Thursday, 9 August 2007

Sudden Demand For Cash

If seems a sudden demand for cash has given the markets a bit of a problem. Many want cash but there is no cash to be found. This is odd because just yesterday someone told me the markets would soar because of all the "sideline cash". I will get to the sideline cash myth in a moment but let's first consider ECB Offers Unlimited Cash as Bank Lending Costs Soar.
The European Central Bank, in an unprecedented response to a sudden demand for cash from banks roiled by the subprime mortgage collapse in the U.S., loaned 94.8 billion euros ($130 billion) to assuage a credit crunch.

The ECB said it would provide unlimited cash as the fastest increase in overnight Libor since June 2004 signaled banks are reducing the supply of money just as investors retreat because of losses from the U.S. real-estate slump. BNP Paribas SA halted withdrawals from three investment funds today because the French bank couldn't value its holdings. Stocks in the U.S. and Europe fell, a turnaround from the past three days when investors concluded that credit market risks were abating.

"There seems to be a hole in the balance sheet of World Inc. that will have to filled by government intervention," said Peter Lynch, chairman of private equity fund Prime Active Capital Plc in Dublin. "The ECB is treating this like an emergency; it might make traders even more afraid."

The ECB said today it provided the largest amount ever in a single so-called "fine-tuning" operation, exceeding the 69.3 billion euros given on Sept. 12, 2001, the day after the terror attacks on New York.

"This is an old-fashioned credit crunch," Chris Low, the chief economist at FTN Financial in New York, said in a report today. "This is not a small thing. A credit crunch, when the short-term credit markets seize up, is extraordinarily serious, almost always the precursor of a significant recession."

"Somewhere out there, there are several people that are in trouble -- it's hard to put your finger on it," said Andrew Busch, global foreign-exchange strategist at BMO Capital Markets in Chicago. "I cannot name names. We know BNP has issues with three funds. But you do not see a movement in overnight rates like that unless there is a huge concern about liquidity and funding."
Wow. There's a bigger demand for cash now than the day after 911. That's rather amazing given all the sideline cash that I'm hearing about. Where is that cash if everyone seems to need it?

The Financial Times is reporting Liquidity fears spark volatility in global markets.
Earlier in the day the European Central Bank injected €94.8bn into money markets to shore up confidence in the financial system. Intervention on that scale had not been seen since the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001.

The trigger to the action was a sharp rise in overnight interest rates moving them to a six-year high of 4.7 per cent, well above the ECB’s main rate of 4 per cent.

"This liquidity-providing fine-tuning operation aims to assure orderly conditions in the euro money market. The ECB intends to allot 100 per cent of the bids it receives," the central bank said.

The unprecedented level of intervention followed a statement from BNP Paribas, the French bank, earlier on Thursday that it had decided to suspend redemptions on three investment funds, with an estimated value of €2bn, because of the deterioration in the credit markets.

The French bank blamed a “complete evaporation” of liquidity for the drastic step.

There were also concerns that one of Germany’s largest banks may have also been affected. Earlier the Bundesbank was forced to deny rumours that it was holding emergency talks to discuss problems at WestLB, the German bank.

“You have to think the odds of this becoming a systemic problem have gone up and it’s an appropriate response by the market to price in a near term rate cut,” said Jim Caron, co-head of global interest rate strategy at Morgan Stanley. “The big problem is we just don’t know how bad things could get. It will take more than one trading day to work through this.”
"This liquidity-providing fine-tuning operation aims to assure orderly conditions in the euro money market. The ECB intends to allot 100 per cent of the bids it receives," the central bank said.

I find it interesting that the biggest injection of cash in ECB history is now labeled "fine tuning". Heaven help us should the need arise for "coarse tuning".

The above statement by the ECB is interesting for another reason. Let's see if I can find it. Ah yes, here it is in Counterfeiting Money - Crime or Good Economics? written February 8, 2007.

If you have not yet read that (or even if you have) you might want a review. It's all about "legal counterfeiting". But the snip I was looking for pertains to the ECB.
Weber: European Central Bank council member Axel Weber said investors shouldn't expect central banks to bail them out in the event of an "abrupt" drop in financial markets. "If you misprice risk, don't come looking to us for liquidity assistance," Weber said in an interview in Davos, Switzerland at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. "The longer this goes on and the more risky positions are built up over time, the more luck you need."

Trichet: Current conditions in global financial markets look potentially "unstable", suggesting that investors need to prepare themselves for a significant "repricing" of some assets, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank. "We are currently seeing elements in global financial markets which are not necessarily stable," he said, pointing to the "low level of rates, spreads and risk premiums" as factors that could trigger a repricing.

Poole: "The Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital".

....

The most important facet of all of this is that monetary claims very likely exceed the pool of real funding by several orders of magnitude. When push comes to shove, this house of cards will eventually collapse in some way.
So we have the biggest "fine tuning" in history even though the ECB said "If you misprice risk, don't come looking to us for liquidity assistance".

Where the heck is the cash?

With that out of the way, where the heck is all the cash if so much of it is sitting on the sidelines?
For starters there is always "sideline cash" (well sort of but not exactly). The "sort of" is that for every stock buyer there is a seller. If there is a billion dollars on the sidelines waiting to buy stocks there will be still be a billion dollars on the sidelines after those stock purchases because for every buyer there is a seller. So the sideline cash theory is just circular logic. A better way to look at things is mutual fund cash levels. They have never been lower. And with massive hedge fund withdrawal requests there are more looking to get out than get in.

But is that really cash that's sitting on the sidelines in the first place? It looks like it but it's a mirage. (This is the "not really" side of the argument.) It is really sideline credit. And the opposite side of the credit ledger is debt. There is staggeringly little cash relative to credit. I talked about this recently in Fleckenstein (and others) State the Deflation Case.
The top is only beginning to wobble. When people tell me "there is so much money out there" I tell them that no, there is so much credit out there. This will be a muli-year process of debt reduction and deflation to correct what the Fed has wrought.
The above snip is thanks to Minyanville's Mr. Practical.

