Tuesday, 14 August 2007

Don't Worry - It's Just Nerves

ForexTV is reporting Trichet says ECB will continue to monitor money market conditions.
"I call on all parties concerned to continue to keep their composure," Trichet said in a statement, adding that this attitude has been "welcome and effective" in the recent days and will help to consolidate a smooth return to a normal assessment of risk in liquid markets.

"We have provided in particular the liquidity which was needed to permit an orderly functioning of the money market," Trichet said.

"We experience a period of market nervousness, a period in which we see increased volatility in many markets and a significant re-appreciation of risks," he said, adding that in some respects this can be interpreted as "a normalisation of the pricing of risks".
It sure is taking a lot of cash these days to calm nerves.

On August 9th the ECB lent an unprecedented 94.8 billion euros ($130.2 billion) after demand for cash in the European money markets drove interest rates higher. Supposedly this was "fine tuning", an interesting choice of words given that "BNP Paribas, France's biggest bank, halted withdrawals from three investment funds, saying a lack of liquidity meant it couldn't 'fairly' value the holdings."

And the fine tuning continued on August 10th with the ECB Adding a Further $83.6 Billion in Liquidity.

On August 14th the ECB adds 7.7 bln euros in 4th short-term operation.
The money in the one-day quick tender was its fourth special operation since last Thursday to calm panicky markets but each has been progressively smaller than the previous one. Earlier the ECB had said that market conditions were close to normal now.
I don't know about you but I'm sure glad "market conditions are close to normal now."

Canada has Bad Case of Nerves Too

Bloomberg is reporting Coventree Says Some Lenders Balking at Emergency Funding.
Aug. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Coventree Inc., the Canadian firm that failed to sell asset-backed commercial paper because of a credit crunch, said some lenders balked at providing emergency funding for C$700 million ($661 million) of maturing debt. Coventree requested funding from lenders after it was unable to refinance debt that matured yesterday as investors declined to buy the new securities.

Shares in Coventree plunged as much as 41 percent on concern that some its funds will be forced into default if they can't get emergency funding from lenders that may include Canada's biggest banks.

Coventree is one of the first companies to delay payments on asset-backed commercial paper in the U.S. and Canada in the 12 years since the debt was created. Coventree may not be the only Canadian commercial paper issuer struggling to refinance debt. DBRS, a Toronto-based credit rating company, said that 17 commercial paper trusts have requested emergency funding, including at least eight offered by Coventree.

"Failure to receive funding in a timely manner through the placement of ABCP or funding under the liquidity facilities may result in the event of default," the rating firm said in a note today.

Coventree, which administers C$16 billion in commercial paper funds, didn't name its "liquidity providers." Craig Armitage, an outside spokesman for Coventree, didn't return a phone call today seeking comment.

Bank of Montreal and Royal Bank of Canada are the largest providers of "disruption funding" for asset-backed commercial paper in Canada, Genuity Capital Markets analysts Mario Mendonca wrote today in a note to investors. He estimates the asset-backed commercial paper market in Canada is worth about C$120 billion.

"It is conceivable that the banks could argue that the current circumstances are more than a market disruption and elect not to provide the liquidity," Mendonca said.
Kevin Depew on Minyanville was also talking about Coventree, deflation and other interesting things in Tuesday's Five Things. Let's take an abbreviated look at a few of the points.
1. Oh No! Not a Return to Normalcy! Please No!

European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet called on investors to keep their composure today, according to Bloomberg, saying markets are returning to normal, which is ironic when you think about it because the last thing markets need is a return to normal. That would erase the nearly five years of abnormal risk-seeking behavior, irregular credit terms and excessively loose lending policies that brought us to this in the first place.

4. The reason equities are selling off is that everyone is waiting for the "fundamentals" to come back "in line."
  • So what we have is a standoff.
  • No one wants to mark to market their illiquid "undervalued" securities that are illiquid and undervalued because no one wants them.
  • So they are doing what they can to hold onto them until the fundamentals come back " in line."
  • Join the crowd. That's what the last investors in, say, Etoys thought back in 2000.
  • The problem is there are now two conflicting and competing interests playing out on Wall Street.
  • On the one hand, firms such as Goldman Sachs are unhappy that certain illiquid assets they are carrying on their books are being assigned current values by what few bidders there are that in the firms' minds do not represent the fundamentals.
  • On the other hand, part and parcel with those very so-called "fundamentals" must be a demand for riskier assets.
  • If that demand dries up due to risk aversion, then the fundamentals have BY DEFINITION changed.
5. The Big Payback
  • Last week's credit crunch (Wow, last week! Has it been so long already?) has set off a worldwide rush for dollars as banks and fund managers scramble to pay back loans used to buy risky mortgage securities, Bloomberg says.
  • After a five-year decline that saw the U.S. currency reach its lowest level in a decade, it has rallied 1.4% against the euro and 1.2% against the pound in the last three trading days, Bloomberg noted.
  • Now, isn't the economy in the U.S., led by housing, slowing? And aren't the Fed, and central banks around the world, injecting liquidity? So shouldn't that pressure the dollar?
  • There are a some things to keep in mind about the dollar under these circumstances.
  • First, increased risk aversion (that is, after all, what we are seeing: banks, lenders becoming risk averse, refusing to lend money under previous credit terms) actually creates incentives to save and postpone spending if those who have been borrowing to leverage assets believe those assets will be lower and purchasing power greater in the future.
  • This pattern can be self-reinforcing, which is what the Fed fears the most.
  • A deflationary credit unwind worsens repayment burdens for borrowers, precisely for the reasons Bloomberg's article noted, because the burden of repaying debt increases with deflation, and the dollar - because borrowers who want to repay their debts must accumulate more of them in order to do so - moves higher.
  • This cycle of risk aversion and decreased time preferences is already playing out in real time.
  • See, for example, Sallie Mae (SLM) facing the fact that investors have suddenly gotten cold feet about their $25.3 billion takeover.
  • Risk aversion, decreased time preferences.
Disruption Funding

Let's return to the idea of "disruption funding" and the inability to get it. Coventree went public in November. If Coventree goes under will it be the quickest IPO to bankruptcy ever?

