Wednesday, 5 March 2008

Ambak "Bailout" Lands with Big Thud

This would be funny if it was not so pathetic. All these announcements of bailouts of Ambac (ABK) and banks investing cash, and splitting the company into two, etc., etc., landed with a big thud today.

Here is a 5 Minute Chart of the Action



click on chart for sharper image

Yahoo Finance is reporting Ambac to Offer $1.5B in Stock and Equity.
Ambac Financial Group Inc. said Wednesday it will try to sell $1.5 billion in stock in a bid to safeguard its critical "AAA" financial-strength rating. The New York-based bond insurer plans to raise $1 billion through a public offering of common stock and an additional $500 million through the sale of equity units that would be exchangeable for common stock in May 2011. The equity unit offering is contingent upon completing the common stock offering.

Standard & Poor's and Moody's each said if the stock sale is successful, it will probably be enough for Ambac to avert a downgrade.

Since the ratings agencies began to question bond insurers' financial strength, coupled with tightening in the credit market, Ambac said it has written only "a limited amount" of business since November and almost "no new business thus far in 2008." Ensuring its "AAA" rating through the offering may help it garner new business that might have been lost because of the uncertainty.
Selling The News

Thud! Ambac closed at $8.70 down 18.84%. The Wall Street Journal asks the rhetorical question: So that’s it, huh?
Ambac Financial Group let the dogs out, announcing plans to raise $1 billion in common stock and about $500 million in equity units, and, uh, well, that was about it.

The monoline insurer also plans on getting out of a number of bad businesses that have put the company in the position it currently finds itself in — such as mortgage-backed securities, auto loans and credit-card receivables. But a decision to stop writing insurance for businesses that have already cost the company wasn’t going to assuage investors today, who were looking for more.

Ambac said it doesn’t expect to regain its triple-A rating from Fitch, but hopes to maintain the triple-A ratings garnered by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
Conspicuously Missing
  • Banks did not give capital to Ambac.
  • Also missing in action is talk of splitting the company in two.
Ambac's Press Release

Inquiring minds may wish to take a peek at the press release.
Michael Callen, Chairman and CEO, commented on the offering, saying, “This capital raise, along with our recent strategic actions, our increased emphasis on risk-adjusted returns over the course of an economic cycle and a six-month suspension of the structured finance business, will strengthen our capital base.

We expect to be better positioned to take advantage of the current favorable market environment for credit enhancement.” He added, “In this offering, we are targeting our core investor base, the long term holders of our stock, who have been loyal to Ambac.”
Six Month Suspension Of Business

Let me get this straight: "A six-month suspension of the structured finance business, will strengthen Ambac's capital base."

Wow. Why not further strengthen the base by suspending business for a year? How about forever? At any rate I am extremely relieved that suspending business was all part of the master plan. Otherwise, I just may have been worried about this: Ambac said it has written only "a limited amount" of business since November and almost "no new business thus far in 2008."

On second thought, I notice that Ambac has written "no new business" in 2008 but the plan was only to suspend "structured finance business". Don't worry, I am sure that can be made part of the plan if necessary.

And I am equally sure shareholders will be relieved by this statement as well “In this offering, we are targeting our core investor base, the long term holders of our stock, who have been loyal to Ambac.”

Time To Stop Pretending

What I said about MBIA (MBI) in MBIA Cannot Estimate January's Losses applies to Ambac as well:
It's time to end the pretending.

I am again calling out the rating agencies for their role in this mess. Please consider S&P Sniffs Horse Hockey, Calls It A Rose as well as MBIA Maintains Highest Rating, Pfizer Cut.

Splitting a rotten apple in two does not give you half a good apple.
Banks would not provide capital because they are so capital impaired themselves. Nor can Ambac be split in two because it cannot dispose of the CDO rot. The same applies to MBIA. Nonetheless, the rating agencies keep pretending the monolines are a viable business. They are not.

You cannot stay in business, by not doing business, no matter what the business is.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Hedge Funds Continue To Unravel

Hedge fund fears are mounting over the Collapse of Focus Capital.
Focus Capital, a $1bn New York hedge fund, has been forced to liquidate its portfolio after missing margin calls from banks, it told investors yesterday. The fund, which had produced strong returns by investing in Swiss mid-cap stocks since starting in 2005, is now expected to shut down after losing about 80 per cent of its value.

In a letter to investors, the founders of Focus, Tim O'Brien and Philippe Bubb, said it had been hit by "violent short-selling by other market participants", which accelerated when rumours that it was in trouble circulated.

"It was like an avalanche," a spokesman said. He said the fund started in February with just over $1bn under management.
Hedge Fund Lotto

Focus Capital had $1 billion under management and made 33% in 2007.
Let's do the math.

$1 billion in assets
33% return in 2007
20% of the gains go to fund management.
6.6% net goes to managers
2.0% management fee is on top of that
8.6% total
$1,000,000,000 * .086 = $86,000,000

$86 Million is not a bad sum of money to make for turning $1 billion into $200 million. Clearly this is the advantage of leverage (at least for those running the fund). All you need is one big year. Who cares after that? I think I could almost retire on $86 million.

VCG Special Opportunities Fund Sues Citigroup

VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., formerly known as CDO Plus Master Fund Ltd., sues Citigroup (C) and Wachovia (WB). The suit alleges false claims on CDO defaults.
VGC has sued Citigroup Inc. and Wachovia Corp., alleging that the banks improperly collected the value of collateralized debt obligation (CDO) write-downs from the hedge fund by falsely claiming that the CDOs had defaulted. Citi and Wachovia had insured the CDOs by buying credit default swaps (CDS) from the hedge fund.