Here is a second snip from Fleckenstein (and others) State the Deflation Case. This one is from Trotsky.
[Credit vs debt is at the root of the misunderstandings of the inflation vs. deflation debates]. Because credit is used as a money substitute in the financial markets, it acts as an inflationary force in the asset markets (and this spills over into the real world as the imaginary wealth thus created leads to overconsumption and malinvestments), but it is all ephemeral - in the end, it is still credit, not money. As soon as money is needed in lieu of credit, such as has now happened in the CMO and CDO markets, it becomes clear that the money simply isn't there."
So there you have it. There is actually very little real cash out there relative to credit. The "sudden demand for cash" is in fact the world's biggest margin call to date. And in spite of saying they wouldn't fund a mispricing of risk the ECB is attempting to do just that. The Fed will too. But it won't work for the simple reason it can't work. Credit far exceeds both underlying asset values and real cash. Sideline cash is really sideline credit and in such cases problems occur when the pool of greater fools runs out and/or credit funding is cut off for those fools. Look at canceled IPOs for the score. Also look at M3 compared to base money supply to see just how out of whack things are. The implications are certainly not inflationary. All it takes to tip over the wobbling top is a change in attitude toward risk and a repricing of a significant portion of assets. Both are happening now.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Prisoner's Dilemma

A lot of play has been given to the article "China threatens 'nuclear option' of dollar sales".
The Chinese government has begun a concerted campaign of economic threats against the United States, hinting that it may liquidate its vast holding of US treasuries if Washington imposes trade sanctions to force a yuan revaluation.

Two officials at leading Communist Party bodies have given interviews in recent days warning - for the first time - that Beijing may use its $1.33 trillion (£658bn) of foreign reserves as a political weapon to counter pressure from the US Congress. Shifts in Chinese policy are often announced through key think tanks and academies.

Described as China's "nuclear option" in the state media, such action could trigger a dollar crash at a time when the US currency is already breaking down through historic support levels.

It would also cause a spike in US bond yields, hammering the US housing market and perhaps tipping the economy into recession. It is estimated that China holds over $900bn in a mix of US bonds.

He Fan, an official at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, went even further today, letting it be known that Beijing had the power to set off a dollar collapse if it choose to do so.

"China has accumulated a large sum of US dollars. Such a big sum, of which a considerable portion is in US treasury bonds, contributes a great deal to maintaining the position of the dollar as a reserve currency. Russia, Switzerland, and several other countries have reduced the their dollar holdings.

"China is unlikely to follow suit as long as the yuan's exchange rate is stable against the dollar. The Chinese central bank will be forced to sell dollars once the yuan appreciated dramatically, which might lead to a mass depreciation of the dollar," he told China Daily.

Simon Derrick, a currency strategist at the Bank of New York Mellon, said the comments were a message to the US Senate as Capitol Hill prepares legislation for the Autumn session.

"The words are alarming and unambiguous. This carries a clear political threat and could have very serious consequences at a time when the credit markets are already afraid of contagion from the subprime troubles," he said.

A bill drafted by a group of US senators, and backed by the Senate Finance Committee, calls for trade tariffs against Chinese goods as retaliation for alleged currency manipulation.

The yuan has appreciated 9pc against the dollar over the last two years under a crawling peg but it has failed to halt the rise of China's trade surplus, which reached $26.9bn in June.

Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, said any such sanctions would undermine American authority and "could trigger a global cycle of protectionist legislation".
Sure, the threat is there. But how likely is it? I asked a friend of mine "Trotsky" who I highly respect what he thought. Here was his reply:
I just had a long debate with someone else about this. Assuming China's leadership hasn't suddenly become totally irrational, this will not happen. (Besides, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is an alarmist scoring a 10 on the Prechter Scale).

What could happen is that the situation's inner dynamics eventually get out of hand by themselves. The big reserve holders are in a Prisoner's Dilemma - selling means that they bring about what they fear most, but whoever sells first may get the best price.

The only thing that could make this 'nuclear option' a reality is if something not yet known or expected happens and imparts an irrational impetus to the situation's dynamics. I've used the start of WW1 as an example describing such a situation.

It's not impossible, but from a real-politik standpoint, it is highly unlikely. Sometimes China let's an academic speak up in a newspaper in order to unveil threats, sort of reminding everybody of who's who in the zoo....but these threats do not constitute actual policy.
In a second Email I received these additional comments:
Paulson was interviewed today, and inter alia this 'nuclear option' theme came up. I thought he had a very measured and rational response to that, noting that the economic relationship is in the interest and to the advantage of both countries, and generally taking a rather relaxed, and more importantly, anti-protectionist stance.

Paulson noted that the threat of Chinese t-bond sales is overstated, as their entire holdings amount to one day's worth of volume in this market, which I think is an important point as well.

To this I would add that anyone who really thinks for a minute about trade should realize that since it is entirely voluntary, it must be to the advantage of all concerned, otherwise it wouldn't take place. It follows therefore that it is beneficial.

The senate is trying to enact the 'currency manipulation bill' which is clearly aimed at China and is incredible nonsense. After all, who's to tell what value the yuan should be at until it floats, and besides it's already going up for quite some time now (even if not by much). Should the EU hit back with a bill of its own?

All the talk about a 'strong dollar' policy hasn't kept the Euro from soaring after all. Also not to forget: back when Japan was the favorite whipping boy, its currency eventually went on a tear. Did that help the trade deficit with Japan any? These guys play 'populist politics' on the backs of US consumers and Chinese producers, but in reality it's just a pretty transparent and cynical pleading for special interest groups (domestic producers who do not want to be subjected to competition).
As hard as it is to believe, on occasion, government clowns can occasionally make sense. Take for example Greenspan. In spite of all his serious and many faults, Greenspan did have one redeeming quality: Greenspan was an advocate of free trade from beginning to end. It might have been the only thing he had correct, but he did have that.

On free trade, Paulson too appears to be on the right side of things. Nonetheless the fact that Paulson was trotted out on the White House lawn to speak on this matter suggests they are far more concerned about the economy and about Congress than may be obvious. And Bush trying to reassure the markets by telling everyone how strong the economy is a sure sign that he is worried about how weak it is. If the economy was strong, everyone would not need to communicate that fact on an almost daily basis.