But I am not worried about such things and nor should Canadians because Trichet says things are normal, and Paulson says this is the strongest global economy he has ever seen.

Normalcy is a good thing too, because otherwise people might have concerns about all this talk of "disruption funding" and the first delayed payments on asset-backed commercial paper in the U.S. and Canada in 12 years. Others might be concerned that 17 other commercial paper trusts have requested emergency funding. Still others might be worried about massive percentage increases in foreclosures and/or the recent stock market decline.

But thanks to Trichet and Paulson, everyone should realize this is nothing really to worry about. It's just a bad case of the nerves.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Monday, 13 August 2007

Genius Fails Again

Forbes is asking Goldman Sachs Alpha to Fail?
It's not looking good for Goldman Sachs's Global Alpha fund.

Despite rumors that the investment bank would wind up the ailing quantitative fund, Goldman Sachs continues to stand by its unit. It was widely reported in the media on Thursday that Global Alpha, a mega $9 billion hedge fund in Goldman's asset management group, was down 16% for the year.

Unlike the typical hedge fund, Global Alpha is a quantitative fund, meaning that its trades are determined by computers and convoluted mathematical models. Some quant funds are completely computer dictated, while others spew out investment options for a human trader to veto or accept.

Global Alpha was also engineered to place big, risky bets--one unexpected swing in the market could take a major bite out of the fund. After years of consecutive growth, the fund started to wobble--in 2006 it fell 6%.

This year has been worse-- much worse. Global markets have been rocked by confluence of circumstances including the unwinding of the carry trade, the credit crunch and a heightened fear of risk. So Global Alpha has been hurting. According to media reports, the fund's traders have been cleaning up certain positions.

Of course Global Alpha might not be alone. While it may be one of the most high-profile funds because of its size and the name of its parent, other quantitative funds may also be at risk.

Investors may still remember the epic 1998 collapse of one particular fund that was driven by quantitative formulas: Long-Term Capital Management.
When Genius Failed
When Genius Failed, by Roger Lowenstein, is the true story of Wall Street traders, academics and hubris. It is the story of the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund founded by John Meriwether.

The Genius mentioned in the title refers to Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. Nine months before LTCM failed 1997, Merton and Scholes shared the Nobel prize in economics. Merton, Scholes and Stanford's William Sharp (famous for developing the sharp ratio to measure risk) are some of the founders of modern finance, which attempts to apply quantitative techniques to market analysis. Merton and Scholes jumped at the chance to join LTCM where they could not only apply their theoretical work but make a great deal of money.

As a Big Swinging Dick hedge fund with the most stellar partners and a huge capital base, LTCM was able to convince banks to lend them money at rates that were not available to lesser mortals (including investment banks like Salomon Brothers). LTCM used this credit to leverage their capital base by a factor of twenty to thirty times. In the first few years this allowed LCTM to make spectacular profits for themselves and their investors.

One of the flaws of When Genius Failed is that Lowenstein sacrifices the details of the investment strategies used by LTCM to tell the story (Nicholas Dunbar's book Inventing Money does a better job explaining the details of the LTCM's financial strategies). Many of the strategies that LTCM used involved derivatives.

Lowenstein never fully explains what exactly a "swap" is and incompletely explains LTCM's "volatility" bets. As we will see below, LTCM lost most its money on swaps and volatility bets, so these derivatives play an important part in the story. I've included a footnote here on interest rate swaps and volatility bets. ...

LTCM's mistakes were made fatal by massive leverage and lack of liquidity. ... LTCM was not the only trading firm to lose large amounts of money. Virtually every investment bank lost money when interest rate spreads widened unexpectedly. This was largely because they were using the same kind of trading models. ...
Let's consider a second review of When Genius Failed.

Roger Lowenstein explains how Long-Term became arrogant due to its success and eventually leveraged $4 billion into $100 billion in assets. This $100 billion became collateral for $1.2 trillion in derivatives exposure! With this kind of financial leverage even the most minute market move against you can wipe you out several times over. Talk about financial weapons of mass destruction! This risk did not deter Long-Term, though.

Finally in 1998, Russia defaulted on its bonds- many of which Long-Term owned. This default stirred up the world’s financial markets in a way that caused many additional losing trades for Long-Term.

By the spring of 1998, LTCM was losing several hundred million dollars per day. What did LTCM’s brilliant financial models say about all of this? The models recommended waiting out the storm.

By August 1998, LTCM had burned through almost all of its $4 billion in capital. At this point LTCM tried to exit its trades, but found it impossible, as traders all over the world were trying to exit as well.

With $1.2 trillion dollars at risk, the economy could have been devastated if LTCM’s losses continued to run its course. After much discussion, the Federal Reserve and Wall Street’s largest investment banks decided to rescue Long-Term. The banks ended up losing several hundred million dollars each.

What became of Long-Terms founders? Were they jailed or banned from the financial world? No. They went on to start another hedge fund!

