[Mish comment: There's nothing like excluding the worst of the garbage when coming up with your number.]

Between June 1 and July 17, typical spreads on BBB rated Alt A securities widened by 125 basis points to 475 basis points, while spreads for similar subprime securities rose 200 basis points to 450 basis points, according to Citigroup.

A Near Halt

As investors flee the market, a near halt in non-guaranteed mortgage-bond sales and a greater differentiation among securities with the same labels and ratings is limiting consensus among analysts on typical levels. Analysts at Credit Suisse and New York-based Bear Stearns reported higher spreads for both Alt A and subprime securities in reports last week.

[Mish comment: This is enormously compounding the ability of homebuilders to sell homes. Some are going bankrupt. It's the same every cycle. Risk is piled upon risk as trend players project the past forever into the future. Greed and fraud both run rampant then the whole thing blows up.]

Alt A and subprime loans compose about 13 percent to 14 percent of all outstanding home mortgages, according to estimates Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole cited in a speech last week.

[Mish comment: Bulls have been citing the small percentage of subprime debt as if it's too small to matter. How many times have we heard, subprime is only 8% of the market. Hmmm Now it's subprime and Alt-A are only 14% of the market. But is 14% the extent of the problem? Of course not. The right questions are: How much total garbage was rated "A" that did not deserve to be. How much of the originally deserving "A" paper also deserves to be downgraded? Thus a seemingly bullish factor is anything but. In fact it serves as a warning about how overrated all this debt was in the first place]
Mispriced Risk

Risk was seriously mispriced as evidenced by the complete collapse of the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leveraged Fund and the sudden widening BBB rated Alt A securities credit spreads by 125 basis points to 475 basis points.

Given how little debt has actually been downgraded so far, those spreads have a long, long way to widen.

CDOs Grind to a Halt

Bloomberg is reporting Homeowners Face Funding Drain as CDO Sales Slow.
The Wall Street money-machine known as collateralized debt obligations is grinding to a halt, imperiling $8.6 billion in annual underwriting fees and reducing credit for everyone from buyout king Henry Kravis to homeowners.

Sales of the securities -- used to pool bonds, loans and their derivatives into new debt -- dwindled to $9.1 billion in the U.S. this month from $42 billion in all of June, analysts at New York-based JPMorgan Chase & Co. said in a report yesterday.
From $42 billion to $9 billion is quite a collapse. Look at the reduction in underwriting fees. Think about how much harder this make it to buy a new house or sell and existing one. How quick we forget. Was it a mere 7 years ago that the same thing happened in the dotcom bubble?

The Ghost of Drexel Burnham Lambert

Kevin Depew on Minyanville gave everyone a history lesson in point one of Tuesday's Five Things.
1. Ghost in the Machine Slowly Grinding to a Halt

The market for collateralized debt obligations is slowly grinding to a halt, according to Bloomberg, threatening one of Wall Street's sacred cash cows - (read: $8.6 bln in annual underwriting fees) - and reducing the availability of credit for everyone from major Wall Street buyout firms to homeowners themselves.
  • Sales of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which are used to pool bonds, loans and their derivatives into new debt, fell to $9.1 billion in July, down from $42 billion in June, analysts at JPMorgan Chase (JPM) said, according to Bloomberg.
  • What's behind the declining appetite for CDOs?
  • The near collapse of two Bear Stearns (BSC) hedge funds, for one. The downgrade of 75 CDOs by the ratings agency S&P, for two. And concern about growing losses due to rising homeowner mortgage defaults, for three. Those are just for starters.
  • OK, so what are we really talking about here with these so-called CDOs?
  • CDOs were created in 1987 by bankers at Drexel Burnham Lambert.
  • Wait a minute.
  • Did you say Drexel Burnham Lambert?
  • Isn't that the same firm that was driven into bankruptcy in 1990 due to illegal trading in junk bonds driven by Drexel employee Michael Milken?
  • And did you say they were created in 1987?
  • The same year the market crashed?
  • And wasn't the 1980s known as the "Decade of Greed"?
  • Yes, yes, yes, yes and yes.
  • So let's see if we got this right.
  • Today, in 2007, the market for securities that were created in the "Decade of Greed" by a firm that was only a short time later forced into bankruptcy due to illegal trading in high-risk bonds is grinding to a halt?
They say that history does not repeat but it does rhyme. In this case they have it wrong. CDO History is indeed repeating. What will also repeat is how the Fed will react to the problem. That way of course will be the same way the Fed reacts to every problem (by cutting rates). Regardless of whether or not that tactic works the next time (I doubt it), the attempt itself should be good for gold as the yield curve steepens.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/