Wednesday, 8 August 2007

High Rate CDs and other Moral Hazards

The Pittsburgh Post Gazette has the sad story of a man whose lifetime of saving evaporated with the collapse of Metropolitan Savings Bank.
Raymond Przybilinski socked away $521,000 from a lifetime of driving trucks, working overtime when he could and playing the piano or accordion late into the evenings at weddings, hotel bars and social clubs.

The money was destined for his five children. But that was before more than half of the family nest egg disappeared on Feb. 2 as state banking regulators seized Metropolitan Savings Bank in Lawrenceville, citing "unsafe and unsound" operations. When Mr. Przybilinski tried to take his money out, the man in charge of Metropolitan Savings' assets informed him that there was only $200,000 left to withdraw -- the amount protected by the federal government.
School of Hard Knock Lessons
  • If a bank is offering above market rate interest on CDs and deposits there is a reason behind it. That reason is risk. And with excessive risk comes eventual disaster.
  • With credit spreads widening, margin calls being issued, and absurd lending to build condos in Florida and other places smack in the face of record inventories, there are going to be more bank failures like this.
  • Know and understand the FDIC limits or your life savings can be wiped out.
  • If you have money at a bank in excess of the FDIC limits, do something about it now, while you can.
Moral Hazard

The moral Hazard in this is called risk. Banks are willing to take risk with customers money far beyond what is prudent. And the smaller the bank the less risk banks should take. But because of FDIC insurance both banks and depositors do risky things because of those government guarantees. But as we have seen above, guarantees are available only up to certain limits.

But should there be guarantees at all? Probably not, except on checking accounts and other demand deposits. Why checking accounts? Because logic dictates checking account deposits are supposed to be available immediately on demand and should not be lent out.

Logic? Who cares about logic? Banks are allowed to lend out checking account deposits even though they pay no interest on those accounts. Customers assume the risk and banks literally sweep up the profit. This is a sweet deal for the banks and is accomplished ironically enough via sweeps.

Sweeps are a mechanism by which "excess capital" is swept from some accounts into other buckets based on patterns of expected behavior (not all customers are going to demand all of their money all at once). Money in the accounts where the money was swept is allowed to be lent out. In essence, the money sitting in your checking account right now is not really sitting there at all. It's lent out all over the place (in theory overnight but in practice for god knows how long or for what).

Massive Surge in Sweeps



The above chart came from a study about bank reserve requirements by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in May 2002.

The complete research paper is a 16 page PDF called Are Reserve Requirements Still Binding?

... retail sweep programs are an inefficient and costly way to avoid reserve regulations. The proliferation of these programs therefore underscores the need for reform.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented evidence that reserve requirements are rapidly losing relevance. Although a sizable minority of banks are still bound by reserve requirements in an accounting sense, in an economic sense our evidence suggests that such requirements have had a lessening effect on banks for at least several years. ....
The study does not say it explicitly but I will. There are essentially no bank reserves. Wait a second, I take that back. The combination of fractional reserve lending and sweeps really means there are negative reserves. Far more money has been lent out than really exists. For more on this idea please see the sections "The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning" and "Money vs. Debt" in Fleckstein (and others) State the Deflation Case with a tip of the hat to Minyanville professor John Succo for both sections.

Inquiring minds might now be asking "Exactly how are M1 and M2 affected by sweeps?" It's a very good question. The answer can be found in Money Supply and Recessions.

For now let's return to the moral hazard. When banks offer above market rate interest rates on CDs the money pours in. It goes pouring in explicitly because of government guarantees. Banks in turn take high risks with that money to be able to afford the high rates. All kinds of projects are thus funded that have no business being funded, like Florida condos for example.

Consider the Business Summary of Corus Bank.
Corus Bankshares, Inc. operates as the holding company for Corus Bank, N.A. that offers consumer and corporate banking products and services. The bank's deposit products include checking, savings, money market, and time deposit accounts. Its loan portfolio primarily comprises commercial real estate loans, including condominium construction and condominium conversion loans; commercial loans; and residential real estate loans. The bank focuses its lending activities in various metropolitan areas in Florida and California, as well as in Las Vegas, New York City, and the Washington, D.C.
Corus bank is operating in nearly every major housing bubble area.
Consider the chart of Corus Bank.

Corus Bank - Cors



High Yield Rates for 1 yr CDs

One can find high rate CDs on Bankrate.com.
The following table is as of August t 2007.



By guaranteeing those CDs, money flows to the highest yields simply because of those government guarantees. Who in their right mind would be lending Corus Bank money at such minuscule returns over treasury rates were it not for those guarantees?

Depositors can't really be blamed for this. It's only logical to seek out the highest rates. But one misstep as Raymond Przybilinski found out, can cost a person his life savings. And all sorts of absurd condo projects are getting funded because depositors plowed money into guaranteed CDs and savings accounts.

All things considered, FDIC insurance is a moral hazard except for non-interest bearing checking deposits that banks should not be permitted to be lend out. And anyone wanting risk free returns should buy US treasuries.

I have no problem with banks offering above market rates on CDs provided they and the depositors assume full risk. Taking risk and accepting responsibility for that risk is what the free market is all about. That means no FDIC insurance on those rates and no taxpayer bailouts if and when things blow up.

One point I forgot to emphasize in Will Rate Cuts Save The Economy? is the actions requested by Jim Cramer represent a huge moral hazard as well. When there is an implicit guarantee (sometimes known as the Greenspan Put), people and businesses do all sorts of irresponsible things. Proof is easy to find these days. And although Cramer should know better, he went far beyond asking for rate cuts, he went so far as to ask the Fed to buy massive numbers of futures to blow out the shorts. In other words Cramer was begging for PPT intervention and rate cuts by the Fed without once considering the moral implication of what he was asking.

Congress Never Learns Either

In point number 4 of Tuesday's Five Things, Kevin Depew was asking Who's Afraid of Fannie Mae? Let's take a look.
Yesterday afternoon there was talk the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, the GSE regulator, was actively working on ways to expand the portfolio caps that legislation this past spring reduced. Why? Because, as FNM interim chief executive Daniel Mudd and FRE Chief Executive Richard Syron explained to the Senate Banking Committee this past spring, the ability to hold onto some of those loans, and to expand them, can keep funding available in a crisis.