Here is the table of losses from the first article.




The Same Mistakes Only Bigger

The losses at LTCM are trivial compared to today. The Fed would not bat an eye over a $4 billion hedge fund failure today. In Who's Holding The Bag? I reported "Notional amounts of interest rate derivatives outstanding grew almost 14 percent to $285.7 trillion in the second half of 2006." Look closely at that figure. Yes, that is trillion not billion. And that numbers was from 2006. It is higher today. Is it any wonder the Fed is spooked?

Not only have we made the same mistakes but we have made them in orders of magnitude greater size. And look at the buzzwords. They are exactly the same.
  • massive leverage
  • lack of liquidity
  • quantitative funds
  • derivatives
  • credit default swaps
  • hedge fund blowups
One has to laugh about this: "According to media reports, [Goldman Sachs's Global Alpha fund's traders] have been cleaning up certain positions." Fancy that. Computer modeling has failed yet again and humans are cleaning up after them.

More Computer Models Fail

And speaking of computer models, what about those computer models of Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P. Those models are horrendously flawed as I pointed out in Fitch Discloses Its Fatally Flawed Rating Model.
Essentially Fitch extrapolated a model of constantly rising home prices forever into the future, in spite of obvious signs of rampant speculation and home price appreciation far above the long term average for four consecutive years. In addition, Fitch made no allowances for reversion to the mean on home prices, in fact did not even make provisions for a flattening market let alone a reversion to the mean at a time of massively declining lending standards, and with home price appreciation orders of magnitude above affordability indices and rental prices.
That is some set of assumptions that Fitch made in their model isn't it? One might think that those flaws are so obvious that anyone with any reasonable degree of competence would catch. And $trillions of dollars were of mortgage backed securities were rated by "the big 3" on the basis of those flawed models.

But the story gets even worse. Please consider this Press Release: Fitch: U.S. RMBS Criteria Changes for Newly Issued Transactions.

Tanta over at Calculated Risks blog dropped this bombshell about that Fitch press release: They're Just Mortgages. We're Not Expected to Understand Them.
This is big bad-ass deal. Fitch just came out and admitted that "ResiLogic" is working with corrupt or missing data, that Fitch's analysts don't know how to "crack" a mortgage tape (that is, how to map an originator-specific data field into a standard one that can compare across deals), and that there is no reason for any of us to believe them when they say that certain loan characteristics are more or less predictive of default. Some of you may have suspected this before today. But I'll admit that I didn't think they were making mistakes at this elementary a level.
Inquiring minds might be asking "What's behind the explosive use of derivatives, CDOs, LBO, computer trading, massive leverage, and enormous faith in poor models including implicit trust in automated scoring algorithms that supposedly could measure risk of default but obviously failed to deliver. The answer is simple: the Fed. Central banks are enablers of risk. Greenspan himself had high praise for derivatives and encouraged massive use of derivatives, adjustable rate mortgages at the bottom in interest rates, computer modeling and other such nonsense. And when anything has gone wrong the Fed has always been there to provide liquidity (see Bernanke Panics & Gold Responds).

But there comes a time when all such models break down. We saw it with LTCM, we see it now with Moody's, Fitch and the S&P, and we see it again with Goldman Sachs's Global Alpha quant fund that simply cannot trade. There is one more model that going to fail as well. That's the model thinks the Fed can keep engineering bigger bubble after bigger bubble to bail out the markets. That model is on the verge of collapse right now and that is what has nearly every central bank spooked. One can keep track of hedge fund genius failures at the Hedge Fund Implode O Meter and mortgage lending genius failures at the Mortagage Lender Implode O meter.

By the way Global Alpha is sinking by day. It is now down 26% as of a more current Bloomberg report: Goldman's Global Alpha Falls 26% in 2007.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s $8 billion Global Alpha hedge fund has fallen 26 percent so far this year, a decline that may prompt more investors to withdraw their money, according to people familiar with the fund.

Goldman's largest hedge fund, managed by Mark Carhart and Raymond Iwanowsk, has dropped almost 40 percent since July 31, 2006, said the people, who declined to be named because the fund is private. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index of the biggest U.S. stocks has returned 16 percent during the same period.

"It's hard to imagine how investors can maintain confidence, because their losses have been taking place over a long period of time, starting last year," said Virginia Parker, who helps oversee about $1.8 billion at Parker Global Strategies LLC in Stamford, Connecticut. "There has been a broad range of market climates, and the fund has not demonstrated the ability to excel in any of them."
It's quite interesting that a computer quant fund that is supposed to make money in every market environment is now struggling to make money in any environment. Genius is fleeting.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Sunday, 12 August 2007

Busted Bonds & Financial Illusions

MarketWatch is reporting $43 billion in loan deals pulled in past two weeks.
In the past two weeks, another 13 corporate loan or bond deals have been postponed or reduced, representing slightly less than $43 billion, according to new research released Thursday by Baring Asset Management.

That lifts the total number of deals pulled since June 22nd to 46, analysts at the firm said. They valued those at more than $60 billion. Last year, no pulled deals were counted by the firm's research staff.

The amount of incomplete cash-financed leveraged buyouts and management-led buyouts sitting on bank balance sheets remains substantial, wrote Toby Nangle, a fixed-income manager at Barings, in a note. "Given their inability to pass this credit risk on to the market, their short-term acquisition finance is increasingly looking like a series of long-term loans," Nangle added.
46 busted deals since June 22 is a lot of busted deals. Instead of being able to pass the trash, companies like Citigroup have already committed to funds the IPOs are stuck with it. Merrill Lynch,Lehman, Bear Stearns, etc all made fortunes passing the CDO trash to pension plans, life insurance companies, and foreign governments.