According to VCG, Citibank was 'more likely in a panic over recent turmoil in the debt markets connected to the sub-prime mortgage lending crisis, and because of that sped up demands for additional margin.' Soon thereafter, the fund said, because of an 'implied writedown' of the value of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) it had insured via the CDS agreement, Citi claimed that a credit default had taken place. As a result, Citi said VCG owed the full $10 million. VCG argued that a default had not place, and said the demands for and seizure of its collateral were baseless.

The hedge fund made the same claims against Wachovia for breaching the CDS agreement they made on May 30.
No CDO Recovery in 2008

Moody's Foresees No CDO Recovery in '08
Moody's Investors Service does not expect a recovery in the market for collateralized debt obligations - complex pools of debt that have fallen victim to the credit crisis in 2008, the ratings agency said Tuesday.

After issuance of CDOs peaked at nearly $350 billion in 2006, volume slowed down last year. The newfound distaste for risk investors developed scared buyers away from the CDO market.

A spike in payment defaults on home loans prompted Moody's to downgrade 1,655 tranches of CDOs last year, 10 times the number of downgrades in 2006. Moody's said it does not foresee a rebound this year.
Peloton Partners Liquidates Funds

Peloton Partners, a $3 billion hedge fund run by former Goldman Sachs star traders, was forced to liquidate its two investment funds. And margin calls at the Bank of Montreal recently went unanswered. Fingers are all pointing in the wrong direction. Please see Margin Calls Force Selling of Assets for more on those stories.

Hedge funds are supposed to make money no matter which direction the market goes. Clearly some don't. Excessive leverage and illiquid bets are frequently the reason. Expect to see more hedge funds blow up over CDOs, CDSs, CLOs, and CMOs. Still more will blow up over currencies and various carry trades.

The party has just started. I suspect 30-50% of the hedge funds in existence today will not be around several years from now.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Commercial Slowdown A Disaster For Jobs

The Wall Street Journal is reporting Building Slowdown Goes Commercial.
Cracks are starting to show in commercial construction.

For the second month in a row, the Commerce Department reported a decline in spending on nonresidential construction -- which includes everything from hospitals to office parks to shopping malls. The report yesterday showed construction spending fell 1.7% in January from December, the steepest drop in 14 years. While residential construction accounted for a big part of the decline, spending on nonresidential construction slid 0.8%.

Meanwhile, there may be an oversupply of shopping malls and office buildings after a period of intensive construction. It adds up to bad news for employment, the economy and investors.
My Comment: There is no "may" about it. A massive oversupply of shopping mall space already exists. Meanwhile more mall space is still being added.
As home construction got caught in a downward spiral last year, nonresidential construction continued to expand at a healthy clip. Spending on nonresidential structures rose 16% in 2007, the biggest four-quarter increase since 1984, according to Morgan Stanley.

Signs of trouble cropped up at the end of the year. As credit markets tightened, office space sold in the fourth quarter dropped 42% from a year earlier, and sales of large retail properties declined 31%, says Real Capital Analytics, a New York real-estate research group.
My Comment: The party is clearly over.
If spending continues to slow, construction workers, who are reeling from the housing slowdown, face more layoffs. Construction jobs made up 5.4% of nonfarm payrolls in January. While that's down from a peak of 5.7% in April 2006, it's still above the long-term average of 4.9%, say economists at Payden & Rygel in Los Angeles, leaving room for more job losses.
My Comment: What's with this "If" and "May" stuff? More job losses are coming.
Nonresidential construction payrolls, down 2.7% in January from their recent peak in March, posted year-over-year declines in December and January, the first such drops since August 2004. A construction slowdown will be especially tough on specialty-trade contractors, such as plumbers, painters and electricians, who account for about two-thirds of overall construction payrolls. This could spell trouble for consumer spending, which accounts for two-thirds of the U.S. economy.

Last year, developers built 144 million square feet of retail projects in the top 54 U.S. markets and are slated to build another 131 million square feet this year, according to Property & Portfolio Research Inc., a Boston research company. Property & Portfolio Research calculates that demand justified 36% of the new space built last year and will support 15.7% of the space slated to be completed this year.
My Comment: This is an out and out disaster for store owners. Lease rates are going to plunge and commercial real estate bankruptcies are going to soar along with vacancies. Capital impaired banks are going to be the proud owners of strip malls and nail salons. Won't that be fun?
As building slows, demand for construction materials such as lumber, concrete and heavy machinery, which has been hit by the weak housing market, will slacken further. It will hurt sales of medium and heavy trucks -- which, largely because of the housing turmoil, fell 23% in 2007, according to trade publication Ward's Automotive. Sales of light trucks, often used by construction workers, also will suffer, another headache for auto makers General Motors Corp (GM) and Ford (F).
My Comment: The latest reports from GM and Ford were a horror story. I will have more on Truck sales below.
The outlook is souring. Retailers have reported a slowdown in sales. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and J.C. Penney Co., among others, have pared expansion plans. Electronics seller Best Buy Co. has reined in its quarterly earnings forecast. Talbots Inc., Movie Gallery Inc.'s Hollywood Video and numerous home-furnishings retailers have announced store closings. Others, including Bombay Co., have liquidated under bankruptcy protection.
Auto Sales

CNNMoney is reporting Ford, GM And Toyota All Sell Fewer Cars In February.
  • Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp. on Monday all reported declines in February U.S. sales, reflecting the tough climate for consumers during the persistent housing slump and credit crunch.

  • Dearborn, Mich.-based Ford (F) said that it sold 196,681 cars and trucks last month, down 6.9% from 211,150 a year earlier.

  • Ford's longtime best-selling F-Series pickup saw a 4.9% drop to 52,548 trucks, with demand stung by the decline in construction. Overall, trucks fell 5.6% while cars declined 9.3%.

  • General Motors (GM) reported a 12.9% decline in light vehicle sales to 308,411 cars and trucks. The car side fell 1.2% while light trucks dropped 19.2%.