Sure enough, a piece on Bloomberg yesterday afternoon reported, "Fannie Mae, the largest source of money for U.S. home loans, asked its regulator for permission to take on more mortgage assets and help ease a crunch in the credit markets, a person with knowledge of the request said." Well, considering that's the same thing Fannie Mae has been saying for the past two years as legislators sought to cap their portfolios it's hardly news. Unless... unless it's not Fannie Mae doing the asking.

Who else might be asking? Politicians being pressured by banking executives who are worried about how serious the situation in credit markets has become. That would mean that in less than three months we've gone from political pressure to limit the portfolios of GSEs, to political pressure to expand the portfolio limits of the GSEs.

So, who's afraid of Fannie Mae? Us. If these portfolio caps are raised, it would suggest credit market problems are far more serious than thought.
Kevin did not explicitly say it, but once again the moral hazard should be obvious. It was irresponsible lending and borrowing that created this mess. Now, to alleviate the problems caused by irresponsible lending and borrowing, Congress does a complete flip flop demands more of the same.

Instead, I suggest it's time for both people and businesses to consider the consequences of their actions and to be held accountable for them. That is the only way to end these moral hazards.

Monetary Statistics Review

By the way I want to personally thank Gary North for reviewing the money supply aggregate I call M Prime (M') in his recent post Monetary Statistics on LewRockwell.com. He posted that article in response to one of his reader's questions. M' just happens to tie in very nicely with this post. Here are a few snips:
Recently, I was asked a question about money statistics. The person asked if I thought a particular unofficial index is better than the official indexes: M1, M2, M3, MZM.

The article by "Mish"
discusses a recent article by Frank Shostak. I am familiar with the work of both men. They are thoughtful, well-informed analysts of economic trends. Shostak does this for a living. He actually invests money for clients. Mish is an advocate of Elliott wave theory forecasting. I am not. Shostak is an Austrian School economist, a view I share. But I don’t always follow his logic. This may be my fault.

Mish’s article makes several important observations about the relationship between the most prominent monetary aggregates and the economy. He finds that M1 is far better than the other three in forecasting recessions.

Mish has come up with a new aggregate, which he calls M-prime. He symbolizes it as M'. Using Shostak’s article as a guide, he argues that M' is superior theoretically because it does not include any credit transactions, i.e., "sell this asset and get money." I agree with his assessment. ....

Mish says that we should focus on the rate of change. This is provided by the yellow line. This does seem to be an accurate forecasting tool. ....

Mish did a follow-up on May 9: "Money Supply is Soaring ... Right?"
It takes to task the use of M-3. I agree wholeheartedly.
....
CONCLUSION

I think M-prime is a better measure than the other M's. If I could get access to it every month on Mish’s site, I would consult it.
Note to Gary North and other inquiring minds: The biggest difference between M' and M1 is sweeps. And as shown above, sweeps have exploded.

In a previous phone conversation I had with economist Paul Kasriel, Paul stated an opinion that the Fed keeps tracks of sweeps in their review of M1. Of course that is a theory that cannot be proven, which is exactly what Kasriel said to me.

I would like to correct a couple of small things Gary North said. Ewave it is just one of the tools we use. We use many other tools as well such as advance decline, support resistance, and many other technical analysis tools. I would never recommend using E-wave alone. The "we" in this paragraph refers to Sitka Pacific Capital Management. I am a licensed investment manager representative for Sitka Pacific. Sitka Pacific publishes monthly commentary about the markets and one can sign up for free, or view it online at by clicking that last link.

I will see what I can do about more timely updates of M' especially if people are interested in tracking it. By the way, the charts are actually produced by "Bart" at NowAndFutures using specifications from me based on a formula from prior articles written by Frank Shostak. Without help from NowAndFutures, those charts would not be published. So thanks to both "Bart" and Frank Shostak as well. But don't look for fireworks. It moves pretty slowly especially to someone used to watching M3. Also note that our sweeps data is about one month delayed. Thank the Fed for that. But all things considered we are probably lucky the Fed posts sweeps data at all.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, 7 August 2007

Fleckenstein (and others) State the Deflation Case

I was surprised to see Bill Fleckenstein, a long time believer in inflation, state the case for a Japanese style deflation in the US. But it's right here in America follows Japan's misguided path.
....Given all our problems related to debt, I thought it might be worthwhile, particularly for new readers, to provide a brief history leading up to where we are now.

Taking a big step back, the Bank of Japan acted foolishly throughout the 1980s, which caused that country to experience enormous real-estate and stock bubbles. Japan's stock bubble was really a residue of its real-estate bubble -- actually a credit bubble, as the banks lent money to any corporation with a pulse. (Does that sound familiar?)

Then the institutions that lent the money took forever to write off the bad loans. That's why Japan's real-estate market, stock market and economy did so poorly for more than a decade.

Free money exacts a price

After [the dotcom] bubble, Greenspan took a page out of the Bank of Japan's book and lowered rates to 1%. That helped precipitate the housing bubble here that ended in 2005.

As to why the unwinding has taken so long to commence, only recently has the cause become clear: the mark-to-model fantasy employed by those who have bought the sliced-and-diced mortgage paper.

But the fantasy is unraveling as these structured-credit products are now slowly being marked to market. Just as virtually every subprime-mortgage lender has blown up, Alt-A lenders (the next rung up the ladder creditwise) will blow up -- and, ultimately, many hedge funds will blow up, though we're in the early days of that process.

In the years since our equity bubble peaked, trillions of dollars' worth of debt have piled up throughout corporate America. So now, as we enter recession, we will experience not just a weak economy, real-estate market and stock market, but the exacerbating effect of a mountain of bad debt, completing the analogy to Japan of the 1990s.
Like it or not (and I suspect he might not because he did not use the D-Word itself) Fleckenstein described how and why a Japanese style deflation is headed for the US.

Economist Paul Kasriel at the Northern Trust also describes how a Japanese style deflation can occur in the US. Please read Interview with Paul Kasriel if you have not yet done so.

The D-Word

Two of my favorite professors on Minyanville are not afraid to use the D-Word (deflation). Point #1 in Kevin Depew's daily dose of Five Things was FOMC Preview: Their Greatest Fear.
..... Stocks may still be up but as Professor Bennet Sedacca noted on the Minyanville Buzz and Banter this morning, financials rallied huge yesterday, but what about corporate spreads, the true barometer of the health of the financial industry? "Believe it or not, spreads on brokerage and bank corporates are actually wider than yesterday morning," Sedacca said. That means someone has it wrong. Either equity investors haven't woken up to credit market problems, or credit markets are overestimating the risk of owning corporate debt. "My guess is the credit market has it right," he said.