Flashback June 1 2007

Banks Sell 'Toxic Waste' CDOs to Calpers, Texas Teachers Fund
June 1 (Bloomberg) -- Bear Stearns Cos., the fifth-largest U.S. securities firm, is hawking the riskiest portions of collateralized debt obligations to public pension funds.

At a sales presentation of the bank's CDOs to 50 public pension fund managers in a Las Vegas hotel ballroom, Jean Fleischhacker, Bear Stearns senior managing director, tells fund managers they can get a 20 percent annual return from the bottom level of a CDO.

"It has a very high cash yield to it," Fleischhacker says at the March convention. "I think a lot of people are confused about what this product is and how it works."

Chriss Street, treasurer of Orange County, California, the fifth-most-populous county in the U.S., says no public fund should invest in equity tranches. He says fund managers are ignoring their fiduciary responsibilities by placing even 1 percent of pension assets into the riskiest portion of a CDO.

"It's grossly inappropriate to take this level of risk," he says. "Fund managers wanted the high yield, so Wall Street sold it to them. The beauty of Wall Street is they put lipstick on a pig."
If they were confused before they should not be now. It's as simple as this:
  • Bear Stearns has lost all credibility.
  • Bear Stearns Cos. co-president and co-chief operating officer Warren Spector was fired.
  • The firing of top level management is seldom a sign that the problems have been taken care of.
  • Anyone buying toxic garbage from Bear Stearns on the promise of 20% returns now regrets it.
  • Anyone buying anything Wall Street is pumping is likely to regret it.
Greatest Bait and Switch Ever

Tollowing are excerpts from Hayman Capital Partners on The Greatest “Bait and Switch” of ALL TIME
I recently spent some time with a senior executive in the structured product marketing group (Collateralized Debt Obligations, Collateralized Loan Obligations, Etc.) of one of the largest brokerage firms in the world.

This individual proceeded to tell me how and why the Subprime Mezzanine CDO business existed. Subprime Mezzanine CDOs are 10-20X levered vehicles that contain only the BBB and BBB- tranches of Subprime debt. He told me that the “real money” (US insurance companies, pension funds, etc) accounts had stopped purchasing mezzanine tranches of US Subprime debt in late 2003 and that they needed a mechanism that could enable them to “mark up” these loans, package them opaquely, and EXPORT THE NEWLY PACKAGED RISK TO UNWITTING BUYERS IN ASIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE!!!! He told me with a straight face that these CDOs were the only way to get rid of the riskiest tranches of Subprime debt.

Interestingly enough, these buyers (mainland Chinese Banks, the Chinese Government, Taiwanese banks, Korean banks, German banks, French banks, UK banks) possess the “excess” pools of liquidity around the globe. These pools are basically derived from two sources: 1) massive trade surpluses with the US in USD, 2) petrodollar recyclers. These two pools of excess capital are US dollar denominated and have had a virtually insatiable demand for US dollar denominated debt…until now. They have had orders on the various desks of Wall St. to buy any US debt rated “AAA” by the rating agencies in the US.

How do BBB and BBB-tranches become AAA? Through the alchemy of Mezzanine-CDOs. With the help of the ratings agencies the Mezzanine CDO managers collect a series of BBB and BBB- tranches and repackage them with a cascading cash waterfall so that the top tiers are paid out first on all the tranches – thus allowing them to be rated AAA. Well, when you lever ONLY mezzanine tranches of Subprime RMBS 10-20X, POOF…you magically have 80% of the structure rated “AAA” by the ratings agencies, despite the underlying collateral being a collection of BBB and BBB- rated assets... This will go down as one of the biggest financial illusions the world has EVER seen.

...
Sincerely,
J. Kyle Bass
Managing Partner
Misconstrued Views

A couple of people have posted comments that I have misconstrued the views of Bill Fleckenstein in Fleckenstein (and others) State the Deflation Case . If so, it was not intended. The point is that whether Fleckenstein believes in deflation or not, he sure presented a strong case for it. Furthermore, not knowing whether or his views on deflation in the US had changed or not I posted "Like it or not (and I suspect he might not because he did not use the D-Word itself) Fleckenstein described how and why a Japanese style deflation is headed for the US." That is a statement of fact. Fleckenstein described deflation as did others in the article. He simply chooses not to believe his own arguments, I suspect on grounds that the Fed has an ability and willingness to hyperinflate and that it will work. On that latter point, I do not share his view for reasons I have stated many times.

A Saturday Song

To the tune of Me & Bobby McGee

Busted bonds in Wall Street, waitin' for a pump
This market’s near as faded as my jeans
Goldman thumbed Bernanke down just before the dump
Said act or stocks are only good as beans

Feelin' good was easy, Lord, when Greenspan cut the rates
And feelin' good was good enough for me
Good enough for me and you Ben B

If anyone cares to add verses to this song and/or to completely rewrite the above, please send the lyrics my way. If there are enough submissions I will combine the best of them and post the result.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Saturday, 11 August 2007

Bernanke Panics & Gold Responds

In Globally Contained Liquidity Crunch I pointed out that the Fed was providing temporary loans (as repos) not capital to the markets. While true I missed something. What I missed involves the collateral the Fed is willing to take for those short term loans.