  • Cadillac, boosted by its car lineup, was the only GM brand to show a year- over-year improvement. Saturn took the biggest hit, down 33.4%.

  • Chevy, GM's flagship brand, saw sales drop 11.2% to 166,166 cars and trucks.

  • Toyota (TM) reported that February U.S. sales fell 2.8% to 182,169 vehicles, down from 187,330 last year.
The Big Picture

That was an interesting piece by Scott Patterson and Kris Hudson on construction jobs. There were lots of pertinent facts to consider even if they were more than a bit overly cautious on what's coming down the pike. However, it's not so much the loss of trade jobs that is important, but the 10's of thousands of jobs to fill those stores that will also soon to be gone. If you are not building stores, you are not going to be hiring employees to work in them.

The current wave of commercial real estate overexpansion will end in 2008. There is nothing to take the place of that service sector hiring, either to build the stores or work in them..

This is a stunning figure: "Property & Portfolio Research calculates that demand justified 36% of the new space built last year and will support 15.7% of the space slated to be completed this year."

That overhang of excess mall capacity is going to last a long time, perhaps a decade.

What's Kaput
  • Residential real estate is kaput
  • Commercial real estate is kaput
  • Auto and Truck manufacturing is kaput
  • Financial services other than bankruptcy specialists are kaput
  • State and municipal hiring is kaput
Where is the source of jobs to drive the economy going to come from?

I suggest nowhere. Oh sure, there will be government work programs at the federal level, but not enough to matter. Unemployment is going to soar, not just from construction trade workers losing their jobs but because there is no source of hiring anywhere.

Expect to see one grim jobs report after another for the rest of the year.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Tuesday, 4 March 2008

Bernanke Asks Taxpayers To Bail Out Banks

Bernanke is asking taxpayers to bail out banks. In a rehash of already failed ideas, plus one new one, let's tune into Bernanake's speech on Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures.
Over the past year and a half, mortgage delinquencies have increased sharply, especially among riskier loans. This development has triggered a substantial and broad-based reassessment of risk in financial markets, and it has exacerbated the contraction in the housing sector. In my remarks today, I will discuss the causes of the distress in the mortgage sector and then turn to the key question of what can be done in this environment to reduce preventable foreclosures.

The recent surge in delinquencies in subprime ARMs is closely linked to the fact that
many of these borrowers have little or no equity in their homes. For example, data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act suggest that nearly 40 percent of higher-priced home-purchase loans in 2006 involved a second mortgage (or "piggyback") loan. Other data show that more than 40 percent of the subprime loans in the 2006 vintage had combined loan-to-value ratios in excess of 90 percent, a considerably higher share than earlier in the decade.3 Often, in recent mortgage vintages, small down payments were combined with other risk factors, such as a lack of documentation of sufficient income to make the required loan payments.