The general population can easily see how not contained this mess is. Containments spreads nearly every day. And making things harder to discern fact from fiction with Paulson is the repeated nonsense about a "strong dollar" policy when he clearly wants it weaker. Why else would Paulson head to China every month suggesting China should float the Renminbi if the US did not want a weaker dollar? But Paulson and Congress ought both be careful. Weaker is one thing but a disorderly decline is another, and a depression is still another. If Congress does pass a protectionist tariff bill and overrides the inevitable Bush veto of it, the only immediate effect will be a strengthening of the upcoming recession, just as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act did in the great depression.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, 8 August 2007

High Rate CDs and other Moral Hazards

The Pittsburgh Post Gazette has the sad story of a man whose lifetime of saving evaporated with the collapse of Metropolitan Savings Bank.
Raymond Przybilinski socked away $521,000 from a lifetime of driving trucks, working overtime when he could and playing the piano or accordion late into the evenings at weddings, hotel bars and social clubs.

The money was destined for his five children. But that was before more than half of the family nest egg disappeared on Feb. 2 as state banking regulators seized Metropolitan Savings Bank in Lawrenceville, citing "unsafe and unsound" operations. When Mr. Przybilinski tried to take his money out, the man in charge of Metropolitan Savings' assets informed him that there was only $200,000 left to withdraw -- the amount protected by the federal government.
School of Hard Knock Lessons
  • If a bank is offering above market rate interest on CDs and deposits there is a reason behind it. That reason is risk. And with excessive risk comes eventual disaster.
  • With credit spreads widening, margin calls being issued, and absurd lending to build condos in Florida and other places smack in the face of record inventories, there are going to be more bank failures like this.
  • Know and understand the FDIC limits or your life savings can be wiped out.
  • If you have money at a bank in excess of the FDIC limits, do something about it now, while you can.
Moral Hazard

The moral Hazard in this is called risk. Banks are willing to take risk with customers money far beyond what is prudent. And the smaller the bank the less risk banks should take. But because of FDIC insurance both banks and depositors do risky things because of those government guarantees. But as we have seen above, guarantees are available only up to certain limits.

But should there be guarantees at all? Probably not, except on checking accounts and other demand deposits. Why checking accounts? Because logic dictates checking account deposits are supposed to be available immediately on demand and should not be lent out.

Logic? Who cares about logic? Banks are allowed to lend out checking account deposits even though they pay no interest on those accounts. Customers assume the risk and banks literally sweep up the profit. This is a sweet deal for the banks and is accomplished ironically enough via sweeps.

Sweeps are a mechanism by which "excess capital" is swept from some accounts into other buckets based on patterns of expected behavior (not all customers are going to demand all of their money all at once). Money in the accounts where the money was swept is allowed to be lent out. In essence, the money sitting in your checking account right now is not really sitting there at all. It's lent out all over the place (in theory overnight but in practice for god knows how long or for what).

Massive Surge in Sweeps



The above chart came from a study about bank reserve requirements by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in May 2002.

The complete research paper is a 16 page PDF called Are Reserve Requirements Still Binding?

... retail sweep programs are an inefficient and costly way to avoid reserve regulations. The proliferation of these programs therefore underscores the need for reform.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented evidence that reserve requirements are rapidly losing relevance. Although a sizable minority of banks are still bound by reserve requirements in an accounting sense, in an economic sense our evidence suggests that such requirements have had a lessening effect on banks for at least several years. ....
The study does not say it explicitly but I will. There are essentially no bank reserves. Wait a second, I take that back. The combination of fractional reserve lending and sweeps really means there are negative reserves. Far more money has been lent out than really exists. For more on this idea please see the sections "The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning" and "Money vs. Debt" in Fleckstein (and others) State the Deflation Case with a tip of the hat to Minyanville professor John Succo for both sections.

Inquiring minds might now be asking "Exactly how are M1 and M2 affected by sweeps?" It's a very good question. The answer can be found in Money Supply and Recessions.

For now let's return to the moral hazard. When banks offer above market rate interest rates on CDs the money pours in. It goes pouring in explicitly because of government guarantees. Banks in turn take high risks with that money to be able to afford the high rates. All kinds of projects are thus funded that have no business being funded, like Florida condos for example.

Consider the Business Summary of Corus Bank.
Corus Bankshares, Inc. operates as the holding company for Corus Bank, N.A. that offers consumer and corporate banking products and services. The bank's deposit products include checking, savings, money market, and time deposit accounts. Its loan portfolio primarily comprises commercial real estate loans, including condominium construction and condominium conversion loans; commercial loans; and residential real estate loans. The bank focuses its lending activities in various metropolitan areas in Florida and California, as well as in Las Vegas, New York City, and the Washington, D.C.
Corus bank is operating in nearly every major housing bubble area.
Consider the chart of Corus Bank.

Corus Bank - Cors



High Yield Rates for 1 yr CDs

One can find high rate CDs on Bankrate.com.
The following table is as of August t 2007.



By guaranteeing those CDs, money flows to the highest yields simply because of those government guarantees. Who in their right mind would be lending Corus Bank money at such minuscule returns over treasury rates were it not for those guarantees?

Depositors can't really be blamed for this. It's only logical to seek out the highest rates. But one misstep as Raymond Przybilinski found out, can cost a person his life savings. And all sorts of absurd condo projects are getting funded because depositors plowed money into guaranteed CDs and savings accounts.

All things considered, FDIC insurance is a moral hazard except for non-interest bearing checking deposits that banks should not be permitted to be lend out. And anyone wanting risk free returns should buy US treasuries.

I have no problem with banks offering above market rates on CDs provided they and the depositors assume full risk. Taking risk and accepting responsibility for that risk is what the free market is all about. That means no FDIC insurance on those rates and no taxpayer bailouts if and when things blow up.