Mr. Practical was right there with The Fed's Path.
It has now become obvious to me the path of the Fed. No, Mr. Bernanke is not going to be tough on markets. He is not going to give the medicine that is needed. He has chosen his path, the seeds of which were planted in his November 2002 speech about monetization (dropping dollars from helicopters).

The Fed today injected $65 bln of repos, extending credit to banks to shore up their liquidity needs. Normally the Fed only accepts treasuries as collateral. But the banks no longer have enough treasuries, or they don't want to sell their "safe" assets in exchange for credit. But they do have lots of risky assets like CDOs that everyone wants to get rid of. The Fed bent over and today announced they will take those "off their hands".

....

This is alchemy finance in its truest form. All it will do is stave off the inevitable and make it worse when it happens.
Read that last sentence again. This is the same mistake Japan made.

Credit Addicts On Withdrawal

Central Bankers worldwide have now all panicked in unison. And the stock markets are not even down 10% from the recent highs. The DOW is still up on the year. This means they central bankers are really spooked. And this sure as hell is not an inflation scare.

Kevin Depew on Minyanville was talking about Credit Addiction in points 1 thru 5 of "Five Things". Let's take a look at point #4: Like All Enablers, They "Didn't Know".
  • As recently as Tuesday the FOMC warned of the continuing risks of inflation.
  • The European Central Bank, in its monthly report noted in Number 3 actually said its monetary policy is still "on the accommodative side."
  • Yes, that's the same report that was released a day after the ECB injected a record amount of liquidity into the banking system.
  • A day after the Bank of Japan, which maintains it has successfully defeated its bout with deflation, pumped 1 trillion yen into the money market in coordination with the U.S. and European central banks.
  • So what's next? The same thing that happens whenever any junkie reaches the end of the ability to expand his or her addiction.
  • A deflationary cutback.
  • What does it mean for a junkie to enter a period of "deflationary cutback"?
  • Well, consider for a moment how an addiction begins. Ordinary, normal people in the early stages of addiction are typically able to service both their habit and their outside obligations - family, work, etc.
  • In the final stages of addiction, all those obligations - to family, to work, to friends - are sacrificed in order to service the addition.
  • If the addiction is to credit/debt, then everything must be sacrificed to service that debt. The ability to expand the addiction has concluded.
  • We know what happens next: enabling (and the negative consequences) or (real) intervention (kick the habit).
  • Neither are pretty, which is what makes the choice between the two so hard.
  • Until the end, even among friends and family, the path of least resistance is to enable the addict.
The Credit High Has Worn Off

Bloomberg is reporting Central Banks Add Cash to Avert Crisis of Confidence.
The Federal Reserve, in a second day of action in concert with the European Central Bank, provided $38 billion of reserves and pledged further funds "as necessary," in a statement unprecedented since the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The European Central Bank loaned 61.05 billion euros ($83.6 billion) after injecting a record amount yesterday.

In the U.S., the federal funds rate opened at 6 percent, the highest in six years. The rate, which normally fluctuates around the Fed's target, fell to 5 percent after the New York Fed bought assets including mortgage-backed securities in three operations over a six-hour period. The $38 billion was the highest amount of temporary funds since Sept. 12, 2001.

Today, the Fed said in an unscheduled statement that it will add money to the system as needed to steer the federal funds rate "close to" the 5.25 percent target. Officials also noted that direct loans through the Fed's discount window are available "as always."

Countrywide Financial Corp., the biggest U.S. mortgage lender, today said it faces "unprecedented disruptions" that may hurt profit. Countrywide won't be able to sell as many of its loans as expected because investor demand has dried up, the Calabasas, California-based company said. NIBC Bank NV in the Netherlands posted losses from U.S. credit investments.
Credit Crack

Countrywide is hooked on "credit crack". They continuously need more of it. I talked about Countrywide (CFC) Thursday in "Unprecedented Disruptions" at Countrywide. The overnight gyrations of CFC (gapping down to $24.76 and recovering all the way back up to $28.08 before settling at $27.86 down about 2.8% perhaps tells a story. If so what is that story? Is the Fed accepting mortgage backed garbage from CFC as collateral?

Gold Responds

Gold was up on Friday, perhaps in response to Bernanke's three repo actions accepting mortgage assets that no one else wants as collateral. Then again perhaps gold was responding to something else (which is why one must be cautious about such casual correlations). Nonetheless the 24 hour chart from Kitco was interesting.



(click on chart for a sharper image)

The above chart is thanks to Kitco and is a snapshot taken 16:41 EST on Friday August 10. Whether or not gold was acting the way it did because of Bernanke's panic is hard to say. What's easier to say is that is how we should expect gold to behave if the Fed is willing to take toxic waste as collateral for temporary loans.

But enabling addicts (which is what the Fed is doing) is morally wrong. See High Rate CDs and other Moral Hazards for more on that topic.

And the thing about addiction is that over time it takes stronger and stronger doses to achieve the same high. In 1980 it took $1 in debt to add $1 to the GDP. Today it takes closer to $7 or $8 in debt to add $1 to GDP and that of course presumes one believes today's GDP figures.

The problem with such addiction is that stronger and stronger doses eventually kills the patient. This is where we are today. Some junkies (consumers) have finally realized this on their own accord, most far too late to do any good, as debt has already hollowed out their livelihood just as heroin would have done. Some dealers (banks and brokerage houses) have belatedly realized the same thing and have stopped extending credit to credit junkies. A violent withdrawal is now underway. An enabling Fed is attempting to halt this "credit withdrawal" but as Succo suggests, the Fed is fighting a losing battle.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

$100 Billion Bond Backup

BusinessWeek reported on July27, that Corporate Debt Was All Dressed Up, Nowhere to Go.
More than $90 billion in high-yield corporate bonds are waiting to get syndicated from banks to institutional investors, the by-product of a long boom in leveraged buyouts. That record six-month inventory of loans is about twice the typical backlog, corporate finance experts say. The problem? No buyers.