This weak underwriting might not have produced widespread payment problems had house prices continued to rise at the rapid pace seen earlier in the decade.
My Comment: Bernanke is essentially saying there would be no problems if we did not have any problems. The trend of ever rising home prices was standard deviations above both wages and rent. Had the prices of houses continued to rise, there simply would have been a bigger problem down the road. The only real solution is to allow home prices drop to levels that are affordable.
Delinquencies and foreclosures likely will continue to rise for a while longer, for several reasons. First, supply-demand imbalances in many housing markets suggest that some further declines in house prices are likely, implying additional reductions in borrowers' equity. Second, many subprime borrowers are facing imminent resets of the interest rates on their mortgages. In 2008, about 1-1/2 million loans, representing more than 40 percent of the outstanding stock of subprime ARMs, are scheduled to reset. We estimate that the interest rate on a typical subprime ARM scheduled to reset in the current quarter will increase from just above 8 percent to about 9-1/4 percent, raising the monthly payment by more than 10 percent, to $1,500 on average. Declines in short-term interest rates and initiatives involving rate freezes will reduce the impact somewhat, but interest rate resets will nevertheless impose stress on many households.
My Comment: This is an honest assessment for a change. You know things are bad when political hacks are forced to admit the truth.
In the past, subprime borrowers were often able to avoid resets by refinancing, but currently that avenue is largely closed. Borrowers are hampered not only by their lack of equity but also by the tighter credit conditions in mortgage markets. New securitizations of nonprime mortgages have virtually halted, and commercial banks have tightened their standards, especially for riskier mortgages. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that private lenders are originating few nonprime loans at any terms.
My Comment: This too is an honest assessment for a change.
This situation calls for a vigorous response. Measures to reduce preventable foreclosures could help not only stressed borrowers but also their communities and, indeed, the broader economy. At the level of the individual community, increases in foreclosed-upon and vacant properties tend to reduce house prices in the local area, affecting other homeowners and municipal tax bases. At the national level, the rise in expected foreclosures could add significantly to the inventory of vacant unsold homes--already at more than 2 million units at the end of 2007--putting further pressure on house prices and housing construction.
My Comment: Nonsense. Falling prices are exactly what is needed and more home construction when inventories are already sky high is exactly what is not needed. The situation calls for no response. The free market, if left alone, would take care of the situation nicely. And if that causes some bankruptcies at banks then so be it. Lenders who make bad decisions should not be bailed out by taxpayers. Fed manipulation got us into this mess. Fed manipulation will not get out out of this mess.
Of course, care must be taken in designing solutions. Measures that lead to a sustainable outcome are to be preferred to temporary palliatives, which may only put off foreclosure and perhaps increase its ultimate costs. Solutions should also be prudent and consistent with the safety and soundness of the lender. Concerns about fairness and the need to minimize moral hazard add to the complexity of the issue; we want to help borrowers in trouble, but we do not want borrowers who have avoided problems through responsible financial management to feel that they are being unfairly penalized.
My Comment: The only way to eliminate moral hazards is to do nothing.
Let me turn now to some recent efforts to help distressed borrowers refinance. The FHASecure plan, which the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) announced late last summer, offers qualified borrowers who are delinquent because of an interest rate reset the opportunity to refinance into an FHA-insured mortgage. Recently, the Congress and Administration temporarily increased the maximum loan value eligible for FHA insurance, which should allow more borrowers, particularly those in communities with higher-priced homes, to qualify for this program and to be eligible for refinancing into FHA-insured loans more generally. These efforts represent a step in the right direction
My Comment: This represents a step towards nationalization of mortgages. Clearly Bernanke does not even know what the primary goal of the FHA is. More on this in a bit.
Not all borrowers are eligible for this program, of course; in particular, some equity is needed to qualify. In addition, second-lien holders must settle or be willing to re-subordinate their claims for an FHA loan, which has sometimes proved difficult to negotiate. Separately, some states have created funds to offer refinancing options, but eligibility criteria tend to be tight and the take-up rates appear to be low thus far.
My Comment: More nonsense. Eligibility requirements are too low. There should not be an FHA at all. Nor should government be promoting housing. Government promotion of housing is one of the reasons why housing is not affordable. The other is the Fed micro-managing interest rates.
In cases where refinancing is not possible, the next-best solution may often be some type of loss-mitigation arrangement between the lender and the distressed borrower. Indeed, the Federal Reserve and other regulators have issued guidance urging lenders and servicers to pursue such arrangements as an alternative to foreclosure when feasible and prudent.
My Comment: On a one on one basis I do not object to these workouts as long as the workouts are voluntary between lenders and borrowers.
Unfortunately, even though workouts may often be the best economic alternative, mortgage securitization and the constraints faced by servicers may make such workouts less likely. For example, trusts vary in the type and scope of modifications that are explicitly permitted, and these differences raise operational compliance costs and litigation risks. Thus, servicers may not pursue workout options that are in the collective interests of investors and borrowers. Some progress has been made (for example, through clarification of accounting rules) in reducing the disincentive for servicers to undertake economically sensible workouts. However, the barriers to, and disincentives for, workouts by servicers remain serious problems that need to be part of current discussions about how to reduce preventable foreclosures.
My Comment: It is not for servicers to decide (at least it shouldn't be) what is in the best interests of everyone. By the time rules and other barriers are worked out, it will be too late anyway.
Loan modifications, which involve any permanent change to the terms of the mortgage contract, may be preferred when the borrower cannot cope with the higher payments associated with a repayment plan. In such cases, the monthly payment is reduced through a lower interest rate, an extension of the maturity of the loan, or a write-down of the principal balance. The proposal by the Hope Now Alliance to freeze interest rates at the introductory rate for five years is an example of a modification, in this case applied to a class of eligible borrowers.
My Comment: Freezing interest rates at introductory rates as an across the board measure is likely a violation of contract except when there is explicit agreement between all parties involved. Even then, it will not prevent walking away when it is in the best interest of homeowners to do so. I encourage people to walk away when it is in their best interest. Please see Disingenuous Begging By Paulson for more on this topic.
Lenders tell us that they are reluctant to write down principal. They say that if they were to write down the principal and house prices were to fall further, they could feel pressured to write down principal again. Moreover, were house prices instead to rise subsequently, the lender would not share in the gains. In an environment of falling house prices, however, whether a reduction in the interest rate is preferable to a principal writedown is not immediately clear. Both types of modification involve a concession of payments, are susceptible to additional pressures to write down again, and result in the same payments to the lender if the mortgage pays to maturity. The fact that most mortgages terminate before maturity either by prepayment or default may favor an interest rate reduction. However, as I have noted, when the mortgage is "under water," a reduction in principal may increase the expected payoff by reducing the risk of default and foreclosure.
My Comment: If lenders write down principal it will invite everyone to ask for the same, over and over. It also punishes those who put up a substantial down payment for whom no writeoff would occur. Finally it would encourage those able to make payments to purposely get behind to ask for writeoffs. Loan writeoffs simply will not work on a broad brush basis.
In my view, we could also reduce preventable foreclosures if investors acting in their own self interests were to permit servicers to write down the mortgage liabilities of borrowers by accepting a short payoff in appropriate circumstances. For example, servicers could accept a principal writedown by an amount at least sufficient to allow the borrower to refinance into a new loan from another source. A writedown that is sufficient to make borrowers eligible for a new loan would remove the downside risk to investors of additional writedowns or a re-default. This arrangement might include a feature that allows the original investors to share in any future appreciation, as recently suggested, for example, by the Office of Thrift Supervision.
My Comment: This idea is beyond stupid. Please see Postpone But Don't Forget for more details.
A potentially important step to facilitate greater use of short payoffs is the modernization of the FHA, which I have supported. Going beyond the current proposals for modernization, permitting the FHA greater latitude to set underwriting standards and risk-based premiums for mortgage refinancing--in a way that does not increase the expected cost to the taxpayer--would allow the FHA to help more troubled borrowers. A concern about such an approach is that servicers might refinance only their riskiest borrowers into the FHA program. A combination of careful underwriting, the use of risk premiums, and other measures (for example, a provision that would allow the FHA to return a mortgage that quickly re-defaults to the servicer) could help mitigate that risk.