One point I forgot to emphasize in Will Rate Cuts Save The Economy? is the actions requested by Jim Cramer represent a huge moral hazard as well. When there is an implicit guarantee (sometimes known as the Greenspan Put), people and businesses do all sorts of irresponsible things. Proof is easy to find these days. And although Cramer should know better, he went far beyond asking for rate cuts, he went so far as to ask the Fed to buy massive numbers of futures to blow out the shorts. In other words Cramer was begging for PPT intervention and rate cuts by the Fed without once considering the moral implication of what he was asking.

Congress Never Learns Either

In point number 4 of Tuesday's Five Things, Kevin Depew was asking Who's Afraid of Fannie Mae? Let's take a look.
Yesterday afternoon there was talk the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, the GSE regulator, was actively working on ways to expand the portfolio caps that legislation this past spring reduced. Why? Because, as FNM interim chief executive Daniel Mudd and FRE Chief Executive Richard Syron explained to the Senate Banking Committee this past spring, the ability to hold onto some of those loans, and to expand them, can keep funding available in a crisis.

Sure enough, a piece on Bloomberg yesterday afternoon reported, "Fannie Mae, the largest source of money for U.S. home loans, asked its regulator for permission to take on more mortgage assets and help ease a crunch in the credit markets, a person with knowledge of the request said." Well, considering that's the same thing Fannie Mae has been saying for the past two years as legislators sought to cap their portfolios it's hardly news. Unless... unless it's not Fannie Mae doing the asking.

Who else might be asking? Politicians being pressured by banking executives who are worried about how serious the situation in credit markets has become. That would mean that in less than three months we've gone from political pressure to limit the portfolios of GSEs, to political pressure to expand the portfolio limits of the GSEs.

So, who's afraid of Fannie Mae? Us. If these portfolio caps are raised, it would suggest credit market problems are far more serious than thought.
Kevin did not explicitly say it, but once again the moral hazard should be obvious. It was irresponsible lending and borrowing that created this mess. Now, to alleviate the problems caused by irresponsible lending and borrowing, Congress does a complete flip flop demands more of the same.

Instead, I suggest it's time for both people and businesses to consider the consequences of their actions and to be held accountable for them. That is the only way to end these moral hazards.

Monetary Statistics Review

By the way I want to personally thank Gary North for reviewing the money supply aggregate I call M Prime (M') in his recent post Monetary Statistics on LewRockwell.com. He posted that article in response to one of his reader's questions. M' just happens to tie in very nicely with this post. Here are a few snips:
Recently, I was asked a question about money statistics. The person asked if I thought a particular unofficial index is better than the official indexes: M1, M2, M3, MZM.

The article by "Mish"
discusses a recent article by Frank Shostak. I am familiar with the work of both men. They are thoughtful, well-informed analysts of economic trends. Shostak does this for a living. He actually invests money for clients. Mish is an advocate of Elliott wave theory forecasting. I am not. Shostak is an Austrian School economist, a view I share. But I don’t always follow his logic. This may be my fault.

Mish’s article makes several important observations about the relationship between the most prominent monetary aggregates and the economy. He finds that M1 is far better than the other three in forecasting recessions.

Mish has come up with a new aggregate, which he calls M-prime. He symbolizes it as M'. Using Shostak’s article as a guide, he argues that M' is superior theoretically because it does not include any credit transactions, i.e., "sell this asset and get money." I agree with his assessment. ....

Mish says that we should focus on the rate of change. This is provided by the yellow line. This does seem to be an accurate forecasting tool. ....

Mish did a follow-up on May 9: "Money Supply is Soaring ... Right?"
It takes to task the use of M-3. I agree wholeheartedly.
....
CONCLUSION

I think M-prime is a better measure than the other M's. If I could get access to it every month on Mish’s site, I would consult it.
Note to Gary North and other inquiring minds: The biggest difference between M' and M1 is sweeps. And as shown above, sweeps have exploded.

In a previous phone conversation I had with economist Paul Kasriel, Paul stated an opinion that the Fed keeps tracks of sweeps in their review of M1. Of course that is a theory that cannot be proven, which is exactly what Kasriel said to me.

I would like to correct a couple of small things Gary North said. Ewave it is just one of the tools we use. We use many other tools as well such as advance decline, support resistance, and many other technical analysis tools. I would never recommend using E-wave alone. The "we" in this paragraph refers to Sitka Pacific Capital Management. I am a licensed investment manager representative for Sitka Pacific. Sitka Pacific publishes monthly commentary about the markets and one can sign up for free, or view it online at by clicking that last link.

I will see what I can do about more timely updates of M' especially if people are interested in tracking it. By the way, the charts are actually produced by "Bart" at NowAndFutures using specifications from me based on a formula from prior articles written by Frank Shostak. Without help from NowAndFutures, those charts would not be published. So thanks to both "Bart" and Frank Shostak as well. But don't look for fireworks. It moves pretty slowly especially to someone used to watching M3. Also note that our sweeps data is about one month delayed. Thank the Fed for that. But all things considered we are probably lucky the Fed posts sweeps data at all.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, 7 August 2007

Fleckenstein (and others) State the Deflation Case

I was surprised to see Bill Fleckenstein, a long time believer in inflation, state the case for a Japanese style deflation in the US. But it's right here in America follows Japan's misguided path.
....Given all our problems related to debt, I thought it might be worthwhile, particularly for new readers, to provide a brief history leading up to where we are now.

Taking a big step back, the Bank of Japan acted foolishly throughout the 1980s, which caused that country to experience enormous real-estate and stock bubbles. Japan's stock bubble was really a residue of its real-estate bubble -- actually a credit bubble, as the banks lent money to any corporation with a pulse. (Does that sound familiar?)

Then the institutions that lent the money took forever to write off the bad loans. That's why Japan's real-estate market, stock market and economy did so poorly for more than a decade.

Free money exacts a price

After [the dotcom] bubble, Greenspan took a page out of the Bank of Japan's book and lowered rates to 1%. That helped precipitate the housing bubble here that ended in 2005.

As to why the unwinding has taken so long to commence, only recently has the cause become clear: the mark-to-model fantasy employed by those who have bought the sliced-and-diced mortgage paper.