The lack of new credit stems from a daily drop in prices in the secondary market, Sparks says. Investors aren't willing to buy something that's likely to be cheaper the next day. Another investor agreed. "Anybody who has bought credit recently has seen it trade down, so people are reluctant to try and catch the falling knife," says Dean Kehler, founder and managing partner at Trimaran Capital Advisors. "The way it feels now, if you wait it's going to be cheaper tomorrow."

A few months ago, it often looked as if the LBO boom would never end. Now it's hard to imagine that risk-laden environment returning anytime soon.
Read that last sentence again. Sentiment can and does change on a dime. We saw it with housing and now we are seeing it again with LBOs and debt financings.

And by the way it was not "a few months ago" that bullish LBO sentiment was stong. It was a few weeks ago. More precisely July 10, 2007. See Quotes of the Day / Top Call.
Chuck Prince - Citigroup Ceo

No End Soon to Buyout Boom: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing".
No end to the buyout boom huh? No end? Really?

On August 10, Reuters is reporting US firms ready to unload blns of debt if market calms.
Companies sold roughly $15 billion of new corporate bonds on Wednesday after weeks of inactivity as worries about the spreading subprime mortgage meltdown lifted. But companies largely retreated as credit concerns returned to roil global financial markets on Thursday and Friday.

Under normal circumstances, U.S. companies would be tapping buyers for $10 billion to $20 billion of cash a week.

Instead, a backlog of debt deals is developing. Roughly $100 billion of investment-grade bond supply is waiting in the wings, while $300 billion could arrive before the end of the year, according to Sid Bakst, portfolio manager at Weiss, Peck and Greer in New York.

Corporations are also avoiding launching new high-yield or leveraged loan deals, and it is very possible no loans will be sold next week, according to Reuters Loan Pricing Corp.
Note that is $100 billion of "investment" grade debt. How much junk is waiting in the wings? I have no answer for that question but any junk debt that needs to roll over soon is clearly in trouble.

And the next question is: Who really believes those "investment grade" ratings? Does anyone trust the S&P, Moody's, or Fitch to provide accurate ratings? How could they will all these disasters in mortgage debt ratings. How could they with these disclaimers?

Disclaimers

S&P: “Any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any investment decision.”

Moody's: "Moody's has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence."

If investors are reluctant to trust Moody's, Fitch, or the S&P why would they want to buy debt? Equally important, if not even more important is the question: why should investors be willing to buy something that's likely to be cheaper tomorrow?

In the meantime the debt backs up. Is the Fed going to buy it all? I think not. And let's revisit Will Rate Cuts Save The Economy?
Some are slower than others, but by now everyone (including Cramer and the Fed) should be realizing that it was the Fed's miracle financing that caused the corporate malinvestments, overcapacity, and consumer debt hangover problems we now face. Miracle financing caused the problems, so miracle financing sure won't be the cure. The miracles have now run out and the party is over regardless of what the Fed does or does not do. It's as simple as that.
And if banks are extremely unwilling to lend money right now, what makes anyone think banks would be willing to lend more money after a measly 25 or 50 basis point cut in an economy that is clearly slowing rapidly?

Yet the talking heads say "inflation is the Fed's big worry", "corporate profits will strengthen", and "the economy is strong". If inflation was the concern, and the economy was strong we would not be hearing Bush administration clowns repeating that mantra every other day, and we sure as heck would not be seeing $100 billion backups in bonds or unprecedented actions by central bankers worldwide to provide liquidity. Actions are clearly speaking louder than words.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Friday, 10 August 2007

Globally Contained Liquidity Crunch

In Sudden Demand For Cash we discussed Major Liquidity problems in the ECB.
The European Central Bank, in an unprecedented response to a sudden demand for cash from banks roiled by the subprime mortgage collapse in the U.S., loaned 94.8 billion euros ($130 billion) to assuage a credit crunch.

Intervention on that scale had not been seen since the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001.

"This liquidity-providing fine-tuning operation aims to assure orderly conditions in the euro money market. The ECB intends to allot 100 per cent of the bids it receives," the central bank said.
US Liquidity Crunch

But the liquidity crunch was not contained to the EU. The Herald Tribune reported Fears about a U.S. liquidity crunch roil markets.
During a "liquidity crisis," the big banks get nervous about risk and become more cautious about doing deals and making trades. They're less likely to extend the easy credit that has fueled the economy in the past few years, and that makes it more difficult to match buyers with sellers. That is what happened to markets around the world Thursday.

The fallout from a liquidity crunch causes a ripple effect. The most immediate impact is that loans could become harder to get. But troubles can spread to the wider economy, hurting peoples' investments and endangering their long-term financial plans. If banks are not lending and no one will extend credit to anyone else, markets seize up and economic growth disappears.

Major financial institutions can absorb hefty losses without toppling. However, liquidity concerns cause institutions to become reluctant to lend money to other banks. Loans between banks on an overnight basis, one of the primary ways they fund their operations, have become more expensive as concerns arise about their ability to repay the loans — and that forces costs up.

In addition, banks also bring debt offerings to the market on behalf of their clients. But, if investors are reluctant to buy them, many times the banks will be left holding the debt.