This explains in part why it feels so treacherous right now. If the markets have decided that too much credit is too easily available, as it appears they already have, then the Fed can simply lower rates to make credit more available. Problem solved. But what if there are two separate but related forces at work: tightening lending standards and reduced credit appetites? Then the Fed has something more serious on their hands.

The key in all of this is not inflation, as most believe. The Fed says they are most worried about inflation risks, but the reality is that they are most worried about deflation risks. Always. Always deflation. The Fed has no choice but to always remind us that the risks are tilted toward inflation, just as the Treasury Secretary, whichever one happens to be in office at the time, must always say that the U.S. maintains a strong dollar policy, even if monetary policy and fiscal policy are conspiring to devalue the dollar.

As for equities, when the dollar begins to rise, and it appears the Fed finally will begin to cut rates, as they inevitably must to try and sustain credit consumption, then it's time to worry. That means deflation is winning.
The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning

One of the best articles I've on the subject of deflation was Mr. Practical's (Professor John Succo's) article today on Minyanville: The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning.
The "strong U.S. economy" has been pushed and pushed along by 25 years of hyper credit expansion fostered by the Federal Reserve. When witnessing the tumultuous results of just a slowing down of the credit expansion, one can only imagine the problems that will surface once credit begins to contract in earnest.

And here lies the crux of the matter: what the Fed has done over the last 25 years is artificially decrease the relative value of real money in the U.S. system while increasing the relative value of debt. It has done so with no concern for the level of income generated to pay that debt back. The Fed through their hyper expansionary credit policy and Wall Street through financial engineering have loaded the system with debt not supported by a commensurate level of future (present) income.

But the Fed has been able to accomplish what it has only because investors, for the above reasons, have lost sight of this hidden risk. The Fed doesn’t really have the power to create more and more of this artificial liquidity called debt; they need investors to cooperate. Here is why.

The Fed really only can do two things (Prof. Succo has explained this situation, but let's go over it again). [Mish comment: Prof. Succo's previous explanation follows these excerpts]. They can lower margin requirements for banks, the amount of capital they have to hold to make loans. That it has already driven to basically zero. So the Fed cannot allow banks any more “leeway” than it already has.

They can also perform open market money operations like REPOS and coupon passes. The Fed calls up big banks and buys their government bonds out of their portfolio. But they don’t buy them with real money; they buy them with credit newly created just for that purpose. The big bank can then lend that credit out in a much greater amount because the Fed only requires them to keep a small fraction of that credit to support whatever the bank wants to lend out. This is our wonderful fractional reserve system. If everyone went to the bank to get their “savings” at once they would find that they could get out less than 1%.

But here is the key. The bank must ultimately be willing to lend it and then find some investor to borrow it. This has been no problem whatsoever over the last several years. Now most investors realize that they have too much debt, that their level of income cannot support it. Banks realize this too and have increased their lending requirements. The last borrower is always the most aggressive speculator.

So most market participants are now looking for ways to pay back debt (deflation) just when the Fed is desperate to get investors to borrow more (inflation).

The top is only beginning to wobble. When people tell me “there is so much money out there” I tell them that no, there is so much credit out there. This will be a muli-year process of debt reduction and deflation to correct what the Fed has wrought.

Best regards,
Mr. Practical
Those are small snips from a great article. I recommend clicking on the link above and reading the entire piece.

Money vs. Debt

As noted earlier here is Minyanville professor John Succo on Money vs. Debt.
Mini-Minyan Mailbag
Minyan MC to Professor Succo:

I was given these general statistics on U.S. circulation of dollars, and I was wondering if they were somewhat accurate?
$2 trln was put in circulation from 1776 through 1990
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 1991 through 2000 (for a total of $4 trln)
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2001 through 2003 (for a total of $6 trln)
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2004 through 2005 (for a total of $8 trln)
$2.8 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2006 through 1st half 2007 (for a total of $10.8+- trln)

So, essentially, in the last six and a half years, circulation of U.S. Dollars has increased by 170% (10.8 minus 4.0 = 6.8 trln dollars added to the system). And what do people say about free money?
What do you think?

Professor Succo to Minyan MC:

Minyan MC,
Yes, but it is not really “money”. The stats you quote are “debt”.
There is no “money” any more.
The actual money used to be backed by gold.
Actual money stock is 0.001% of what people call the money supply.
The money supply is really the debt supply.
Thanks to Mr. Practical, Kevin Depew, Paul Kasriel, and John Succo for helping explain how a Japanese style deflation could hit the US. The key point is deflation is caused by a massive increase in credit/debt not supported by a commensurate level of income. In simple terms, there is no way to ever pay back what has been borrowed. It's also critical to understand the distinction between a hyperexpansion of credit and a hyperinflationary printing of money. The former is what caused the Great Depression (and is happening again now), while the latter happened in the Weimar republic and is happening right now in Zimbabwe.

Addendum

My friend who posts on Kitco under the alias "Trotsky" just pinged me with this comment: "absolutely correct - this at the root of the misunderstandings out there. because credit is used as a money substitute in the financial markets, it acts as an inflationary force in the asset markets (and this spills over into the real world as the imaginary wealth thus created leads to overconsumption and malinvestments), but it is all ephemeral - in the end, it is still credit, not money. as soon as money is needed in lieu of credit, such as has now happened in the CMO and CDO markets, it becomes clear that the money simply isn't there."

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Monday, 6 August 2007

Will Rate Cuts Save The Economy?

The question of the day is "Will interests rate cut by the Fed save housing and the economy?"

Jim Cramer Says "Yes"

Jim Cramer's opinion can be seen in Financial TV host flips out over the state of the economy.



(click on the above link to see Cramer in action)

But the answer is "No".

So we've seen what Cramer has to say, let's take a serious look at whether Fed rate cuts will save the economy and why I believe the answer must be "no".

The first reason is that long term rates (the 10 year treasury), simply may not decline when the Fed starts cutting. Does anyone remember "Greenspan's Conundrum"? If not, Greenspan was perplexed as to why long term rates did not rise much as a series of 17 consecutive rate hikes by the Fed were made. On that basis it is therefore entirely possible that when the Fed starts cutting (and they will), that long term treasury rates may not follow. Clever readers will now be asking "Wait a second Mish, you said may and now you are presuming will. What gives?"