But the fantasy is unraveling as these structured-credit products are now slowly being marked to market. Just as virtually every subprime-mortgage lender has blown up, Alt-A lenders (the next rung up the ladder creditwise) will blow up -- and, ultimately, many hedge funds will blow up, though we're in the early days of that process.

In the years since our equity bubble peaked, trillions of dollars' worth of debt have piled up throughout corporate America. So now, as we enter recession, we will experience not just a weak economy, real-estate market and stock market, but the exacerbating effect of a mountain of bad debt, completing the analogy to Japan of the 1990s.
Like it or not (and I suspect he might not because he did not use the D-Word itself) Fleckenstein described how and why a Japanese style deflation is headed for the US.

Economist Paul Kasriel at the Northern Trust also describes how a Japanese style deflation can occur in the US. Please read Interview with Paul Kasriel if you have not yet done so.

The D-Word

Two of my favorite professors on Minyanville are not afraid to use the D-Word (deflation). Point #1 in Kevin Depew's daily dose of Five Things was FOMC Preview: Their Greatest Fear.
..... Stocks may still be up but as Professor Bennet Sedacca noted on the Minyanville Buzz and Banter this morning, financials rallied huge yesterday, but what about corporate spreads, the true barometer of the health of the financial industry? "Believe it or not, spreads on brokerage and bank corporates are actually wider than yesterday morning," Sedacca said. That means someone has it wrong. Either equity investors haven't woken up to credit market problems, or credit markets are overestimating the risk of owning corporate debt. "My guess is the credit market has it right," he said.

This explains in part why it feels so treacherous right now. If the markets have decided that too much credit is too easily available, as it appears they already have, then the Fed can simply lower rates to make credit more available. Problem solved. But what if there are two separate but related forces at work: tightening lending standards and reduced credit appetites? Then the Fed has something more serious on their hands.

The key in all of this is not inflation, as most believe. The Fed says they are most worried about inflation risks, but the reality is that they are most worried about deflation risks. Always. Always deflation. The Fed has no choice but to always remind us that the risks are tilted toward inflation, just as the Treasury Secretary, whichever one happens to be in office at the time, must always say that the U.S. maintains a strong dollar policy, even if monetary policy and fiscal policy are conspiring to devalue the dollar.

As for equities, when the dollar begins to rise, and it appears the Fed finally will begin to cut rates, as they inevitably must to try and sustain credit consumption, then it's time to worry. That means deflation is winning.
The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning

One of the best articles I've on the subject of deflation was Mr. Practical's (Professor John Succo's) article today on Minyanville: The Fed is Keeping the Top Spinning.
The "strong U.S. economy" has been pushed and pushed along by 25 years of hyper credit expansion fostered by the Federal Reserve. When witnessing the tumultuous results of just a slowing down of the credit expansion, one can only imagine the problems that will surface once credit begins to contract in earnest.

And here lies the crux of the matter: what the Fed has done over the last 25 years is artificially decrease the relative value of real money in the U.S. system while increasing the relative value of debt. It has done so with no concern for the level of income generated to pay that debt back. The Fed through their hyper expansionary credit policy and Wall Street through financial engineering have loaded the system with debt not supported by a commensurate level of future (present) income.

But the Fed has been able to accomplish what it has only because investors, for the above reasons, have lost sight of this hidden risk. The Fed doesn’t really have the power to create more and more of this artificial liquidity called debt; they need investors to cooperate. Here is why.

The Fed really only can do two things (Prof. Succo has explained this situation, but let's go over it again). [Mish comment: Prof. Succo's previous explanation follows these excerpts]. They can lower margin requirements for banks, the amount of capital they have to hold to make loans. That it has already driven to basically zero. So the Fed cannot allow banks any more “leeway” than it already has.

They can also perform open market money operations like REPOS and coupon passes. The Fed calls up big banks and buys their government bonds out of their portfolio. But they don’t buy them with real money; they buy them with credit newly created just for that purpose. The big bank can then lend that credit out in a much greater amount because the Fed only requires them to keep a small fraction of that credit to support whatever the bank wants to lend out. This is our wonderful fractional reserve system. If everyone went to the bank to get their “savings” at once they would find that they could get out less than 1%.

But here is the key. The bank must ultimately be willing to lend it and then find some investor to borrow it. This has been no problem whatsoever over the last several years. Now most investors realize that they have too much debt, that their level of income cannot support it. Banks realize this too and have increased their lending requirements. The last borrower is always the most aggressive speculator.

So most market participants are now looking for ways to pay back debt (deflation) just when the Fed is desperate to get investors to borrow more (inflation).

The top is only beginning to wobble. When people tell me “there is so much money out there” I tell them that no, there is so much credit out there. This will be a muli-year process of debt reduction and deflation to correct what the Fed has wrought.

Best regards,
Mr. Practical
Those are small snips from a great article. I recommend clicking on the link above and reading the entire piece.

Money vs. Debt

As noted earlier here is Minyanville professor John Succo on Money vs. Debt.
Mini-Minyan Mailbag
Minyan MC to Professor Succo:

I was given these general statistics on U.S. circulation of dollars, and I was wondering if they were somewhat accurate?
$2 trln was put in circulation from 1776 through 1990
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 1991 through 2000 (for a total of $4 trln)
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2001 through 2003 (for a total of $6 trln)
$2 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2004 through 2005 (for a total of $8 trln)
$2.8 trln more was added and was put in circulation from 2006 through 1st half 2007 (for a total of $10.8+- trln)

So, essentially, in the last six and a half years, circulation of U.S. Dollars has increased by 170% (10.8 minus 4.0 = 6.8 trln dollars added to the system). And what do people say about free money?
What do you think?

Professor Succo to Minyan MC:

Minyan MC,
Yes, but it is not really “money”. The stats you quote are “debt”.
There is no “money” any more.
The actual money used to be backed by gold.
Actual money stock is 0.001% of what people call the money supply.
The money supply is really the debt supply.
Thanks to Mr. Practical, Kevin Depew, Paul Kasriel, and John Succo for helping explain how a Japanese style deflation could hit the US. The key point is deflation is caused by a massive increase in credit/debt not supported by a commensurate level of income. In simple terms, there is no way to ever pay back what has been borrowed. It's also critical to understand the distinction between a hyperexpansion of credit and a hyperinflationary printing of money. The former is what caused the Great Depression (and is happening again now), while the latter happened in the Weimar republic and is happening right now in Zimbabwe.