There are, no doubt, tax-related, accounting, and legal obstacles to expanding the use of principal writedowns. For example, investors in different tranches of mortgage-backed securities may not benefit equally, securitized trusts may not be permitted to acquire new equity warrants, and principal writedowns may require a different accounting treatment than interest rate reductions. But just as market participants, with the help of regulators, obtained greater clarity on the use of interest rate freezes through guidelines issued by the American Securitization Forum, industry and regulator efforts could also help clarify how this alternative type of workout might be effectively applied.
My Comment: See how complex all of this is? I had someone write me today telling me how "simple" this all is. It is only simple if you forget to look at the details. But the real scary thing here is the clear proposal by Bernanke to nationalize this mess through the FHA. In other words, Bernanke is asking for a taxpayer bailout of banks.
Reducing the rate of preventable foreclosures would promote economic stability for households, neighborhoods, and the nation as a whole. Although lenders and servicers have scaled up their efforts and adopted a wider variety of loss-mitigation techniques, more can, and should, be done. The fact that many troubled borrowers have little or no equity suggests that greater use of principal writedowns or short payoffs, perhaps with shared appreciation features, would be in the best interest of both borrowers and lenders. This approach would be facilitated by allowing the FHA the flexibility to offer refinancing products to more borrowers.

Ultimately, though, real relief for the mortgage market requires stabilization, and then recovery, in the nation's housing sector. Modernization of the FHA would be of help on this front as well. I am sure that the FHA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, given the appropriate powers by the Congress, will make every effort to expand their operations and to help improve the functioning of the market for home-purchase mortgages. For community bankers, FHA modernization and expansion would provide an important opportunity--of which I urge you to take advantage--to better serve your customers and community.

The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, likewise could do a great deal to address the current problems in housing and the mortgage market. New capital-raising by the GSEs, together with congressional action to strengthen the supervision of these companies, would allow Fannie and Freddie to expand significantly the number of new mortgages that they securitize. With few alternative mortgage channels available today, such action would be highly beneficial to the economy. I urge the Congress and the GSEs to take the steps necessary to allow more potential homebuyers access to mortgage credit at reasonable terms.
Laying the Groundwork for Nationalization of Housing

Bernanke's speech was mostly a rehash of old ideas that have failed spectacularly. However, Bernanke proposed one new, and scary idea: nationalization of mortgages by the FHA on a grand scale. Bernanke is clearly asking taxpayers to foot the bill for irresponsible bank lending. I urge Congress to do nothing.

Professor Depew on Minyanville seems to agree. He wrote an excellent post today on Bernanke's speech .

Please read Five Things You Need to Know: Laying the Groundwork for Nationalization of GSE's

FHA Mission

With that let's review the FHA Mission
The original goal of the FHA was to provide a stable mortgage market for American families who dreamed of home ownership. The FHA would also provide the funds needed to construct low-income housing, something that was desperately needed.

Because the plan was working so well, the FHA soon became part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This allowed even more Americans to have access to affordable housing. In fact, since its inception, the FHA has grown to become the world’s single largest insurer of home mortgages.
The FHA's Failed Mission

The Mission of the FHA was to provide affordable housing. How could it possibly have failed more than it did? In fact, it has failed so badly, that the proposed new mission is to bail out banks that made poor lending decisions to people who could not afford to buy houses.

Those poor lending decisions drove up the price of homes. Taxpayers paid thru the nose to support the original mission, now taxpayers are asked to pay through the nose to support the new mission.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
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Interest Rate Policy Madness

The Former Prime Minister says of Japan Should Consider Cutting Interest Rates.
The Bank of Japan should consider cutting interest rates to prevent an economic slowdown, said Heizo Takenaka, economy minister under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Takenaka, answering audience questions after a speech in New York, said it would be "very difficult" for the central bank to maintain its policy of gradually raising interest rates, and "they have to consider an interest-rate cut again."

Japanese consumer prices are rising even as the world's second-largest economy shows signs of slowing. A report yesterday showed factory output in January slumped at twice the pace economists predicted. Japan's key interest rate is the lowest among the world's major economies at 0.5 percent.
Japan only has 50 basis points left to work with. How much more cutting can they do? Can it possibly do any good if other nations are cutting more?

Cries For Intervention As Euro Soars

The Telegraph is reporting Soaring euro threatens European jobs exodus.
The euro has surged to an all-time high of $1.51 against the dollar, prompting bitter complaints from European industry and setting off a sharp sell-off in sovereign bonds from southern states deemed least able to withstand a super-strong currency.

Germany's car-maker BMW said it was slashing 5,600 jobs and warned of more drastic action if there was a "sustained rise" in the euro above $1.50.

Charles Edelstenne, head of France's Dassault Aviation, told Le Monde that the euro's rise was reaching asphyxiation level. "We can't cope with a such an exchange gap by producing and sourcing in the eurozone.

Airbus has also drawn a line in the sand at $1.50, warning that it will have to turn its industrial structure inside out if it is to meet aircraft delivery contracts priced in dollars.

A top aide to French President Nicolas Sarkozy fired a shot across the bows of the ECB yesterday, demanding that "monetary policy must remain within reasonable bounds". The comments are a clear hint that Paris may try to force a change of tack by invoking Maastricht Article 109, which gives EU politicians the power to dictate exchange policy. France has lacked allies for use of this so-called "nuclear option", but this may change now that a number of eurozone countries are in trouble.

Spreads between 10-year German government bonds and the equivalent debt across the eurozone's Latin bloc have jumped to the highest level since the launch of EMU, reaching 45 basis points for Greece, 43 for Italy, 36 for Greece. The spreads on Spanish bonds have ballooned to 28 from 4 last May, reflecting an abrupt change in perceptions as the property boom deflates and investors take a closer look at Spain's current account deficit, now a 10pc of GDP.

"The widening spreads are telling us that these countries are going to be hit harder than core Europe in a downturn," said Simon Derrick, head of currency research at Bank of New York Mellon.

Hans Redeker, currrency chief at BNP Paribas, said foreigner investors had largely stopped buying euro-zone bonds, suggesting that the euro rally is now on its last legs. The inflow is mostly "hot money" speculation.