That brings up reason number two. Everyone knows Mortgage rates are directly tied to the 10 year treasury note. Or are they? I have been stating for well over a year that mortgage rates would disconnect from the 10 year treasury note. Some have laughed at me for that viewpoint. But my reason was simple: increasing default risk would eventually force it.

While the "Reverse Conundrum Hypothesis" is indeed just that (it may or may not happen and now I think that it won't but it could), the 10 yr vs. mortgage rate disconnect is no longer a theory. Eventually has arrived. The disconnect is now well underway. It started in June and has blown wide open in the last two weeks. Yes, I have proof.

Consider the following chart of treasury yields for the past 12 months.

$TNX - Treasury Yields



(click on any chart for a crisper view)

The above chart shows all the major rallies and declines in the 10 yr treasury over the past year in basis points.

Bankrate.com 30 year fixed mortgage rates



(basis points are approximate given chart scales)

Major Moves: Treasuries vs. 30 yr Fixed Mortgages

32 basis points vs. 20 basis points
44 basis points vs. 37 basis points
43 basis points vs. 22 basis points
84 basis points vs. 74 basis points
60 basis points vs. 13 basis points

Look at those last two data points closely.
An 84 basis point rally in the 10 year led to a 74 basis point hike in mortgage rates.
On the subsequent decline of 60 basis points only 13 were picked up in mortgage rates.

But it's not even that good. Not even close.

Bankrate.com 30 year fixed mortgage rate Jumbos



Jumbo rates went UP even with that substantial rally in treasuries.

Bankrate.com 5/1 ARMs



5/1 Arms are similar to 30 year fixed but.... for all the additional risk, the consumer is saving a mere 25 basis points.

All of the above charts are for Prime Loans, with good credit scores, and a down payment. Inquiring minds are no doubt wondering what happens in other conditions.

Major Disconnect in Subprime

Late last Friday I gave a call to Dave Donhoff at No Bull Mortgage and was wondering about subprime and Alt-A, and how they were affected by these treasury gyrations. Before I go further, let me say that Dave is one of the good guys. He has not had a single returned loan or foreclosure on one of his customers in the last 6 years. Although Dave has not been tracking exactly what I wanted he did offer this:
  • Almost all stated income loans everywhere vanished last Friday.
  • Almost all 2/28 ARMs vanished last Friday.
  • While this was eventually expected it was not expected by everyone overnight.
As we were talking I was fortunate that a representative of major mortgage lender who had a scheduled appointment stopped by to see Dave. That person agreed to talk to me on condition anonymity so I will honor the request. But here is what I found out from that major lending insider.
  • Subprime rates have risen by as much as 190 basis points at his organization in just the last 2 weeks!
  • Many other lending institutions have done the same thing.
  • The definition of prime has tightened considerably, everywhere.
  • Any variance from prime raises the mortgage rate.
  • Small differences in FICO score now matter (sometimes by a lot).
  • Every little thing adds up.
  • 90% LTV rates are higher than 85% LTV rates which are higher than 80% LTV rates.
  • 100% LTV rates are very difficult to come for subprime and even Alt-A.
  • Condos vs. homes matters significantly.
  • There were 3 rate increases in the last 2 weeks even as 10 year treasury rates rallied.
  • Second mortgages have nearly vanished - no market.
  • 2/28 arms - gone.
  • Someone who is "really clean" but is not prime (but close) and is putting down 20% has had a 70-80 basis point hike in the last 2 weeks.
  • The bankrate charts might not show it, but in the last two weeks nearly every loan rate went up even as treasuries rallied significantly. The primest of prime was perhaps flat.
A 190 basis point hike in two weeks was so shocking that I asked for a repeat. "90?" I asked. "No. that's 190 basis points" came the reply. For those not familiar with the term basis points, 100 basis points is a 1% rise in the loan rate. For example, 190 basis points would send a mortgage loan from 7% to 8.9%. The bigger the loan the bigger the increase in monthly payments (ouch!)

Virtually any subprime borrower whose arm is due to reset later this year or early next year and has not yet rolled over the loan is obviously in deep trouble regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. Not only is the teaser rate itself going to rise dramatically because of the rising treasury rates, the risk component has risen as much as 190 basis points in addition to that.

Furthermore, anyone in a stated income loan, anyone with a second mortgage, anyone in a pay option arm, or anyone in a 2/28 is now locked out of all those options. (Please see Locked Out for more on what's happening through the eyes of Bankrate.com). And finally, as Dave Donhoff put it to me, "Many buyers are discovering there is a difference between quoted rates and actual availability of funding at those rates".

Let's Assume A Miracle

But let's assume a miracle. Let's assume that the Fed cuts rates 100 basis points in a surprise move on the advice of Cramer, interest rate spreads plunge, there is no treasury/mortgage rate disconnect, the 10 year treasury rate drops significantly, mortgage rates follow the 10 year rate lower, fixed rate mortgages at reasonable rates are offered to everyone regardless of credit risk, and the US dollar does not blow up in response. Wow. Nonetheless, let's assume that Miracles R Us grants all that as a single miracle request. Unfortunately there are still two sticky questions to resolve.

Sticky Questions

1) Is the consumer out of the woods?
2) Is the economy out of the woods?

The answer to both questions is still no. Remember that foreclosures are massively rising even though the bulk of interest rates resets is still upcoming. Many of those teaser rates were put in place as the Fed slashed rates to 1%. Cramer simply did not ask for enough.

Consumers need not only lower rates, but the initial teaser rates they had (if not even lower). So let's assume still another miracle: mortgage rates reset at the prior teaser rate lows regardless of risk, negative amortization, or worsening FICO scores of the applicants. That's asking a hell of a lot more of Miracles R Us but the Miracle Fairy heard my telepathic plea and returned my call on the Miracles R Us Miracle Hotline. I was told that both miracles would be granted if I could honestly assure them that it would solve all the problems.

Sadly, I had to inform Miracles R Us the honest truth: Still more miracles on top of those miracles would be needed. With that, Miracles R Us issued me an MDT (Miracle Denied Ticket) and told me I could apply again in six to twelve months.