Q. What did the big government banks do on Thursday to ease the problem?

A. The U.S. Federal Reserve pumped $24 billion (€17.48 billion) into the U.S. banking system. Meanwhile, The European Central Bank made a record cash injection of $130 billion (€94.69 billion) into its markets to increase liquidity and shake off credit fears.
Canada to Provide Liquidity

Bloomberg reported the Bank of Canada to 'provide liquidity'.
The Bank of Canada said it will "provide liquidity'' to support financial markets after the European Central Bank loaned money to ease a credit crunch that started with the U.S. subprime mortgage collapse.

The central bank will "support the stability of the Canadian financial system and the continued functioning of financial markets,'' the bank said today from Ottawa in a statement on its Web site, without disclosing a specific course of action.

The benchmark London interbank offered rate for overnight loans between banks in Canadian dollars rose to 4.74 percent today from yesterday's 4.53 percent, mirroring increases in rates for loans in euros and U.S. dollars. The Bank of Canada's target rate for overnight loans between banks is 4.5 percent.
Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Singapore

Canada's actions were rather mild compared to elsewhere. But liquidity concerns were not contained to the Western Hemisphere as Asia central banks join bid to calm money markets.
Central banks from Tokyo to Sydney injected extra cash into banking systems or pledged to do so on Friday, as Asia joined a global campaign by monetary authorities to calm panicky credit markets.

"What the central banks are doing is a concerted effort to inject liquidity. And the worrying thing is that they do that when the system is not functioning the way it should," said Jimmy Koh, a currency strategist at United Overseas Bank.

The moves came after the European Central Bank injected record amounts of cash to prevent a financial system seizure after European banks essentially stopped providing short-term funds to one another on Thursday. The U.S. Federal Reserve also injected cash on a smaller scale.

The bank for the world's second-largest economy offered to supply 1.0 trillion yen ($8.45 billion) in funds. Traders said the amount was at the higher end of market expectations, but was not a major surprise.

The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) on Friday added more than twice the usual amount of money into the banking system, injecting A$4.95 billion ($4.19 billion) in its regular morning money market operation.

Elsewhere in the region, central banks pledged to open the tap on additional liquidity on the first signs of a seizure in money markets.
Liquidity Issues and Deflation

This question about deflation came up on my blog.

Q: "Ok, I have a question. The hedgies use leverage, make a wrong bet, and owe people money they do not have. The ECB loans out 130 billion spanking brand new dollars (Euros) to pay these people. How exactly is this brand new money deflationary?"

A: For starters there was no brand new money created by these central bank actions. There were, however, huge emergency repos but those are temporary loans. What happened is that banks fearing a need for capital would not lend money to each other like they normally would. This caused overnight rates to shoot sky high.

In the US, the Fed foolishly defends an interest rate target as does the ECB. To defend that interest rate target, repos or reverse repos (draining money) are used to keep the rates where the Fed / ECB wants them. Of course neither the Fed or the ECB has any real idea where interest rates should be and that is one of the reasons we are in the mess we are in.

At any rate, the money (credit really) the hedgies lost is in money (credit) heaven. It wasn't magically brought back by the ECB's or the Fed's open market operations. Those open market operations can help keep the interbank payment system afloat (at least for a while), but it can't persuade any new borrowers to borrow and it can't fix anyone's losses.

The ECB's Weber stated things incorrectly back on February 8 as I noted in Sudden Demand For Cash :

Weber: European Central Bank council member Axel Weber said investors shouldn't expect central banks to bail them out in the event of an "abrupt" drop in financial markets. "If you misprice risk, don't come looking to us for liquidity assistance."

The market came looking for "liquidity assistance" and got it in a flash. The Fed's Poole stated matters correctly.

Poole: "The Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital".

And that is what has transpired so far. There was no capital created in these operations, and even had the Fed done a coupon pass (created money), it would have been lent out not handed out.

It is the destruction of credit that is the deflationary phenomenon and that is happening at an increasing pace. It would happen at a far quicker pace if things were marked to market.

Credit Crunch Not Going Away

Once again Mr. Practical (aka Professor Succo) was right on top of things with a good explanation of what is happening in his article Credit Crunch Not Going Away.
Last night the European Central Bank issued a statement promising plenty of liquidity to banks. The Fed arranged a very large $24 bln in repos this morning, trying to get fresh credit in the hands of banks to deal with their current commitments. Even the Bank of Canada issued the same statement.

But all this misses the problem. The theory is flawed. Central banks promising new credit to strapped banks only helps them with their current problems. It will not get new credit into a system that can't take anymore. Banks, given their situation, are reducing drastically their new commitments, as they should. Borrowers can't afford to borrow more.

Sooner or later the market will realize that this is a credit crunch. We have not seen a real credit crunch since 1973. Go back to your history books to witness what a credit crunch does to asset prices. Pure and simple, when the borrowing dries up, there is no "money" to buy assets.

This is a process that is likely to take years to correct. It will not be a pretty process as debt gets destroyed (foreclosures) until enough of these excesses get wiped away to start anew. It was all caused by too-easy credit for too long by a Central bank not willing to let the market itself handle the allocation of capital. It insisted on providing credit cheaply when the market didn't deserve it.

So U.S. consumers have lived beyond their means for too long. They have wasted away their savings and are now in too much debt. Pure and simple
If you're not reading Professor Succo, Mr. Practical, Kevin Depew's daily dose of "Five Things", Bennet Sedacca, Jeff Macke, Greg Weldon, Jeffrey Cooper, (among many others) you are missing out.