Mr Redeker said there may soon come a point when the ECB's ultra-hawkish turns negative for the euro, causing traders to look beyond instant yield and focus on the risk that monetary overkill could tip the bloc into a deep downturn.
The ECB Will Cut

The ECB will cut or the market or politicians will force it to. Heaven help the Eurozone if politicians wrest control of the process.

The Fed Will Cut Now, Worry About Inflation Later

Charles Plosser, president of the Philadelphia Fed, says Economy trumps inflation.
In a speech delivered to the National Association for Business Economics in Washington, the president of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, Charles I. Plosser, said inflationary worries can be put aside in certain unique situations.

"I believe we are in a situation where monetary policy cannot be made by focusing solely on inflation," Plosser said. "The current turmoil in financial markets has already had a significant impact on the economy and has the potential to continue to restrain economic growth going forward."

But Plosser said that once the markets turn around, significant action needs to be taken to stem the tide of inflation.

"Such deviations should be temporary and limited and promptly reversed when conditions return to normal," Plosser said.
50 Basis Point Cut Baked Into Cake

Check Out The March Probability Curve



click on chart for sharper image
Chart courtesy of the Cleveland Fed

The current Fed Funds rate is 3.00% but the odds of a cut all the way to 2.00% are actually higher than a cut to 2.25%. That's pretty wild.

Canada Cuts Rates A Half Point

The economic slowdown in the US has solidly hit Canada. Canada Cuts Rate a Half Point, Signals More Is Needed.
The Bank of Canada cut its benchmark interest rate a half point, the first such move since 2001, and signaled it will have to act again to offset a slump in exports to the U.S.

Mark Carney, in his first decision as governor, cut the target rate for overnight loans between commercial banks to 3.5 percent, the lowest since March 2006. Thirteen of 26 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News predicted the move.

"Further monetary stimulus is likely to be required in the near term," the central bank said today in a statement from Ottawa. Signs of economic slowdown in Canada are "materializing and, in some respects, intensifying."

Tumbling exports to the U.S. will limit 2008 economic growth to a seven-year low of 1.8 percent, the central bank says, and have erased the country's broad trade surplus for the first time since 1999. The bigger rate cut today also helps catch up with moves this year by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and may slow the Canadian dollar's advance that has battered manufacturers.

"There are clear signs that the U.S. economy is likely to experience a deeper and more prolonged slowdown than had been projected," which will have "significant spillover effects on the global economy," the Bank of Canada said today.

There are still signs that consumer prices might pick up again. Canada's jobless rate is at a 33-year low, wages are rising at the fastest pace in a decade, and companies are earning record profits.
Financial Winter

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is writing The Federal Reserve's rescue has failed.
The verdict is in. The Fed's emergency rate cuts in January have failed to halt the downward spiral towards a full-blown debt deflation. Much more drastic action will be needed. Yields on two-year US Treasuries plummeted to 1.63pc on Friday in a flight to safety, foretelling financial winter.

The debt markets are freezing ever deeper, a full eight months into the crunch. Contagion is spreading into the safest pockets of the US credit universe.

It is hard to imagine a more plain-vanilla outfit than the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which manages bridges, bus terminals, and airports.

The authority is a public body, backed by the two states. Yet it had to pay 20pc rates in February after the near closure of the $330bn (£166m) "term-auction" market. It had originally expected to pay 4.3pc, but that was aeons ago in financial time.

"I never thought I would see anything like this in my life," said James Steele, an HSBC economist in New York.

As the once unthinkable unfolds, the leaders of global finance dither. The Europeans are frozen in the headlights: trembling before a false inflation; cowed by an atavistic Bundesbank; waiting passively for the Atlantic storm to hit.

The euro fetches $1.52 (from $0.82 in 2000), beyond the pain threshold for aircraft, cars, luxury goods and textiles. The manufacturing base of southern Europe is largely below water. As Le Figaro wrote last week, the survival of monetary union is in doubt. Yet still, the ECB waits; still the German-bloc governors breathe fire about inflation.

The Fed is now singing from a different hymn book, warning of the "possibility of some very unfavourable outcomes". Inflation is not one of them.

"There probably will be some bank failures," said Ben Bernanke. He knows perfectly well that the US price spike is a bogus scare, the tail-end of a food and fuel shock.

The greater risk is slump, says Princetown Professor Paul Krugman. "The Fed is studying the Japanese experience with zero rates very closely. The problem is that if they want to cut rates as aggressively as they did in the early 1990s and 2001, they have to go below zero."

Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act allows the bank - in "exigent circumstances" - to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk. It has not done so since the 1930s.

"We are becoming increasingly concerned that the authorities in the world do not get it," said Bernard Connolly, global strategist at Banque AIG.

"The extent of de-leveraging involves a wholesale destruction of credit. The risk is that the 'shadow banking system' completely collapses," he said.

For the first time since this Greek tragedy began, I am now really frightened.
Economic Madness

The madness in all of this is that every economic policy maker is guessing what to do. It's fairly safe to say that Japan cutting rates to zero is probably a bad policy decision. But what about actions by the ECB or the Fed? Is anyone certain what to do?

I agree with Ambrose Evans-Pritchard that the ECB is "trembling before a false inflation". Anyone seeing inflation in either the US or EU simply does not know what inflation is.

However, we are in this mess because of central bank policies worldwide have purposely fostered inflation. Those policies "work" until they don't. We are now on the back side of a credit crunch unlike anything we have seen since the great depression.

And unlike 1930 there are far more variables such as global wage arbitrage, emerging markets, massive resource consumption India and China, global property bubbles, and peak oil. There is no way the Fed or the ECB can factor in all those variables, each of which changes dynamically every day.

Furthermore neither US or EU policy can be set in a vacuum. What the US does may influence the correct course of action elsewhere. We're all related now.