The Miracle Fairy went on to explain the reason for denial: "We are swamped with requests but the Ministry of Miracle's Magic Miracle Bucket (MMMMB) is severely depleted and massively underfunded at this time. Even we Miracle Fairies at Miracles R Us are affected by liquidity issues, and it's the worst possible time too, with so many miracle requests pouring in. We suspect there was a leak in our Miracle Bucket raining unwarranted miracles over the populace for the last four years. We are now officially in MRM (Miracle Rationing Mode)" and your request is simply too big.

With that explanation, the Miracle Hotline was abruptly terminated. I had more questions to ask the Miracle Fairy but they remain unanswered. Given how busy the Miracle Fairy is I am rather pleased she took the initial call.

Inquiring minds are no doubt asking why I told the Miracle Fairy that more miracles would be needed. The reasons center around debt servicing and jobs. There is simply no pent up demand for housing, no growth in wages, and no way cash strapped consumers can service current debt loads. There is also no source of jobs that an overheated housing market created. There is no need for more Home Depots, Lowes, Pizza Huts, Applebees, nail salons, strip malls, Walmarts, etc etc. In fact there is a need for less stores not more and the coming consumer led recession will prove it. Overcapacity is simply rampant. It would take even more miracles to correct all of that.

Is there pent up consumer demand in anything? If there is, why is Walmart slashing prices on 16,000 items smack in the face of rising energy prices? (Please see Price Wars for an explanation). July had the worst decline in US auto sales in years. Is a rate cut supposed to cure that?

The jobs picture is weak and hiring is not even keeping up with the birth rate plus immigration as explained in Martian Economists and BLS Moonbats. And unless more miracles are granted, this is the end of the line for unnecessary corporate expansion. But please don't blame me, I'm just the messenger. Take it up with Miracles R Us.

Oh sure, Starbucks will add another 15,000 stores or whatever (perhaps) but will they be in the US or China or India? So where is the replacement for US jobs that housing provided supposed to come from?

Corporate Profits Have Peaked

The merger mania, buyout bingo, CDO, and LBO parties each went on longer than anyone expected. But the parties are now clearly over. And all of those parties added enormous up-front profits to the pockets of broker dealers like Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Lehman, and scores of hedge funds.

It took about a year longer than expected for subprime to blow up. But Lenders are now blowing up in a magnificent display of fireworks. The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter is at 109 as I type, and more implosions are added every week. By the way, Implode-O-Meter is being sued and a summary judgment to dismiss the lawsuit was tossed. For more information please see Judge Franklin R. Taft Denies Ml-Implode Motion To Strike via Anti-SLAPP.

Expect far fewer stock buybacks on borrowed money, far fewer leveraged buyouts and tighter lending conditions all across the board regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. And we still have not seen enough write downs related to subprime slime. Of $565 billion in subprime loans made in 2005-2006 (the worst years), a mere 2-3% of that has been downgraded by the chickens and sheep at Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P. See Thoughts on Moody's "Tough Stance" for how Moody's is attempting to play the victim in this mess when in fact they are a big part of the problem.

Although the asset side of the balance sheet seems pretty good, it is a complete illusion. The debt side of the balance sheet has never been greater. When assets take a hit (and they will), the debt will still be there acting like an anchor for years to come and/or until massive bankruptcies wipe that debt off the face of the earth.

No matter how one twists and turns, logic dictates that several major miracles as well as massive positive assumptions about those miracles would still not be enough to revive either housing or this economy.

The problems we are facing now are a direct result of too loose a monetary policy at the Fed. Slashing interest rates to 1% cannot be the cure if slashing interest rates to 1% was the problem. Careful analysis thus shows that Cramer is making the same basic mistake as Greenspan and Bernanke.

Some are slower than others, but by now everyone (including Cramer and the Fed) should be realizing that it was the Fed's miracle financing that caused the corporate malinvestments, overcapacity, and consumer debt hangover problems we now face. Miracle financing caused the problems, so miracle financing sure won't be the cure. The miracles have now run out and the party is over regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. It's as simple as that.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Sunday, 5 August 2007

Locked Out

Bankrate.com is reporting Subprime lenders yank most popular loan type.
Lenders have abruptly stopped offering the most popular type of subprime mortgage. Credit-challenged borrowers suddenly have fewer options. "Many borrowers are not going to be able to refinance," says Deborah Goldstein, executive vice president of the Center for Responsible Lending.

Over the past few years, the most common type of subprime loan has been an adjustable-rate mortgage known as the 2/28 ARM. Since mid-July, five of the six biggest subprime mortgage lenders stopped offering 2/28 ARMs. Suddenly, there's a shortage of the type of mortgage preferred by about 60 percent of subprime borrowers.

"We think it's a good thing for consumers," Goldstein says, because too many 2/28 ARMs were underwritten without regard to whether borrowers could afford to repay them. "So we think it's positive that lenders are going to stop offering that product. It doesn't mean they'll stop offering subprime loans."

What's a refi customer to do?
Mortgage brokers and loan officers say borrowers who need to refinance their subprime mortgages still have options -- just not as many. Some lenders might still offer 2/28 and 3/27 ARMs, although the rates might be high -- possibly into the double digits.

[Mish comment: I will have more on spreads, who is affected and how, as well as why Cramer is wrong about interest rate cuts in my next post later today].

"It's old-school again," one mortgage banker sums up.

What about homeowners who face an impending rate reset that will send their payments to unaffordable levels, but can't qualify for a refinanced loan -- either because of insufficient payment history and income, or because they owe more than the house is worth?

"Some families are going to have to make ugly decisions," a banker says, by cutting back on spending or, in the worst case, losing the home in foreclosure.
For a look at how ugly things can get, let's look at some numbers.

Estimated Purchase Dollar Originations 2002



Estimated Purchase Dollar Originations 2006



The above charts courtesy of Credit Suisse
I do not have 2004-2005 originations but I think you get the idea.

Who is guaranteeing a portion of those loans? One such company is MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG).
MGIC Investment Corporation, through its subsidiary, provides private mortgage insurance to the home mortgage lending industry in the United States. The private mortgage insurance covers residential first mortgage loans and expands home ownership opportunities by enabling people to purchase homes.

Its primary insurance provides mortgage default protection on individual loans and covers unpaid loan principal, delinquent interest, and various expenses associated with the default and subsequent foreclosure, and generally apply to owner occupied, first mortgage loans on one-to-four family homes, including condominiums.
MTG
(click on charts for a crisper image)



It sure seems the market is losing confidence in those guarantees. See Cold Feet and Sea Bass for more on this story.