Addendum

My friend who posts on Kitco under the alias "Trotsky" just pinged me with this comment: "absolutely correct - this at the root of the misunderstandings out there. because credit is used as a money substitute in the financial markets, it acts as an inflationary force in the asset markets (and this spills over into the real world as the imaginary wealth thus created leads to overconsumption and malinvestments), but it is all ephemeral - in the end, it is still credit, not money. as soon as money is needed in lieu of credit, such as has now happened in the CMO and CDO markets, it becomes clear that the money simply isn't there."

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Monday, 6 August 2007

Will Rate Cuts Save The Economy?

The question of the day is "Will interests rate cut by the Fed save housing and the economy?"

Jim Cramer Says "Yes"

Jim Cramer's opinion can be seen in Financial TV host flips out over the state of the economy.



(click on the above link to see Cramer in action)

But the answer is "No".

So we've seen what Cramer has to say, let's take a serious look at whether Fed rate cuts will save the economy and why I believe the answer must be "no".

The first reason is that long term rates (the 10 year treasury), simply may not decline when the Fed starts cutting. Does anyone remember "Greenspan's Conundrum"? If not, Greenspan was perplexed as to why long term rates did not rise much as a series of 17 consecutive rate hikes by the Fed were made. On that basis it is therefore entirely possible that when the Fed starts cutting (and they will), that long term treasury rates may not follow. Clever readers will now be asking "Wait a second Mish, you said may and now you are presuming will. What gives?"

That brings up reason number two. Everyone knows Mortgage rates are directly tied to the 10 year treasury note. Or are they? I have been stating for well over a year that mortgage rates would disconnect from the 10 year treasury note. Some have laughed at me for that viewpoint. But my reason was simple: increasing default risk would eventually force it.

While the "Reverse Conundrum Hypothesis" is indeed just that (it may or may not happen and now I think that it won't but it could), the 10 yr vs. mortgage rate disconnect is no longer a theory. Eventually has arrived. The disconnect is now well underway. It started in June and has blown wide open in the last two weeks. Yes, I have proof.

Consider the following chart of treasury yields for the past 12 months.

$TNX - Treasury Yields



(click on any chart for a crisper view)

The above chart shows all the major rallies and declines in the 10 yr treasury over the past year in basis points.

Bankrate.com 30 year fixed mortgage rates



(basis points are approximate given chart scales)

Major Moves: Treasuries vs. 30 yr Fixed Mortgages

32 basis points vs. 20 basis points
44 basis points vs. 37 basis points
43 basis points vs. 22 basis points
84 basis points vs. 74 basis points
60 basis points vs. 13 basis points

Look at those last two data points closely.
An 84 basis point rally in the 10 year led to a 74 basis point hike in mortgage rates.
On the subsequent decline of 60 basis points only 13 were picked up in mortgage rates.

But it's not even that good. Not even close.

Bankrate.com 30 year fixed mortgage rate Jumbos



Jumbo rates went UP even with that substantial rally in treasuries.

Bankrate.com 5/1 ARMs



5/1 Arms are similar to 30 year fixed but.... for all the additional risk, the consumer is saving a mere 25 basis points.

All of the above charts are for Prime Loans, with good credit scores, and a down payment. Inquiring minds are no doubt wondering what happens in other conditions.

Major Disconnect in Subprime

Late last Friday I gave a call to Dave Donhoff at No Bull Mortgage and was wondering about subprime and Alt-A, and how they were affected by these treasury gyrations. Before I go further, let me say that Dave is one of the good guys. He has not had a single returned loan or foreclosure on one of his customers in the last 6 years. Although Dave has not been tracking exactly what I wanted he did offer this:
  • Almost all stated income loans everywhere vanished last Friday.
  • Almost all 2/28 ARMs vanished last Friday.
  • While this was eventually expected it was not expected by everyone overnight.
As we were talking I was fortunate that a representative of major mortgage lender who had a scheduled appointment stopped by to see Dave. That person agreed to talk to me on condition anonymity so I will honor the request. But here is what I found out from that major lending insider.
  • Subprime rates have risen by as much as 190 basis points at his organization in just the last 2 weeks!
  • Many other lending institutions have done the same thing.
  • The definition of prime has tightened considerably, everywhere.
  • Any variance from prime raises the mortgage rate.
  • Small differences in FICO score now matter (sometimes by a lot).
  • Every little thing adds up.
  • 90% LTV rates are higher than 85% LTV rates which are higher than 80% LTV rates.
  • 100% LTV rates are very difficult to come for subprime and even Alt-A.
  • Condos vs. homes matters significantly.
  • There were 3 rate increases in the last 2 weeks even as 10 year treasury rates rallied.
  • Second mortgages have nearly vanished - no market.
  • 2/28 arms - gone.
  • Someone who is "really clean" but is not prime (but close) and is putting down 20% has had a 70-80 basis point hike in the last 2 weeks.
  • The bankrate charts might not show it, but in the last two weeks nearly every loan rate went up even as treasuries rallied significantly. The primest of prime was perhaps flat.
A 190 basis point hike in two weeks was so shocking that I asked for a repeat. "90?" I asked. "No. that's 190 basis points" came the reply. For those not familiar with the term basis points, 100 basis points is a 1% rise in the loan rate. For example, 190 basis points would send a mortgage loan from 7% to 8.9%. The bigger the loan the bigger the increase in monthly payments (ouch!)

Virtually any subprime borrower whose arm is due to reset later this year or early next year and has not yet rolled over the loan is obviously in deep trouble regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. Not only is the teaser rate itself going to rise dramatically because of the rising treasury rates, the risk component has risen as much as 190 basis points in addition to that.