Everyone Is Guessing

The proper course of action may (or may not) be for the the ECB to cut. On the other hand, the US may (or may not) have already done everything that can possibly be done already (and then some). Canada is facing shrinking exports to the US but a jobless rate at a 33 year low. What's the right decision here? The answer might not be apparent until the Canadian property bubble busts for good.

It's time to face the facts: Central banks are guessing. In many cases it look like "panic guessing". However, the facts remain that the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Canada do not know where interest rates should be any more than they know what the price of orange juice should be. After all, it was the Fed slashing rates to 1% that created much of this mess. It is now widely understood, just how bad that decision was.

If the Fed proposed tomorrow to fix the price of orange juice, everyone would think they were mad. Ironically, the vast majority sees nothing wrong with price fixing interest rates, even though it is clearly proven the Fed has no idea what it is doing. Consecutive bubble blowing is proof.

The sad thing in all of this is there is no need for guessing. We would not be in this mess if there was no Fed and there was no such thing as fractional reserve lending.

It's time to eliminate interest rate and currency madness. The way to do that is to abolish the Fed specifically, central bankers in general, and fractional reserve lending right along with them. Sound money and sound monetary policy is the solution, not price fixing. Price fixing interest rates rates and currency manipulation got us into this mess, it will not get us out of it.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Monday, 3 March 2008

California calls muni insurance waste of taxpayer money

MarketWatch is reporting California enters frayed muni market, protection-free.
California's upcoming $1.75 billion issue will join a growing number of municipal bond deals notable for what's missing -- bond insurance. Financial troubles at MBIA (MBI), Ambac Financial (ABK), and other companies that provide this insurance have, in many cases, made the bond insurance irrelevant or even a handicap.

California, for instance, has not paid for bond insurance on its last two big deals -- a $3.3 billion economic recovery bond, sold in February, and a $1 billion general obligation bond, issued in November. The state doesn't plan to pay for insurance on its upcoming general obligation bonds either, which are available to retail investors Monday and Tuesday and are set for institutional sales and pricing Wednesday.
That's a change from the past. California spent $102 million insuring general obligation bonds between 2003 and 2007.

"The value of bond insurance is not what it was a half-year ago," said Tom Dresslar, a spokesman for the California state treasurer's office. He said the state continues to do the math on whether to buy bond insurance, comparing the interest rates it would pay on insured bonds with those on uninsured issues.

It has recently found the benefits of insurance are not worth the payout.
"It would be a waste of taxpayer money to buy insurance on our bonds," Dresslar said.

What is odd, traders and analysts say, is that the bonds lacking insurance are trading at the same prices or even higher than comparable ones carrying insurance.

Take some recent moves in Massachusetts general obligation bonds traded on the TheMuniCenter trading platform. Both carry an interest rate of 5.25% and are due in 2019. But on Thursday, the one with the lower credit rating (Aa2/AA) and no insurance was trading at a higher price -- $109.445 -- than the Massachusetts bond with a higher credit rating (Aaa/AAA) and insurance. The better rated, insured bond traded at $108.735.

"The bidders have chosen, to some extent, to penalize the insured bonds, when a year ago the exact opposite would have been the case," said James Colby, senior municipal strategist at Van Eck Global, a $5.5 billion asset management firm that manages three municipal-bond exchange-traded funds.
Insurance penalized?

"Insurance penalized" makes for a good story but that's not what is really happening. The reality is James Colby missed the boat. The better rated bond was only rated better because Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P continue to pretend that the guarantee of Abmac and MBIA is worth something.

What's really happening is the market does not believe that AAA ratings can be inherited (at least from the current sad collection of monolines) and neither do I.

By implication, the ratings of Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P are worthless as well. Here are three reasons why:
Why Buy Insurance?

You can pin an "AAA" label on a donkey or you can put lipstick on a pig. Both are a waste of time and money. And that is exactly what the market has decided.

Instead of trading at levels artificially assigned by Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P, the market is making an attempt to assign a more legitimate default estimate on municipal bonds. As long as that is happening, and with the realization that Ambac's and MBIA's guarantees are worthless, it is foolish to pay for insurance.

A Look At "Unfair" Muni Ratings

Recent events have California calling for reform of "unfair" muni ratings.
California is spearheading efforts by municipal bond issuers to reform "unfair" ratings that cost taxpayers billions of dollars, a spokesman for the state Treasurer Bill Lockyer said on Monday.

The state, the largest municipal bond issuer in the United States with about $43.7 billion of general obligation debt outstanding, is drafting a letter to three major rating agencies urging them to change how municipal bonds are rated, spokesman Tom Dresslar said.

"The current system is not fair. It makes no sense and it harms taxpayers to the tune of billions of dollars," Dresslar said.

"The Agencies' own studies have shown that corporate issuers with higher ratings default at a much greater rate than municipal issuers. Taxpayers wind up paying through the nose for this dual standard. So we think it's time to end that system," he added.

Many municipal bond issuers have lower ratings than their corporate counterparts despite a lower default rate because rating agencies have historically evaluated the risk in the $2.6 trillion municipal bond market more conservatively.

Lower ratings mean issuers had to pay more to borrow money in the $2.6 trillion municipal bond market, costs that are borne by taxpayers.

Dresslar said once the letter is finished, California will circulate it among other issuers to gather signatures and urge rating agencies to develop a new system that better serves taxpayers, investors and the market.
Dresslar needs to get a grip on reality. One cannot compare munis to corporates, and that is exactly what Fitch said: Huxley Somerville, a spokesman for Fitch Ratings, said the rating agency was "pretty explicit" that its ratings were meant to compare muni issuers to each other, given the hugeness of the municipal market, and not to corporate credits.

Dresslar also needs to keep in mind that taxpayers and municipalities prefer fantasyland over accuracy, while investors prefer the latter. Dresslar does not want "fair" he wants low rates, probably based on historical trends. But historical trends failed in subprime, Alt-A, and even super-prime so historical trends are a bad measure of what's going to happen, especially at economic turns.