So here we are, right on the verge of massive numbers of loans that will reset and the products current applicants are in, are simply no longer available.

"Some families are going to have to make ugly decisions, by cutting back on spending or, in the worst case, losing the home in foreclosure."

Ugly is right.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Elegant Anal-ysis by the Times Online

Irwin Stelzer for the Times Online totally blows it with his analysis of the housing collapse. The headline Search for a scapegoat finds Greenspan sums it up nicely.
WITH investors having lost the odd trillion in recent weeks, the hunt is on for a scapegoat. Washington pundits are not famous for their kindness to politicians, regulators and other out-of-power figures to whom they no longer crave access. So it should come as no surprise that Alan Greenspan has been nominated as the culprit, and that the process of chipping away at the pedestal on which he stands has begun.

The first attack on Greenspan was one of those indirect, by-implication-only assaults in which government officials specialise. William Poole, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, used a speech to property professionals to unburden himself of some thoughts on the nonprime mortgage market.

That market, Poole pointed out, matters to the Fed because of the importance of the housing industry to the overall economy, and the Fed’s regulatory responsibility for banks and practices in the mortgage market. He therefore finds it “odd” that the Fed and lenders did not realise that low interest rates in the 2002-4 period could not be maintained. Yet sub-prime borrowers were encouraged to take out adjust-able-rate mortgages (ARMs), many of which are now in default as a result of higher interest rates, leaving a trail of foreclosures and creating chaos in the market for mort-gage-backed securities.

What does all this have to do with Greenspan, who is nowhere mentioned in Poole’s rather elegant anal-ysis?

Greenspan’s main point was that “American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage”. That has been the case, as Poole points out: “The bottom line is that more people have access to mortgage credit now than ever before . . . Despite its limitations and flaws, the nonprime market has served a large number of borrowers very well.”
Speaking of elegant anal-ysis that is exactly what Irwin Stelzer is guilty of. Where is the proof that access to mortgage credit has served a large number of nonprime borrowers well? One look at record numbers of foreclosures, should be enough to prove otherwise. Better yet let's see a percentage of those who benefited vs. those who didn't. Where's the analysis?

With that, inquiring minds just might be asking: "Mish it sounds like you are arguing with the free market. What kind of libertarian are you anyway? Didn't the free market create those products?"

No, the free market did not create those products. Those products came about largely because .....
  • Greenspan slashed interest rates to 1%.
  • Bush promoted an "Ownership Society".
  • The HUD subsidized loans to those who could not afford them.
  • Congress created Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under misguided policies to make housing affordable. Those policies backfired.
  • Tax breaks promoted housing.
  • The Fed let speculation get out of hand.
  • The Fed does not believe in popping asset bubbles but does believe in bailing out banks and lending institutions in the wake of popped asset bubbles. This creates a moral hazard and promotes speculative lending.
None of the above has anything to do with free market forces. Nor does the housing bubble itself. Thus the questions I asked Irwin Stelzer earlier are in practice moot. So what if "many" benefited from those lending practices. I believe more were harmed. But whether or not some select few (or many as Irwin Stelzer thinks) benefited from those policies is irrelevant.

What matters is that inflation benefits those with first access to money (banks, brokerage houses, etc). By the time mortgage standards were low enough for everyone to partake in the boom, the boom was nearly over. That makes these bubble blowing polices of the Fed, Congress, and the administration morally corrupt and that is why the Fed should be abolished and that is why Ron Paul should be elected. And finally that is why Irwin Stelzer is guilty of elegant anal-ysis. Greenspan is not a scapegoat. Greenspan, Bernanke, and the Fed, in conjunction with inane Congressional and Bush Administration policies is the problem. Implementation of free market strategies with a sound currency backed by gold as the constitution stipulates, in conjunction with sound fiscal policies by Congress is the cure.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Hell Fights Back

Yesterday we discussed the Pulte House From Hell. The August 13 BusinessWeek cover story Bonfire Of The Builders suggests that hell is fighting back.
Elizabeth and Armando Motto are living a real estate nightmare with a new breed of monster: the big homebuilder as lender. In November, 2005, the couple, who have four children, agreed to pay $540,000 for a newly built three-bedroom house in suburban Clarksburg, Md., near Washington, D.C. Rather than send them to a bank, the builder, Beazer Homes USA Inc. (BZH), offered to provide a mortgage itself in an arrangement of the sort that helped fuel the long housing boom across the country.

But when it appeared that the Mottos might not qualify financially for the loan, things took a troubling turn. Beazer, according to the couple, inflated the pair's earnings in loan-application documents by incorrectly stating they were collecting rental income from the house they were leaving.

"I don't want to misrepresent myself," Elizabeth said in e-mail correspondence with Beazer's outside mortgage service, dated July 14, 2006. But in the end, the couple signed the documents, and soon after they closed on the Clarksburg house.

They now regret it. The Mottos moved to Clarksburg, but they haven't succeeded in unloading their previous home in Rockville, Md. They have nearly $1 million in mortgage debt on the two dwellings. With $145,000 in family income, Elizabeth says, they are "on the brink of foreclosure" on both houses. "We are so broke."

The Atlanta company has much more than the Mottos to worry about. On Aug. 1 its stock fell nearly 18% on rumors that it was preparing to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy court protection—which Beazer swiftly denied, calling the Wall Street gossip "scurrilous and unfounded." Just five days earlier, Beazer revealed that the Securities & Exchange Commission had elevated an informal inquiry into its mortgage business to a formal investigation. The company warned that criminal penalties could follow. Earlier this year, Beazer received a subpoena from the Justice Dept. seeking documents related to its home loans, and the company is also under civil investigation by the North Carolina Attorney General's office.

Even as the housing supply began to exceed demand last year, builders kept sales brisk by pushing adjustable-rate, interest-only, and other risky loans. In some cases they attracted clientele who couldn't afford conventional mortgages. In others, builders allegedly violated federal lending standards to get customers to sign on the dotted line. KB Home (KBH) paid a record $3.2 million settlement in July, 2005, to resolve allegations by the Housing & Urban Development Dept. that the builder's mortgage unit overstated borrowers' income, among other practices, to obtain loan approvals. KB, which denied wrongdoing, sold its loan business before settling.
It's hard to feel truly sorry for anyone in living hell if that hell was a result of being a willing party to commit fraud. But sooner or later hell nearly always strikes back at everyone involved in fraudulent transactions.