Furthermore, anyone in a stated income loan, anyone with a second mortgage, anyone in a pay option arm, or anyone in a 2/28 is now locked out of all those options. (Please see Locked Out for more on what's happening through the eyes of Bankrate.com). And finally, as Dave Donhoff put it to me, "Many buyers are discovering there is a difference between quoted rates and actual availability of funding at those rates".

Let's Assume A Miracle

But let's assume a miracle. Let's assume that the Fed cuts rates 100 basis points in a surprise move on the advice of Cramer, interest rate spreads plunge, there is no treasury/mortgage rate disconnect, the 10 year treasury rate drops significantly, mortgage rates follow the 10 year rate lower, fixed rate mortgages at reasonable rates are offered to everyone regardless of credit risk, and the US dollar does not blow up in response. Wow. Nonetheless, let's assume that Miracles R Us grants all that as a single miracle request. Unfortunately there are still two sticky questions to resolve.

Sticky Questions

1) Is the consumer out of the woods?
2) Is the economy out of the woods?

The answer to both questions is still no. Remember that foreclosures are massively rising even though the bulk of interest rates resets is still upcoming. Many of those teaser rates were put in place as the Fed slashed rates to 1%. Cramer simply did not ask for enough.

Consumers need not only lower rates, but the initial teaser rates they had (if not even lower). So let's assume still another miracle: mortgage rates reset at the prior teaser rate lows regardless of risk, negative amortization, or worsening FICO scores of the applicants. That's asking a hell of a lot more of Miracles R Us but the Miracle Fairy heard my telepathic plea and returned my call on the Miracles R Us Miracle Hotline. I was told that both miracles would be granted if I could honestly assure them that it would solve all the problems.

Sadly, I had to inform Miracles R Us the honest truth: Still more miracles on top of those miracles would be needed. With that, Miracles R Us issued me an MDT (Miracle Denied Ticket) and told me I could apply again in six to twelve months.

The Miracle Fairy went on to explain the reason for denial: "We are swamped with requests but the Ministry of Miracle's Magic Miracle Bucket (MMMMB) is severely depleted and massively underfunded at this time. Even we Miracle Fairies at Miracles R Us are affected by liquidity issues, and it's the worst possible time too, with so many miracle requests pouring in. We suspect there was a leak in our Miracle Bucket raining unwarranted miracles over the populace for the last four years. We are now officially in MRM (Miracle Rationing Mode)" and your request is simply too big.

With that explanation, the Miracle Hotline was abruptly terminated. I had more questions to ask the Miracle Fairy but they remain unanswered. Given how busy the Miracle Fairy is I am rather pleased she took the initial call.

Inquiring minds are no doubt asking why I told the Miracle Fairy that more miracles would be needed. The reasons center around debt servicing and jobs. There is simply no pent up demand for housing, no growth in wages, and no way cash strapped consumers can service current debt loads. There is also no source of jobs that an overheated housing market created. There is no need for more Home Depots, Lowes, Pizza Huts, Applebees, nail salons, strip malls, Walmarts, etc etc. In fact there is a need for less stores not more and the coming consumer led recession will prove it. Overcapacity is simply rampant. It would take even more miracles to correct all of that.

Is there pent up consumer demand in anything? If there is, why is Walmart slashing prices on 16,000 items smack in the face of rising energy prices? (Please see Price Wars for an explanation). July had the worst decline in US auto sales in years. Is a rate cut supposed to cure that?

The jobs picture is weak and hiring is not even keeping up with the birth rate plus immigration as explained in Martian Economists and BLS Moonbats. And unless more miracles are granted, this is the end of the line for unnecessary corporate expansion. But please don't blame me, I'm just the messenger. Take it up with Miracles R Us.

Oh sure, Starbucks will add another 15,000 stores or whatever (perhaps) but will they be in the US or China or India? So where is the replacement for US jobs that housing provided supposed to come from?

Corporate Profits Have Peaked

The merger mania, buyout bingo, CDO, and LBO parties each went on longer than anyone expected. But the parties are now clearly over. And all of those parties added enormous up-front profits to the pockets of broker dealers like Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Lehman, and scores of hedge funds.

It took about a year longer than expected for subprime to blow up. But Lenders are now blowing up in a magnificent display of fireworks. The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter is at 109 as I type, and more implosions are added every week. By the way, Implode-O-Meter is being sued and a summary judgment to dismiss the lawsuit was tossed. For more information please see Judge Franklin R. Taft Denies Ml-Implode Motion To Strike via Anti-SLAPP.

Expect far fewer stock buybacks on borrowed money, far fewer leveraged buyouts and tighter lending conditions all across the board regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. And we still have not seen enough write downs related to subprime slime. Of $565 billion in subprime loans made in 2005-2006 (the worst years), a mere 2-3% of that has been downgraded by the chickens and sheep at Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P. See Thoughts on Moody's "Tough Stance" for how Moody's is attempting to play the victim in this mess when in fact they are a big part of the problem.

Although the asset side of the balance sheet seems pretty good, it is a complete illusion. The debt side of the balance sheet has never been greater. When assets take a hit (and they will), the debt will still be there acting like an anchor for years to come and/or until massive bankruptcies wipe that debt off the face of the earth.

No matter how one twists and turns, logic dictates that several major miracles as well as massive positive assumptions about those miracles would still not be enough to revive either housing or this economy.

The problems we are facing now are a direct result of too loose a monetary policy at the Fed. Slashing interest rates to 1% cannot be the cure if slashing interest rates to 1% was the problem. Careful analysis thus shows that Cramer is making the same basic mistake as Greenspan and Bernanke.

Some are slower than others, but by now everyone (including Cramer and the Fed) should be realizing that it was the Fed's miracle financing that caused the corporate malinvestments, overcapacity, and consumer debt hangover problems we now face. Miracle financing caused the problems, so miracle financing sure won't be the cure. The miracles have now run out and the party is over regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. It's as simple as that.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Sunday, 5 August 2007

Locked Out

Bankrate.com is reporting Subprime lenders yank most popular loan type.
Lenders have abruptly stopped offering the most popular type of subprime mortgage. Credit-challenged borrowers suddenly have fewer options. "Many borrowers are not going to be able to refinance," says Deborah Goldstein, executive vice president of the Center for Responsible Lending.