Sadly, Moody's, Fitch, and the S&P continually fail to do their job. Moody's has even expressly stated so in blunt terms: "Moody's has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence."

Truer words were never spoken (See Fitch Discloses Its Fatally Flawed Rating Model for the origin of the quote). In light of the above, it should be clear the big three serve no legitimate economic purpose at all.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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MBIA Cannot Estimate January's Losses

MBIA, the "AAA" rated company that recently raised capital by selling notes at 14% to shore up its balance sheet, is now saying Subprime Losses Continue and that it cannot estimate January's losses. Let's take a look:
MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group Inc., the bond insurers hobbled by $10 billion of writedowns on subprime debt last year, said losses continued into 2008.

MBIA and New York-based Ambac said they have written little new insurance since their ratings came under scrutiny.

[Please see Ambac Deal Hits Snag, MBIA writing "Very Little" New Business for more on this idea]

Ambac marked down the value of derivative contracts linked to subprime mortgages by $650 million in January, according to a regulatory filing on Feb. 29.

MBIA said it couldn't estimate January's losses.

Ambac reduced the value of CDO guarantees by more than $6 billion in 2007. The company said its loss "trend" will continue into February. Market prices indicate the value of CDOs "have continued to decline," Ambac said in the filing.

MBIA said in its Feb. 29 filing that losses on mortgage-backed securities will probably increase this year. The company recorded $3.7 billion in market-value losses on its guarantees of asset-backed debt last year, mostly from mortgage debt.

MBIA said has seen "deterioration" in prime or near-prime home-equity loan securities it backed and loss payments may erode a "significant portion" of reserves by year-end.

Credit-default swaps tied to MBIA's debt soared 168 basis points to 767 basis points on Feb. 29, according to London-based CMA Datavision, a sign of eroding investor confidence in the company's creditworthiness.
Buffett Withdraws Offer

Warren Buffett says U.S. is in recession, but stocks still are 'not cheap'
The billionaire investor Warren Buffett said Monday that the U.S. economy was in recession, and that stocks were "not cheap" despite recent declines.

Buffett also said he was no longer offering to guarantee $800 billion of municipal bonds backed by MBIA, Ambac Financial Group and FGIC, the three large bond insurers.

Speaking on CNBC television, Buffett said he thought the U.S. economy was in a recession even though gross domestic product had not yet fallen for two consecutive quarters, a gauge many economists use to identify when a recession begins.

"By any common-sense definition, we are in a recession," Buffett said. "Business is slowing down. We have retail stores in candy, home furnishings and jewelry. Across the board, I'm seeing a significant slowdown."
MBIA and Ambac are clearly hurting. Bailout proposal after bailout proposal have died on the vine. Who wants to throw money down this sinkhole anyway?

Both are showing declines in business, both face competition from Buffett, and MBIA is admitting it has seen "deterioration" in prime or near-prime home-equity loan securities and loss payments may erode a "significant portion" of reserves by year-end.

MBIA Pretends It Can Raise Capital Even As California Opts Out

Bloomberg is reporting MBIA's Brown Says Plan Will Let Insurer Raise Capital.
MBIA Inc., the world's largest bond insurer, will restructure in a way that allows it to raise capital at a lower cost.

A plan to split MBIA's structured-finance business from its municipal insurance operation in the next five years will make the Armonk, New York-based company more transparent, Chief Executive Officer Jay Brown said in an interview today on Bloomberg Television.

"The way we were structured made it very hard for capital markets to put an attractive price for us to raise capital,'' Brown said. "How do we design the company to be able to raise capital at a reasonably attractive rate, right in the middle of a crisis like we're seeing today?''

My Comment: A company is the sum of all its parts and until something is done with those CDOs, all anyone is doing is pretending. Splitting a company in two pieces accomplishes nothing unless one can figure out how to make the losses in half the company vanish.
MBIA reported $3.4 billion in writedowns last year from guarantees on CDOs, which package pools of debt and slice them into pieces with varying ratings.

The company said it expects to pay claims of more than $700 million this year on bonds it guaranteed backed by home-equity loans.
My comment: How can MBIA estimate claims for the year when it can't even state what the losses for January are?
After a split, investors will be able to distinguish between problems in one part of the business and other healthier lines, Brown said. A split also could prevent the type of turmoil now occurring in the municipal bond market, Brown said.

"Turmoil in the municipal market is being driven by what has happened in the U.S. real-estate market,'' said Brown. "Those two things really have gotten mixed up.''
My Comment: What's mixed up is the business model of Ambac and MBIA, their assurances, and the idea that one can split a business in two and ignore one side of it.

Brown said he expects demand for municipal bond insurance to return even as some officials, including California's debt manager Paul Rosenstiel, have publicly questioned the value of guarantees on municipal bonds.

"At this particular moment, they have made a choice they do not need insurance,'' said Brown, referring to comments by California officials. "I am pretty certain that will not be the case for the long term.''

My Comment: If California returns to bond insurance, it will not be with either Ambac or MBIA. Instead it will be with Buffett.
Because MBIA books revenue from insurance contracts over time, Brown said, it has the "luxury'' of forgoing new business while maintaining about 90 percent of revenue this year.
My Comment: Exactly where is the "luxury" of forgoing business when you are running out of reserves? Look at the company's own words: MBIA said has seen "deterioration" in prime or near-prime home-equity loan securities it backed and loss payments may erode a "significant portion" of reserves by year-end.

It's time to end the pretending. I am again calling out the rating agencies for their role in this mess. Please consider S&P Sniffs Horse Hockey, Calls It A Rose as well as MBIA Maintains Highest Rating, Pfizer Cut.

Splitting a rotten apple in two does not give you half a good apple.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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