Emails of the Mottos have now provided a smoking gun for the justice department, the North Carolina Attorney General's office, and the SEC to investigate. Expect shareholder lawsuits over this matter as well.

Desperation at Beazer or just complete foolishness?

In what is likely a foolish waste of money if not an act of pure desperation given all the investigatory and liquidity problems Beazer is facing, Beazer nonetheless declared a $.10 dividend on Friday.
August 03, 2007 12:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time Beazer Homes USA, Inc. (NYSE: BZH) (www.beazer.com) today announced that its Board of Directors has declared a quarterly cash dividend of ten cents ($0.10) per share of common stock. The cash dividend will be payable on September 21, 2007 to shareholders of record at the close of business on September 10, 2007.
With a tip of the hat to Minyanville for the idea, let's take a look at a 1 minute chart of BZH before and after the news.

BZH One Minute Chart



If that dividend announcement was an act of desperation, the market sure caught on quick and commenced voting with its feet.

Investing in Homebuilders is Foolish

Over the long haul shareholders never even profit but insiders sure do. Take a look at Beazer Insider Transactions. Massive numbers of shares were acquired by insiders for $0.00 and dumped on the market for whatever the insiders could get. Especially note the transactions of Ian J. McCarthy, CEO.

Builders build until they go bust. It's the same every cycle. They keep plowing all earnings into more and more land at artificially inflated prices until the Ponzi scheme finally blows up.

BZH Monthly Chart



Anyone who bought BZH from 2001 through 2007 is now underwater. Poof. And where were the dividends four years ago? Three years ago? This is why investing in homebuilders is a foolish proposition: they do not pay dividends when they can and should but attempt to do so smack in the middle of massive investigations and liquidity issues.

Insiders have made countless millions in the last six years. But those investing in the biggest housing boom in history lost money. Sure some playing the greater Fool's game made out, but for every one those, other investors holding for the "long haul" got clobbered with as much as 86% losses.

HOV Monthly Chart



Hovnarian (HOV) is now back to 2002 prices.

LEN Monthly Chart



Lennar (LEN) is hanging out just above 2002 prices.

WCI Weekly Chart



WCI just started trading publicly in Autumn of 2003. The weekly chart shows the entire history. But check out the arrogance of WCI turning down an offer at $22 as late as May 2007.
Earlier this year, WCI rejected an offer by Icahn to purchase the company for $22 a share, saying it was financially inadequate. His tender offer expired in May, without him buying any shares. At the time Icahn made his offer, WCI’s stock traded in the range of $20. WCI moved its annual meeting from June 15 to Aug. 30 to give it more time to entertain offers.

As WCI’s stock has taken a nose dive, some have questioned whether the company made a mistake when it rejected Icahn’s original offer.
Question? There is no question. Icahn clearly lost his mind to offer $22 for WCI but was bailed out because a bigger fool refused to take the offer. Add that to the list of lawsuits to be filed.

Meanwhile Back in Hell

While the debate continues about whether or not WCI should have taken the offer (or if the offer was even real as some conspiracy theory question), the mad scramble to turn out product as fast as possible has raised a significant amount of quality issues.

BusinessWeek is asking You Call This A Home?
The next boom for builders may be complaints from angry homeowners.

Residents of a new housing development in South Carolina fear that fumes from contaminated soil have caused dizziness and blackouts.

In Colorado, homeowners say they were led to believe they'd enjoy a recreational lake that never materialized, causing property values to slip. As the housing slump worsens, U.S. homebuilders increasingly find themselves fending off complaints of shoddy construction, unsavory sales tactics, and use of unsafe land.

Criterium Engineers, a Portland (Me.) building-inspection service active in 35 states, found that from 2003 to 2006 the number of new homes with "significant problems" rose more than 13%.

"Right now you're seeing the construction claims start to come in," he says, "but it'll take five to seven years" to get a full measure of the angry fallout. Anti-builder Web sites are proliferating, and two consumer groups, HomeOwners for Better Building and Homeowners Against Deficient Dwellings, are compiling online lists of beefs against developers.

The National Association of Home Builders says 55% of customer grievances concern caulking, paint, and other nitpicky issues.

Lennar Corp. (LEN ), another large builder, has drawn scrutiny in South Carolina. Residents of its new Pebble Creek development in North Charleston, such as Bill and Holly Hurley, say they have suffered from light-headedness, lethargy, and depression. Home inspections they commissioned showed unsafe levels of methane gas, which the Hurleys and others fear may be linked to possible soil contamination by a previous land owner.
Let's rephrase that statement by the NAHB as follows: The National Association of Home Builders admits nearly 50% of homeowner grievances are both valid and significant.

Unfortunately the NAHB provided no percentages for these questions: Of the 45% of grievances that are "not nitpicky", how many homeowners are happy with the resolution? How many are not happy about forced arbitration when the homebuilders get to pick the arbitrators?

Real Estate Gripe Sites
The above list compiled by and thanks to BusinessWeek.
Two images from the article (titles mine)

Pure Hell #1




Pure Hell #2




There is much more in the issue. I'm picking up a copy.

That said, in the back of my mind is the idea that magazine covers like these often mark major turning points. Then again, unless homebuilder sales pick up dramatically several of them (or more) are going under.

Perhaps the cover marks not a turning point but a major recognition point about how bad the problem is. As late as a couple weeks ago Paulson was talking about how "contained" the problem is. Well it's obviously not contained.

Another problem the builders face is that people are going to read the issue, see the problems, and be scared to death to buy from any builder in question. And then there is the problem of massive condo building in Florida with tens of thousands of units being built even as there are tens of thousands of units that nobody wants already sitting in inventory. Finally there is the problem of a severely slowing economy with unemployment rates poised to go up dramatically.

Bankruptcy is one way out for these homebuilders to stop the lawsuits cold turkey and walk away scot free of what some might say would be their moral obligations. No doubt some of these builders will soon find that option attractive. The only real question about bankrupt homebuilders is "Who's first?" As for "Who's to blame?" the list is long but start with the Fed and proceed to Congress and this administration.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Saturday, 4 August 2007

Pulte House From Hell

Following is an Email I received about the "Pulte House From Hell". It was interesting enough for me to post, but please bear in mind that time simply does not permit me to get involved in all such endeavors.