In regards to the globally contained liquidity crunch, this statement by Mr. Practical sums it up nicely: Pure and simple, when the borrowing dries up, there is no "money" to buy assets.

Countless times over the past year I have been told that "Banks will always be ready to lend" ... "Consumers will be always be ready to borrow." ... "The US is nothing like Japan". Those theories have now (finally) been blown out of the water. Credit has dried up so fast that 46 IPOs have been pulled since June 22 (none were pulled last year), and all but prime borrowers are struggling to get mortgages, with many mortgage products totally removed. Fear has spread so much that banks are even afraid to lend to each other. The only missing ingredient now is duration. I believe it's coming.

By the way the Fed issued this statement just this morning: The Federal Reserve is providing liquidity to facilitate the orderly functioning of financial markets.
The Federal Reserve will provide reserves as necessary through open market operations to promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to the Federal Open Market Committee's target rate of 5-1/4 percent. In current circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs because of dislocations in money and credit markets. As always, the discount window is available as a source of funding.
The Fed statement today shows there are unusual funding needs. How enlightening. But here are a few things to remember about those funding needs.
  • The Fed and ECB can provide liquidity support but not capital.
  • That liquidity is primarily needed for prior obligations and prior commitments. As a result you can kiss future growth of IPOs, stock buybacks funded by debt, and mergers and acquisitions, goodbye.
  • There is little desire anywhere (globally) to take on more debt or excessive risk.
  • As asset prices sink the ability to pay back existing loans is going to get harder and harder.
  • Bankruptcies and foreclosures will continue to soar. That's what happens in a liquidity crunch.
  • Expect to see lots more hedge funds and lenders blow up too, and not just in the US.
The liquidity crunch is now globally contained.

One last thing: By providing emergency liquidity all the Fed is really doing is defending an interest rate target. It was the Fed defending interest rate targets way back when (say all the way down to 1%) that helped create this mess. If defending interest rate targets is the problem (and it indeed is) then defending interest rate targets cannot be the solution. It's time to abolish the Fed.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/

Thursday, 9 August 2007

"Unprecedented Disruptions" at Countrywide

Inquiring minds might be wondering about liquidity issues at Countrywide. It just so happens I have an August 2 statement right on hand: Countrywide Comments on Its Strong Funding Liquidity and Financial Condition.
"Countrywide has longstanding and time-tested funding liquidity contingency planning," said Eric P. Sieracki, Chief Financial Officer. "These planning protocols were designed to encompass a wide variety of conditions, including recent secondary market volatility. Our liquidity planning proved highly effective earlier during 2007 when market concerns first arose about subprime lending, and remains so today. We place major emphasis on the adequacy, reliability and diversity of our funding sources. It is important to note that short-term liquidity is used exclusively to fund our highest credit quality, most liquid assets.

"Our mortgage company has significant short-term funding liquidity cushions and is supplemented by the ample liquidity sources of our bank," Sieracki continued. "In fact, we have almost $50 billion of highly-reliable short-term funding liquidity available as a cushion today. It is important to note that the Company has experienced no disruption in financing its ongoing daily operations, including placement of commercial paper.

"Countrywide's financial condition remains strong, as evidenced by over $14 billion of net worth, significant excess capital and our strong investment grade credit ratings," Sieracki concluded. "Two independent credit rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's Rating Service, this week re-affirmed their ratings and stable outlook for Countrywide, its bank and its mortgage company."
This is kind of interesting: A $14 billion company needs "almost $50 billion of highly-reliable short-term funding liquidity" as a cushion. A cushion for what? Overleverage?

Hmmm I see CFC is getting pounded after hours. Here is the headline: Countrywide Hit by Credit Market Woes.
Countrywide Financial Corp. faces "unprecedented disruptions" in debt and mortgage-finance markets that could hurt earnings and the company's financial condition, the Calabasas, Calif., lender said in a regulatory filing. (Read the SEC filing)

The company, the largest U.S. home mortgage lender in terms of loan volume, said reduced demand from investors is prompting it to retain more of ...
Let's Review

August 2: It is important to note that the Company has experienced no disruption in financing its ongoing daily operations, including placement of commercial paper.

August 9: Countrywide Financial Corp. faces "unprecedented disruptions" in debt and mortgage-finance markets that could hurt earnings and the company's financial condition, the Calabasas, Calif., lender said in a regulatory filing.

I would like for the SEC to investigate the discrepancy between those two stories. Exactly when did Countrywide face "unprecedented disruptions" and exactly when was today's filing was prepared?

While the SEC is investigating that they may as well start looking into stuff like this:

The associated press is reporting Countrywide Financial Chief Executive Angelo R. Mozilo Exercises Options for 92,000 Shares.
The chairman and chief executive of mortgage lender Countrywide Financial Corp. exercised options for 92,000 shares of common stock under a prearranged trading plan, according to a Securities and Exchange Commission filing Wednesday

In a Form 4 filed with the SEC, Angelo R. Mozilo reported he exercised the options for shares on Wednesday for $14.69 apiece and then sold all of them the same day for $28.74 apiece.
Let's do the math. $14.05 * 92,000 = $1,292,600

That's a pretty big vote of no confidence. And it's surprising too given the August 2 statement by Eric P. Sieracki, Chief Financial Officer: It is important to note that the Company has experienced no disruption in financing its ongoing daily operations, including placement of commercial paper.

CFC 60 minute Chart



(click on chart for a sharper image)
Rest assured there are going to be lawsuits over this.

Mike Shedlock / Mish
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/