Over the past few years, the most common type of subprime loan has been an adjustable-rate mortgage known as the 2/28 ARM. Since mid-July, five of the six biggest subprime mortgage lenders stopped offering 2/28 ARMs. Suddenly, there's a shortage of the type of mortgage preferred by about 60 percent of subprime borrowers.

"We think it's a good thing for consumers," Goldstein says, because too many 2/28 ARMs were underwritten without regard to whether borrowers could afford to repay them. "So we think it's positive that lenders are going to stop offering that product. It doesn't mean they'll stop offering subprime loans."

What's a refi customer to do?
Mortgage brokers and loan officers say borrowers who need to refinance their subprime mortgages still have options -- just not as many. Some lenders might still offer 2/28 and 3/27 ARMs, although the rates might be high -- possibly into the double digits.

[Mish comment: I will have more on spreads, who is affected and how, as well as why Cramer is wrong about interest rate cuts in my next post later today].

"It's old-school again," one mortgage banker sums up.

What about homeowners who face an impending rate reset that will send their payments to unaffordable levels, but can't qualify for a refinanced loan -- either because of insufficient payment history and income, or because they owe more than the house is worth?

"Some families are going to have to make ugly decisions," a banker says, by cutting back on spending or, in the worst case, losing the home in foreclosure.
For a look at how ugly things can get, let's look at some numbers.

Estimated Purchase Dollar Originations 2002



Estimated Purchase Dollar Originations 2006



The above charts courtesy of Credit Suisse
I do not have 2004-2005 originations but I think you get the idea.

Who is guaranteeing a portion of those loans? One such company is MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG).
MGIC Investment Corporation, through its subsidiary, provides private mortgage insurance to the home mortgage lending industry in the United States. The private mortgage insurance covers residential first mortgage loans and expands home ownership opportunities by enabling people to purchase homes.

Its primary insurance provides mortgage default protection on individual loans and covers unpaid loan principal, delinquent interest, and various expenses associated with the default and subsequent foreclosure, and generally apply to owner occupied, first mortgage loans on one-to-four family homes, including condominiums.
MTG
(click on charts for a crisper image)



It sure seems the market is losing confidence in those guarantees. See Cold Feet and Sea Bass for more on this story.

So here we are, right on the verge of massive numbers of loans that will reset and the products current applicants are in, are simply no longer available.

"Some families are going to have to make ugly decisions, by cutting back on spending or, in the worst case, losing the home in foreclosure."

Ugly is right.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Elegant Anal-ysis by the Times Online

Irwin Stelzer for the Times Online totally blows it with his analysis of the housing collapse. The headline Search for a scapegoat finds Greenspan sums it up nicely.
WITH investors having lost the odd trillion in recent weeks, the hunt is on for a scapegoat. Washington pundits are not famous for their kindness to politicians, regulators and other out-of-power figures to whom they no longer crave access. So it should come as no surprise that Alan Greenspan has been nominated as the culprit, and that the process of chipping away at the pedestal on which he stands has begun.

The first attack on Greenspan was one of those indirect, by-implication-only assaults in which government officials specialise. William Poole, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, used a speech to property professionals to unburden himself of some thoughts on the nonprime mortgage market.

That market, Poole pointed out, matters to the Fed because of the importance of the housing industry to the overall economy, and the Fed’s regulatory responsibility for banks and practices in the mortgage market. He therefore finds it “odd” that the Fed and lenders did not realise that low interest rates in the 2002-4 period could not be maintained. Yet sub-prime borrowers were encouraged to take out adjust-able-rate mortgages (ARMs), many of which are now in default as a result of higher interest rates, leaving a trail of foreclosures and creating chaos in the market for mort-gage-backed securities.

What does all this have to do with Greenspan, who is nowhere mentioned in Poole’s rather elegant anal-ysis?

Greenspan’s main point was that “American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage”. That has been the case, as Poole points out: “The bottom line is that more people have access to mortgage credit now than ever before . . . Despite its limitations and flaws, the nonprime market has served a large number of borrowers very well.”
Speaking of elegant anal-ysis that is exactly what Irwin Stelzer is guilty of. Where is the proof that access to mortgage credit has served a large number of nonprime borrowers well? One look at record numbers of foreclosures, should be enough to prove otherwise. Better yet let's see a percentage of those who benefited vs. those who didn't. Where's the analysis?

With that, inquiring minds just might be asking: "Mish it sounds like you are arguing with the free market. What kind of libertarian are you anyway? Didn't the free market create those products?"

No, the free market did not create those products. Those products came about largely because .....
  • Greenspan slashed interest rates to 1%.
  • Bush promoted an "Ownership Society".
  • The HUD subsidized loans to those who could not afford them.
  • Congress created Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under misguided policies to make housing affordable. Those policies backfired.
  • Tax breaks promoted housing.
  • The Fed let speculation get out of hand.
  • The Fed does not believe in popping asset bubbles but does believe in bailing out banks and lending institutions in the wake of popped asset bubbles. This creates a moral hazard and promotes speculative lending.
None of the above has anything to do with free market forces. Nor does the housing bubble itself. Thus the questions I asked Irwin Stelzer earlier are in practice moot. So what if "many" benefited from those lending practices. I believe more were harmed. But whether or not some select few (or many as Irwin Stelzer thinks) benefited from those policies is irrelevant.

What matters is that inflation benefits those with first access to money (banks, brokerage houses, etc). By the time mortgage standards were low enough for everyone to partake in the boom, the boom was nearly over. That makes these bubble blowing polices of the Fed, Congress, and the administration morally corrupt and that is why the Fed should be abolished and that is why Ron Paul should be elected. And finally that is why Irwin Stelzer is guilty of elegant anal-ysis. Greenspan is not a scapegoat. Greenspan, Bernanke, and the Fed, in conjunction with inane Congressional and Bush Administration policies is the problem. Implementation of free market strategies with a sound currency backed by gold as the constitution stipulates, in conjunction with sound fiscal policies by Congress is the cure.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/