Before diving into the house from hell let me first mention The Plight of The Implode-O-Meter. Implode-O-Meter has been sued, a motion to strike has been denied, and anyone wanting to help and/or anyone seeking more information can click on the above link for more details.

The Pulte house from hell:
My name is Susan Sabin.

I currently live in a house I purchased from Pulte Homes. I moved in on June 16, 2006 and after 28 days started experiencing problems. Almost one year later, the damage has accelerated to the point I have lost my homeowners insurance and Pulte denies any responsibility. I am not the only person in a subdivision that Pulte has built throughout the United States that is experiencing the same treatment. The website My Pulte Experience documents my experiences in detail.

I am fighting a multi-billion dollar company that couldn't care less about me as a homeowner. Their treatment of me is the antithesis of their well defined campaign on customer satisfaction and delight. I have filed more complaints than I can count. I have gone to agencies and offices where most just offer a response similar to "what do you want me to do about it?"

If you would like to read more about my journey through hell, I was featured in the Money magazine in March 2007 (Shoddy construction), There are also two media broadcasts dated Nov 06 and June 07 on youtube.com where my house (and another homeowner with a defective house) was featured on KMBC 9 (local Kansas City).

Thank you for your time. I appreciate it.

Susan Sabin
Excerpts from Susan's Website: My Pulte Experience
Since the October 11th 2006 inspection, the living floor has bowed in three places which can be visually seen causing the wooden floor slats to begin to separate. There are more cracks in the drywall in various rooms in the house. The plumbing pipes are begin to show stress from being compressed by the floor rising. The ductwork and pipes from the furnace and the water heater are bending more as the floor rises. The stair way continues to separate from the wall, the boards are being pulled apart and the stair frame is splitting and cracking. The stair frame is also rising above the steps. This can be visually seen. The blue insulation strips that are placed in between the basement top and the framework continues to be 'spit' 'squeezed' from between the two. The bolts that hold the sump pump pipes to the wall are being pulled from the concrete and the concrete is also cracking off in small hunks. The hairline cracks have gotten larger and one of them leaks when ever it rains. The one gas pipe that leads to the furnace was replaced with a flexible pipe because of an impending safety issue.

When I first moved into this house, the floors did not squeak or sway. They shouldn't because a silent floor type material was used for the joists. Now (posting this October 26th 2006 ), when I walk across the room, things I have on my table jiggle or move. The mirror above my dresser in the master bedroom sways back and forth. The floor makes noises. Of course the reason for this is the floor is heaving in places, and the more it heaves upward, the more uneven it becomes. In addition there is no support for these joists. They are just 'out there' within nothing to rest on. Of course they can't rest on anything because they have been pushed up.

The Pulte lawyer has stated they (Pulte) don't believe my engineer's report. Pulte believes there is nothing wrong with the house that a few years of settling won't fix.

....

In the meantime, the damage gets worse on a daily basis. What is worse is that in my heart I know that Pulte knew there was a soil problem before this house was built. I live on a corner and there is only one other lot on this corner. Pulte chose not to build it after pouring the basement and the flatwork. They told me that it was because the lot had not sold, but since out of approximately ten houses being built mine and the one across the street were the only houses that were not speculative (spec), that doesn't pass the logic test. In addition the floor in the basement next to me is cracking and heaving AND there is no weight on the basement. I also noticed that Pulte has added extra pipes for drainage and run an extention cord to run the sump pump. This is not normal procedure for a house that is in the basement stage.

Because I have talked about the lot next to me that was halted after the basement/flatwork stage, I have decided to show some pictures. Click enter to take a peek! I have added some new pictures. We have had some horrific rains and the basement now looks like a pool!

A day or two after I posted the pictures of the basement, Pulte people were there fixing the sump pump and pumping out the water. I have just discovered ( June 23, 2007 ) the lot has been sold. Before the sold sign went on the placard (see pictures), Pulte had taken out the basement floor, they pushed dirt against the areas that have sunken to hide the "holes" and spruced it up. It is unfortunate the people who purchased this lot bought a house that has foundation problems even before the first board is nailed with a hammer.

...

The sale price of this house was $313,100. Incentives (another story) brought the sale price to $294,130.00. This was the appraised value of the house when I moved in June 16, 2006. The appraised value of the house on 1 January 2007 is $174,900 . This is a devaluation of the house of $119,230 in just SIX MONTHS!!!

Could I sell the house for $174,900? No. However, I was offered $40,000 for it a short time ago.

....
A Cure for Shoddy Work

Additional information can be found in the CNNMoney article The Cure for Shoddy Work. The dark side of the housing boom: too much subpar construction and renovation. But you don't have to simply sit and take it.....

But that was written back in March. Nothing has happened since then according to Susan.

Reply to Susan

Susan, other than publishing your story, and wishing you the best of luck, there is little that I can do for you other than to suggest getting the best real estate attorney that you can afford.

General Thoughts
  • For anyone that has purchased but not yet closed on a Pulte home, a Lennar home, a Meritage home, a KB Homes home, a Dominion home, Beazer, etc, etc, etc, and even a privately built custom home ..... consider hiring a home inspector before you close. Know what you are getting.
  • Consider renting until this all blows over.
  • If you have a down payment especially on a Florida condo (or any other property that will immediately put you hugely underwater), hire a good attorney and see if you have a legal reason to break the deal. If you can't break the deal legally, then consider walking away after consulting a legal professional about possible consequences.
  • If you bought a home but since realize you cannot afford it and have not yet closed, consider walking away from the deal after consulting a legal professional about possible consequences.
  • Be very leery of those who claim to find a renter for for your home, will save your home, will do a lease buyback or any other thing that seems too good to be true.
  • If it seems too good to be true, rest assured it is, no matter how hard anyone tries to convince you otherwise.
Market tops and fraud go hand in hand. We saw it with the dotcom bust, we saw it with housing and subprime lending, and we are seeing it happen yet again as I type. I am speaking of course about "buyout bingo" aka leveraged buyouts and other debt funded nonsense that is now starting to implode affecting a wide spectrum of financial equities and the market in general.

Nothing in this post to anyone or even in general should be taken as financial advice or advice of any kind. If you are having difficulty with housing or personal finances please consult your financial advisor and/or attorney for personal advice specific to your situation.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/